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RÉSUMÉ 
La thèse proposée répond à une question importante pour le domaine de la gestion de 
projet, à savoir comment les organisations des projets évoluent dans le temps. Nous 
nous inspirons de la théorie de la structuration, de la théorie de l'acteur-réseau, et de la 
littérature sur le changement organisationnel et les organisations de projet pour 
développer un cadre théorique initial. Nous proposons une nouvelle perspective 
relationnelle sur la structure du projet, en considérant les projets comme des réseaux 
complexes de connexions cognitives et volitives. Ensuite, on distingue entre les 
éléments visibles et cachés, pour obtenir un cadre avec quatre strates de connexions, 
supportés, respectivement, par des représentations implicites, des représentations 
explicites, des intérêts spontanés et des intérêts régularisés . Inspiré par le modèle de 
l'équilibre ponctué et par l'idée d'épisodes tels que vus par Luhmann, nous soutenons 
que la transformation des projets combine de longues périodes de stabilité relative avec 
des courtes périodes de changement significatif. Nous proposons donc le concept 
d'épisode de structuration pour expliquer ces transformations spectaculaires. D'abord 
ce concept est défini comme le processus de transition d'une forme existante de 
l'organisation des activités du projet à une nouvelle forme, à la suite de la réponse des 
participants aux événements internes et externes. Les épisodes de structuration sont 
générés soit par des représentations implicites en collision soit par des intérêts 
spontanés divergents face à ces événements. 
Ces concepts et ces distinctions ont servi de guide pour aborder le terrain, pour collecter 
et analyser les données. Nous avons adopté une approche inductive et nos données sont 
recueillies dans 18 grands projets, de l'Amérique du Nord et de l'Europe, et dans trois 
industries: les constructions d' infrastructure, les systèmes d'information et de 
communication, et les bio- pharmaceutiques. Nous avons mené plus de 53 entretiens 
en face-à-face et nous avons recueilli une quantité importante et variée de documents 
et d'autres données secondaires. 
Nous avons identifié une grande variété de connexions volitionnelles et cognitives, qui, 
selon nos observations, ne sont pas complètement statiques au fil du temps. Cela nous 
a inspiré pour proposer le concept de traduction, qui correspond aux petites 
transformations horizontales à 1' intérieur des strates, pour nous aider à expliquer 
l'évolution du réseau des connexions cognitives et volitives du projet durant les 
périodes de stabilité. Nous suggérons que ce réseau a la capacité d'intégrer les petits 
changements et la plupart des défis qui se produisent sur le cycle de vie du projet. 
Xl 
Cependant, à certains moments, des événements déclencheurs dépassent un certain 
seuil et des transformations plus dramatiques de la structure du projet sont nécessaires. 
Nous avons nommé ces épisodes des épisodes de structuration. 
Enfin, nous avons trouvé que les épisodes de structuration se déroulent en suivant huit 
patterns temporels, en fonction de la strate où l'événement déclencheur a été généré et 
en fonction de la complexité de la transformation. Nous discutons le concept d'un 
épisode échoué et nous expliquons le rôle de l'épisode dans l'évolution de l 'organisation 
à travers le cycle de vie du projet. Nous proposons également tme vision plus 
dynamique de l'organisation de projet en tant que séquence d'épisodes de structuration. 
Mots clés: épisodes de structuration, évolution du projet, perspective relationnelle, 
traductions, événements déclencheurs 
ABSTRACT 
The proposed thesis addresses an important issue for the field of project management, 
namely how project organizations evolve over time. We use insights from stmcturation 
theory, actor-network theory, organizational change and project management literature 
to develop an initial guiding framework to approach our data. We propose a new, 
relational perspective on the project stmcture, seeing projects as complex networks of 
cognitive and volitional connections. We further distinguish between visible and 
hidden elements, to obtain a framework with four strata: implicit representations, 
explicit representations, regularized interests and spontaneous interests. Inspired by the 
punctuated equilibrium mode! and Luhmann 's idea of episodes, we argue that 
transformation in projects combine long periods of relative stability and short periods 
of significant change. We propose the concept of stmcturing episodes to exp lain these 
dramatic transformations and initially define it as the process of transition from an 
existing form of organizing project activities to a new one, as a result of participants' 
response to internai and externat impulses. Such stmcturing episodes result either from 
colliding implicit representations or from divergent spontaneous interests in the face of 
these events. 
These concepts and distinctions served as a guide for approaching the field, collecting 
and analysing the data. We adopted an inductive approach and collected data in 18 
large projects, from North America and Europe, in three industries: infrastructure 
construction, information and communication systems, and bio-pharmaceuticals. We 
conducted 53 face-to-face interviews and collected an important amount and variety of 
documents and other secondary data. 
We identified a large variety of volitional and cogrutlve connections, which, we 
observed, are not completely static over time. This inspired us to propose the concept 
of translation, or the small unidirectional transition between or within strata, to help us 
explain the evolution of the project network of cognitive and volitional connections 
during stable periods. We suggest that this network has the ability to incorporate small 
changes and address most of the challenges that occur over the project lifecycle. 
However, at times, triggering events overcome a certain threshold and more dramatic 
transformations of the project structure are required, the so-called structuring episodes. 
Finally, we found that structuring episodes unfold following eight patterns, depending 
on the stratum where the triggering event was generated and on the complexity of 
Xlll 
transformation. We discuss the concept of a failed episode, as well as explain the role 
ofthe episode in the evolution of the project organization over its entire lifecycle. This 
enables us to propose a more dynamic view of project organizations as sequences of 
structuring episodes. 
Key words: structuring episodes, project evolution, relational view, translations, 
triggering events 
INTRODUCTION 
Projects have become a frequent form of organizing activities in many industries 
(Davies and Hobday, 2005; Lundin and Soderholm, 1995; Ruigrok et al., 1999; 
Whitley, 2006; etc.), as many companies shift from a traditional functional form of 
developing new activities to projects. In response to this change, an increasing number 
of researchers have focused on analyzing different aspects of project development, 
trying to explain how projects can be better planned and managed to efficiently reach 
their goals. Despite the various issues with interest for both theory and practice that 
have been addressed, few prior studies have provided a convincing account of how 
projects actually evolve during their life cycle. This thesis advances a new perspective, 
which builds on a relational view of the project structure and proposes the concept of 
structuring episode, as the core element of project evolution. 
The idea of this thesis first came from empirical observations. While studying severa! 
large projects, we noticed that, for example, in one case, almost half-way through 
project implementation the project leader was changed and the new leader came with 
a completely different perspective to manage the project. He shifted from a democratie 
decision-making approach to a highly centralized, almost dictatorial approach, in 
which decisions were all taken by the largest participant organization. The project 
organizational chart was completely changed, by putting in place fewer and more 
hermetically separated departments. Relations between actors changed accordingly. 
Project scope was frozen and demands for future changes refused. The first thought 
that came to our mind was: why did project actors decide to make such a major change 
so late in the project? Why did they not continue with the old structure? We first saw 
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it as a unique event, but we later noticed more than one similar episode within the same 
project and tens of others in the projects under study, which led us to the idea that 
project evolution in time is more than simple implementation; it is a series of 
transformations. 
We sought inspiration in a range of theories on organization science. From the project 
management literature, in particular the temporary organization approach, we took the 
general view of the project structure as being limited in time and evolving 
independently from that of the parent organizations (London and Siva, 2011 ; Lundin 
and Soderholm, 1995; Floricel et al., 2011a). The flexibility perspective inspired us a 
dynamic perspective on the project structure (Collyer and Warren, 2009; Pitsis et al. , 
2003), white the risk and uncertainty perspectives drew attention on the type of events 
that could affect the smooth project evolution (Hallgren 2009; Jensen et al. , 2006; 
Kendrick, 2003). The interorganizational project perspective, with its roots in strategie 
alliances and social network theory, highlighted the role of interorganizational relations 
and the challenges managers face in projects involving multiple organizations 
(Lehtiranta, 2014; Ruuska et al, 2011). This also inspired the levet of our analysis, as 
we focus on relations between participant organizations or their project teams, but look 
at how these relations work out via concrete interactions between individual actors, 
inte1iwined with, and sometimes structured by, material abjects. 
Going forward, we tried to understand how the project structure actually looks like. We 
then relied on insights from two fundamental sociological theories, namely actor-
network theory (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1997) and structuration theory (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003; Giddens, 1984) and their later developments to distinguish between 
the two main forces that affect organizational development and processes: the network 
of actors ' interests and representations about the project. We refined the distinction 
along the visible/hidden dimensions of these forces (Brown and Duguid, 20 Il ; 
Goffman, 1969; Polanyi, 1966). This way, we obtained a four-stratum framework with 
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implicit and explicit representations and regularized and spontaneous interests. The two 
theories also provided useful indications regarding the way in which project structure 
evolves over time, how it goes through minor and major changes and what kind of 
events launches transformations in each case. 
Finally, as we attempted to study transformation processes, we looked at several 
organizational change theories and, inspired by the sporadic occurrence of events from 
om initial observations, we adapted the punctuated equilibrium mode! to explain how 
projects evolve through their !ife cycle (Gersick, 1991 ). In this sense, we proposed the 
concept of structming episodes to explain periods of significant change that ptmctuate 
long periods of relative stability. The punctuated equilibrium theory also drew om 
attention to the role that the differentiai strength and inertia of the various aspects that 
characterize the relations between project actors. This led us to a preliminary definition 
of structuring episodes as the processes of transition from an existing form of 
organizing project activities to a new one, as a result of participants ' reconfiguring of 
their relations in response to interna! or externalforces. 
We initially approached the field with the intention of studying major transformations 
in projects and the events that generate them. Because the phenomenon of interest is 
rarely studied and the perspective used to illmninate it is relatively new, we adopted a 
semi-grounded inductive approach, which aims to build new theory from data whose 
collection and analysis bad been initially guided by an existing theory (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Russell Bernard and Ryan, 201 0). We aligned with more recent 
developments of the grotmded theory approach that include reading the literatme as 
part of the method (Corbin and Strauss, 2008 ; Dey, 1999). This enabled us to narrow 
the field of observation, while stiJl remaining open to what real-life data have to say, 
or in other words, to how project organizations evolve over time in reality, when they 
face challenging unexpected events or major restructmation decisions. As the research 
advanced and our ideas became clearer (following sorne preliminary analyses, for 
------- ----
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example suggesting types of events that could generate episodes), we refined the 
interview guide (see the difference between those presented in the Appendix A and B) 
and collected more specifie data. 
We rely on data collected in the context of 18 large projects, in North America and 
Europe, in three industries: infrastructure, IT/IS and bio-pharmaceuticals. We 
conducted 53 face-to-face interviews and collected a vast amount of secondary data, 
such as internai documents from interviewees; projects and participant organizations 
websites, reports, press releases, etc.; general and specialized media; and so on. We 
refined the theory in an iterative process of data analysis and comparisons with similar 
and conflicting literatures (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). 
The 18 cases helped us provide preliminary answers to most of the initial questions, 
and these answers sometimes provide significant additions on top of theoretical 
expectations. In this sense, we observed that the project configuration of volitional and 
cognitive connections is not completely frozen ; these elements evolve even during 
stable periods. To explain this evolution, we introduced the concept of translation and 
defined it as the small unidirectional transition between or within strata. We discovered 
1 0 types of translations that are used to incorporate small changes and main tain a 
relatively stable project structure. 
However, at times, events overcome the capacity of the structure to smoothly integrate 
them, and then major alterations of the existing configuration of relations are required. 
These were the above-mentioned structuring episodes and we discovered 4 pairs of 
matching patterns that govern their development, in each pair one pattern for episodes 
that generate in the stratum of implicit representations and one that generates in the 
stratum of spontaneous interests. Inspired by the new concept of translations, we 
further defined structuring episodes as series of translations that develop in a coherent 
manner. This definition also enabled us explain why certain seemingly similar 
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triggering events do not always lead to structuring episodes and , more generally, why 
sorne major transformations fail, sometimes dragging the whole project with them. 
Finally, at the project leve! , we noticed certain relations between episodes and proposed 
a new perspective of projects as sequences of structuring episodes. 
With this theoretical and empirical study, we aim to produce severa! contributions. The 
first and foremost contribution is to the project management domain, an increasingly 
important, but still w1der developed area. Despite the omnipresence of projects in the 
economie and social life, research in this domain is still insubstantial as compared to 
its potential and need (Blomquist et al. , 201 0; Floricel et al. , 20 13 ; Winter et al. , 2006). 
We seek to expand the current body of knowledge by addressing a crucial issue to 
project management, namely how projects evolve over time and how managers cope 
with this transformation. 
In this sense, we introduce the new concepts of translations and structuring episodes to 
explain the project evolution during both periods of stability and active change. We 
also propose a new perspective that sees projects as complex networks of cognitive and 
volitional connections. Since it tries to identify the real motives behind disruptive 
initiatives or unexpected collisions, we think this distinction will help scholars and 
managers alike to better understand where triggering events generate, and so how they 
can be avoided or managed once they occur. 
We develop relevant theory, which builds on and is supported by evidence related to 
18 complex projects. Moreover, we hope that our theory may eventually lead to a new 
understanding of the relation between project planning and execution, which would see 
events not as undesirable threats, but as normal occurrences that result in improvements 
to the project and its organization. In doing this, we expect to help putting on a more 
solid theoretical ground the project management perspective that argues for treating the 
project as a flexible, rather than a rigid, plan-driven organization. 
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As a contribution for practitioners, we hope that the results of this research would 
eventually lead to the development of a series of principles for managing structuring 
episodes, which would complement the current recommendations for the initial 
planning of structural elements such as setting up teams, properly allocating resources, 
predicting future risks and so on. 
We structured the thesis as follows . Chapter 1 reviews the main theoretical sources that 
influenced our research journey. We start with an extensive review of the project 
management literature and explain the evolution of thinking in this domain and what 
elements from each school inspired our perspective. In the second part of the chapter, 
after a brief review of major organizational change theories, we focus on two 
sociological theories, namely structuration theory and actor-network the01·y, which 
provided the basis of our theoretical development in conceiving a new perspective on 
the project structure, on its evolution, as well as on the events that challenge the smooth 
project evolution. 
In Chapter 2, we present the theoretical framework that we developed to guide us in 
collecting and organizing our data. We start by introducing our view of projects as 
complex networks of volitional and cognitive connections. After a second distinction 
between visible and hidden connections, we end up with a framework with four strata: 
implicit representations, explicit representations, spontaneous interests and regularized 
interests. In the subsequent sections, we present the punctuated equilibriurn mode! and 
Luhmann's idea of episodes, which inspired our perspective on project major 
transformations. We continue with a brief presentation of the concept of triggering 
event, which launches structuring episodes, our last theoretical suggestion. 
Chapter 3 presents sorne methodological considerations. We explain why we adopted 
an inductive, semi-grounded perspective and its benefits. We also present details about 
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our data co ll ection and analysis processes, as weil as sorne too ls that we used . We end 
the chapter with sorne deta il s regarding the measures we took to ensure a high-quality 
and object ive data ana lys is process. 
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Figure 1 G raphie representat ion of the structure and relation between empirica l 
chapters in thi s thes is 
Chapte rs 4, 5, 6 and 7 present our empirical findings (see Figure 1). ln Chapte r 4, we 
prov ide deta il ed evidence of cogni tive and vo liti ona l connecti ons from the projects we 
studi ed . ln Chapter 5, we describe the project evo lu tion during stable periods and 
introduce the co ncept of translat ion to help us understand thi s cont inuous 
organizational morphing. We then present each of the ten trans lat ions we ide ntified in 
projects and di scuss the role of each trans lation and some bas ic characterist ics. ln 
Chapter 6, we present the triggering events we fo und in proj ects and elaborate on their 
---------------- ------
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role and conditions of existence. Finally, Chapter 7 addresses the core concept of this 
thesis, the structuring episodes. We present the 10 phases and four patterns of 
development we identified in projects as weil as sorne interesting observations and 
conclusions. We particularly elaborate on the ideas of failed episodes and projects as 
sequences of structuring episodes. 
The last chapter concludes this thesis. It starts with a brief reminder of the main 
findings, followed by a more general presentation of our conclusions. We highlight our 
contributions to both them·y and practice, and end with a short discussion regarding the 
limitations of our thesis and sorne ideas for future research. 
CHAPTERI 
LITERA TURE REVIEW 
This chapter revrews the current state of the project management literature that 
addresses similar research questions and introduces our main sources of fundamental 
theoretical inspiration. Firstly, we review the project management literature on 
transformations that take place during the project !ife cycle. We present different 
perspectives in project management and explain the main ideas and concepts that 
inspired us. Secondly, we use insights from two fundamental sociological theories -
structuration theory (STR) and actor-network theory (ANT) that helped us theorize 
key aspects of project structure and structuring processes (i.e. how change occurs and 
is managed). These prior research findings and conceptual ideas helped us build a new 
theoretical representation of project structuring pro cesses. This theoretical framework, 
which provided a basis for our empirical research, will be presented in the next chapter. 
In that chapter, we also revisit sorne specifie aspects of the prior contributions that 
inspired our framework. 
1.1 Project management and project evolution 
This thesis focuses on understanding the evolution oftemporary organizations. Projects 
are one of the most commonly encountered temporary organizations. However, the 
organizational or, to be more precise, the social aspect of projects has only recently 
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become a central topic in project research (Packendorff, 1995). But even before this 
organizational turn in the understanding of projects, a rich literature addressed planning 
and management aspects related to project change. This Iiterature provided a first 
source of inspiration in building our theoretical framework, by helping us 
conceptualize project-related events, processes and technical constraints. In describing 
this literature, we trace the evolution of the project management thinking as a sequence 
of schools which gradually moved away from the traditional view of project 
management as the planned execution of a technical task toward the incorporation of 
risk, uncertainty and flexibility in projects. We conclude this section by reviewing, 
first, the research that sees projects as temporary organizations and emphasizes the 
inertia and other obstacles that result from the social nature of projects, and, second, 
the research that sees projects as networks of teams or organizations, and emphasize 
the difficulties stemming from geographie, capability and cultural distance, and from 
contractual interfaces. 
1.1.1 The traditional perspective 
The traditional approach considers projects as a set of planned activities that transform 
goals into artifacts (Kendrick, 2003; King and Cl eland, 1988; Turner and Cochrane, 
1993). In the conceptual stage, the project idea is clearly defined and ali relevant details 
that may enable the project team to successfully develop the project are analyzed and 
allotted in activities, resources and schedule, which eventualiy constitute the ideal path 
to be foliowed. The role of ali subsequent phases is to transform the initial idea into the 
desired output, foliowing this ideal path. Milestones are put in place to objectively 
evaluate, based on past experience and industry best practices, whether the project 
follows this ideal path. Within extensive risk management sessions, team members, 
often assisted by external experts, try to forecast ali future threats and elaborate a clear 
mitigation strategy for each case. Afterwards, project leaders aim to minimize or even 
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eliminate deviations from the initially established plan. In this context, the planning 
phase is crucial for project performance (King and Cleland, 1988; Meyer and 
Utterback, 1995), because ali important decisions at the strategie leve! are taken in this 
moment (Slevin and Pinto, 1987; Turner and Cochrane, 1993). They key assumptions 
of this approach include rational decision, as a function of sponsors ' goals and of the 
available knowledge, expressed as expected probability distributions of activity cost 
and duration as weil as market and technical performance (Floricel et al. , 20 13). But 
what is more important for our purposes is the attention that project management and 
related disciplines paid to time, stressing activity scheduling and approaches such as 
critical path to give scheduling a similarly rational appearance. Of course, the time in 
question is assumed to be objective and regular like to one measured by a clock 
(Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988). But the critical path method, for instance, appears to, 
at !east, differentiate the subjective value of time in different activities, depending on 
whether they are on or off the cri ti cal path. 
The weak point of this approach is that unexpected events do occur and sometimes 
have a significant impact on projects (Hallgren, 2007; Williams, 2005). One well-
known example is the Berlin Brandenburg Airport construction project initially envisioned 
as a showcase for Germany. After being delayed for years and already now casting five 
times more than its original budget, it has become a white elephant and its success is now 
highly arguable. The main unexpected event - tire safety and smoke exhaust systems 
failure - could have actually been expected and perhaps avoided. As the resources 
necessary to cope with the crisis were not available, a series of delays due to poor 
construction planning, management, execution and corruption has started, which 
drastically worsened the consequences of the unexpected event. Another example is the 
Ring Rai 1 Li ne/ Keharata connecting Helsinki-Vantaa Airport to the Helsinki commuter 
rail network. Its opening date has been eventually pushed back to July 2015 due to the 
unexpected need tore-design and reinforce the airport station tunnel to withstand the acidic 
products of glycol decay by bacteria within the grou nd . 
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Due to these events, projects are often forced to deviate from their initial path and 
sometimes even fail (Dvir and Lechler, 2004; Koskela and Howell, 2002). Flyvbjerg 
(20 14, p. 1 0) offers a long list of megaprojects that suffered hu ge cost overruns, starting 
with the Suez Canal, the Scottish Parliament Building, the Sydney Opera House, 
Montreal Surnmer Olympics and the Concorde Supersonic Aeroplane, which all ended 
up costing over 1,000% more than the initial estimates. Facing this reality, researchers 
suggested that even extreme measures, such as "killing" a project before completion 
might be a valid option (Boehm, 2000; Keil and Montealegre, 2001). This is a current 
practice in the pharmaceutical industry, where multiple drug development projects 
compete in their early stages of development, but only few, the most promising ones 
are selected to be completed (Girotra et al. 2007). Large infrastructure projects are 
different, because they are more visible and under public scrutiny, but even in their 
case the "killing" option should be considered, especially in the early stages of 
development, in which sunk costs are not as high. Persisting to invest in what looks to 
be a black hole could not only lead to a failed project, but could also cause major 
financial problems for the financial backers of the project. However, project managers 
hesitate to take or recommend this kind of extreme measures, fearing that they will be 
seen as persona! and organizational failures. On the other hand, in the IT industry, 
Boehm (2000) argues that actually most often such decisions are not the result of poor 
project management processes, but are motivated by factors such as Jack of resources, 
goal definition, planning issues, or Jack of stakeholders ' involvement. However, most 
projects continue and more or Jess successfully deal with these surprises and we aim to 
shed light on the conditions in which these events occur and on the processes developed 
to cope with these occurrences. 
Unexpected events are usually seen as having a negative impact on projects, due to 
their unexpected occurrence and the uncertainty associated with their influence on the 
eventual project performance. Projects are developed according to the initial plan and 
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everything that may deviate them is considered unwelcome. But sorne events have a 
positive nature (Ahola et al. , 2011; Lechler et al. , 2012). Internally, pleasant surprises 
may come from teams that finish their work earlier than expected, a great general 
attitude and collaboration between actors, solutions that are functional after a low 
nurnber of iterations, and so on. The external environment could also offer positive 
events when new laws and regulations favor the project in a certain way, such as lower 
taxes or a new immigration policy that facilitates project access to foreign workers. 
Similarly, the project could take advantage of the decreasing priees for construction 
materials, fuel , software and other necessary deviees. Sorne other positive events could 
be seen as opportw1ities for the project to increase participants ' satisfaction, offer a 
more evolved, more innovative or more complete technical solution, enlarge project 
scope, etc. In this case, following the initial plan rigidly could prevent the project and 
the parent organization from exploiting these favorable situations (Giezen, 2012). 
Project managers need to examine and take into account these opportunities as 
attentively as they look at the negative elements in the project context (Lechler et al. , 
2012). 
The research on the way projects could deal with such positive and negative 
occurrences bears many similarities with the "decision" and "design" schools of 
strategy (Mintzberg and Lampe!, 1999) by seeking to identify project activities and 
fonns that decrease the chances of occurrence of such events and their impact on the 
project. In turn, this approach can be subdivided in three directions. A first school of 
thought focuses on specifie potential events, termed risks, and proposes concrete 
identification processes, preventive measures and response strategies that help avoid 
such events or contain their effects (Cooke Davies, 2002; De Bakker et al., 201 0; 
Kendrick, 2003 ; Wallace et al. , 2004 ). A second direction focuses on uncertainty, seen 
as the potential for downward or upward variation of project success that can stem from 
a combination of multiple factors and events due to insufficient knowledge about the 
relevant factors and processes. This direction focuses on the knowledge production 
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aspect of project decisions and activities as a way to redu ce uncertainty (Shenhar, 2001) 
and on ways to reduce project complexity as the main source of uncertainty (Giezen, 
2012). The third direction assumes that managers have a limited ability to anticipate 
events (Jani, 2011 ; Kutsch and Maylor, 2011) or that sorne are simply impossible to 
predict (Piperca and Floricel, 2012). This direction focuses on identifying flexible 
processes and forms that enable projects to cope with any unanticipated event (Floricel 
and Miller, 2001 ; Lenfle, 2011 ; Pi ch et al. , 2002). 
1.1.2 The event anticipation perspective 
Many researchers in this vein focus on identifying and categorizing risks, namely 
potential events with negative consequences for a project. For example, Kendrick 
(2003) studied various sources of risks and classified them according to their main 
impact on the project into risks related to scope, schedule or resources. The project 
scope could suffer changes due to evolving requirements, specifications added later or 
unforeseen dependencies. The scope could also be affected by defects, as results of 
hardware or software failures , or subcomponent incompatibilities and deficiencies. 
Market and confidentiality risks were also included in this category. Schedule risks are 
mainly related with dela ys ( e.g. in delivering parts or subprojects, decisions dela ys or 
lack of information), dependencies on other projects, and erroneous estimates. Finally, 
resource risks are related with money, outsourcing that could involve delays, late starts 
and turnover, and people. People are a major source of risks due to staff leaving the 
project permanently or temporarily, people not fully dedicated to the project, lack of 
motivation, and interpersonal conflict. 
In turn, Wallace et al. (2004) classified risks according to their origin, by distinguishing 
risks related to the social subsystem, technical subsystem, and project management. 
The social subsystem risk cornes from the people and groups involved in the project 
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development and refers to their interests, commitment, resistance to change, and so on. 
The teclmical subsystem risk is related to the artifact that is built which sometimes 
have unclear or evolving requirements . The project development process, its 
coordination and management generate the third main source of risks, the project 
management risks. Sharma and his colleagues (Sharma et al. , 2011) add to this 
classification the project dependability. While analyzing risk dimensions in the Indian 
software industry, they found four critical risk categories: the software requirement 
specification variability, team composition, control processes, and dependability, with 
the first category having the most significant impact on the project performance. 
Other authors draw attention to sources of risks that are usually overlooked in projects 
(Marcelino-Sadaba et al., 2014) like macro-economie factors - recession, inflation, 
etc. (Ren and Lin, 1996) or particular risk dimensions in specifie contexts and 
industries, such as the oil industry (Stinchcombe and Heimer, 1985), infrastructure 
(Aritua et al., 2011 ; Doloi et al., 2012) or IT (Holzmann and Spiegler, 2011). For 
example, in the IT industry requirements change frequently, so associated risks are 
common and need to be given special attention (Fu et al., 2012). On their side, Aritua 
et al. (20 11) identified 14 risks, sorne specifie for public infrastructure projects 
developed in programs. The Indian construction projects have their own particular 
factors that cause delays, such as: unclear project scope and improper planning; 
inefficient site management, coordination and communication; inadequate contract and 
Jack of commitment (Doloi et al., 20 12). These are somewhat different from the factors 
causing delays in Iranian gas pipeline projects with unrealistic project duration, land 
expropriation and obtaining permits standing out along with the more common issues 
related to selection and payments to contractors, suppliers ' deliveries, or changing of 
orders (Fallahnejad, 2013). 
Regional or national contexts are also important and with the recent popularity of 
developing projects overseas or in international partnerships, organizations need to pay 
16 
attention to local characteristics and develop a specifie capability named cultural 
intelligence (Yitmen, 20 13). Unexpected events occur in such projects because the 
project management faits to understand cognitive-cultural , normative or regulative 
institutions on the local context (Orr and Scott, 2008). With a similar perspective, 
Steffey and Anantatmula (20 11) develop a method of radial risk mapping to asses risks 
in international projects, enlisting a large variety of risks grouped in four categories: 
virtual, cultural, political and regional. Virtual risks are associated, among others with 
communication, number of countries involved, management experience and time 
zones. Regional risks could come from the crime rate and other safety issues, local 
weather and housing particularities. Cultural risks are due to the trust leve! between 
partners, economie culture, and number of regions or languages. Finally, political risks 
are related with governments' desire and support for the project, relationships between 
project management and the local governments, government stability or unrest, and 
laws and regulations. 
Familiarity with local specificities help project managers not only avoid or better deal 
with threats, but also benefit from opportunities. For example, Loo et al. (2013) looked 
at externat risks that could be encountered by international companies developing 
projects in the Gulf Cooperation Council states. In the existing literature, they had 
identified seven categories of risks, related with political, social, cultural, economie, 
legal, logistics and natural contexts. However, the systematic analysis revealed that, in 
this region, sorne of these factors are actually positive, due to local governments ' 
policies to massively invest in domestic growth and encourage local presence and 
activities of big foreign corporations. 
A substream of the risk anticipation approach recognizes that sorne risks emerge during 
the project and focuses on the "early warning" system that could help managers detect 
events before they actually occur (Kappelman et al. , 2006; Keil and Montealegre, 
2001). Nikander and Eloranta (1997) noticed that few events happen suddenly, a large 
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majority resulting from cumulative processes. Therefore, the authors sought to identify 
early warning signais and signs that could help managers react promptly to avoid or 
minimize the impact of what could become a major threatening event. Keil and 
Montealegre (2001) argue that, in order to benefit from this system and save resources 
and sometimes the whole project, project managers need to follow a four-stage reaction 
process: problem recognition, re-examining the present course of action, searching for 
alternative courses of action, and implementing an exit strategy. For exarnple, the earl y 
warnings system will help only if higher hierarchicallevels recognize a signal as being 
significant and consequently take immediate action. 
Researchers in the risk anticipation vein also looked to improve other risk-related 
activities, such as risk analysis, risk allocation, risk management, etc. For example, 
Pollack-Johnson and Liberatore (2005) developed a scenario analysis tool to improve 
the risk management process for projects with significant level of uncertainty. 
Nasirzadeh et al. (20 14) proposed a new method to allocate project cost risk between 
owner and contractors, with the optimum as a point where the overall project cost is 
minimized. Locatelli and Mancini (20 1 0) used a framework called SHAMPU 
(Chapman and Ward, 2003) to quantify the impact of risks and provide possible 
mitigation actions in megaprojects. Taking into account elements that are usually 
overlooked in projects, Marcelino-Sadaba et al. (2014) proposed a new project risk 
management methodology with specifie indicators, extensive risk checklists, and 
recommended actions. Similarly, Loo et al. (20 13) developed the ir own external risk 
breakdown structure to identify and respond to external risks in a systematic manner. 
Finally, risk anticipation researchers focused on the conditions that could improve the 
risk management processes. Among the reasons that prevent project managers from 
using these processes tools, the lack of time to apply such techniques, the lack of 
information regarding various aspects of the risk, and the lack of project sponsors ' 
understanding of the cost of the process that may or may not eventually lead to sorne 
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difficult-to-quantify benefits (Kutsch and Hall, 201 0; Lyons and Skitmore, 2004; 
Tummala et al. , 1997). A proper risk management process involves time, money and 
expertise that may not be avai lable in ali projects . Even when budgets and time are 
adequate, project managers find difficult to explain the process rationale to various 
project sponsors that are more inclined to address real , as opposed to potential, and 
clear, as opposed to unclear, costs (Royer, 2000). One last problem is risk ownership 
(Kutsch and Hall , 2009; Ward and Chapman, 1991). If the areas ofresponsibility are 
not clearly delimited, participants may think or perceive certain risks as being 
somebody else ' s responsibility and therefore they may not be preoccupied to prevent 
or intervene in specifie cases. 
The risk anticipation research helped incorporate in our theoretical framework a richer 
understanding of the nature of events, in parti cul ar of the ir various sources and of the 
different impacts that they can have on project activities. These contributions also 
sensitized us to the fact that the onset of events is a process that can take many forms, 
and its temporal profile affects the ability to detect the event and the moment when it 
occurs. However, the anticipation of concrete risks is not al ways possible. In a context 
of novelty the relevant knowledge and the related anticipatory capacity may lacking 
(Shenhar, 1991 ). Moreover, in dynamic environments, constant changes make 
prediction of future risks quite challenging (Sommer and Loch, 2004). This may 
explain the seemingly paradoxical finding that risk management practices are Jess used 
in projects with a high leve! ofuncertainty and dynamism (Besner and Hobbs, 2012). 
Finally, the events that affect a project can be very numerous, which may warrant 
paying attention to minimizing the impact of the overall variability of outcomes rather 
than attending to each pa1iicular event. The ways of dealing with uncertainty are 
discussed in the next subsection. 
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1.1.3 The w1certainty reduction perspective 
Uncertainty can be defined as the lack of knowledge that would enable to anticipate 
future evolutions. Higher uncertainty can result from novelty, in particular the presence 
of more radical technical innovation or of new customers, or from complexity, namely 
the number of interrelated elements in the proj ect (Shenhar, 2001 ). It usually results in 
a higher variance of the anticipated distribution ofproject outcomes, which means that 
project sponsors may have to bear a significant escalation of costs or important !osses, 
but could also benefit from higher than expected gains. Atkinson et al. (2006) suggest 
other angles in addition to uncertainty in estimates, namely uncertainty related with 
other parties, or uncertainty associated with stages in the project lifecycle. Jensen et al. 
(2006) also distinguish three types of uncertainty: operational or related to the internai 
logic of the project, interactional or related with the relationships with the stakeholders, 
and institutional or related with the norms and values. 
One important conclusion of the stream of research on project unce1tainty is that the 
sequence of activities in the project should be designed by considering its ability to 
produce uncertainty-reducing knowledge (Boehm, 1988; Sauser, 2006; Shenhar, 
2001). For example, Shenhar (200 1) suggests that uncertainty increases, on the one 
hand, along four levels of technological novelty and, on the other hand, along three 
levels of system complexity (assembly, system and array). He also suggests that in 
projects with higher uncertainty a higher number of iterations take place before a 
functioning technical solution is developed. Likewise, a larger number of iterations are 
needed in projects that commercialize radical ümovations, which face higher market 
uncertainty (Leifer et al., 2000). 
Other scholars, such as Thomke (1998) and Pich et al. (2002) argue that depending on 
the leve! and type of unce1tainty a project experiences during its lifecycle, and of the 
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cost of trials and the quality of information they produce, a strategy of performing 
severa! trials in parallel could be more beneficiai than an iterative trial and error 
approach. 
A related process-based approach for managing uncertainty is based on the real option 
approach (Trigeorgis, 1995). ln this approach, a relatively small investment, acquiring 
the option, prepares the ground for quickly investing in a full-fledged project when 
uncertainty subsides. Proponents of this approach suggest that the value of holding an 
option increases in situations ofhigher uncertainty (Huchzermeier and Loch, 2001). In 
this sense, McGrath and MacMillan (2000) investigated in detail the conditions, 
namely expected revenues, competitive response as well as development and 
commercialization costs, which increase or decrease the value of holding an option in 
high-uncertainty innovation projects. 
Finally, reducing project complexity, for example by freezing the scope, would also 
reduce uncertainty (Giezen, 2012). Client requirements often change and new events 
occur in all projects, but clearly defining the scope from the planning phase and then 
refusing to adopt any modifications all along project lifecycle has the major advantage 
of developing the project in a familiar environment, since ali details, conditions, 
specifications and requirements are known up front. Giezen (20 12) studied the 
Rotterdam metro expansion project and attributed project success to managers' 
decisions to reduce complexity. The rigid approach enabled project managers to 
eventually finish the project, but this came at the expense of missing sorne 
opportunities : the project became too simple, future improvements (e.g. adding a new 
stop) will be extremely complex and expensive, and broader project performance (e .g. 
land use development) is regarded as being rather poor. 
This approach brings project processes to the fore, and puts even more emphasis on 
their temporal aspect, even though it still espouses an objective time perspective. 
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Moreover, it sees knowledge not as a fixed endowment but as a resource that can be 
active! y produced in the course of project activities, provided that the necessary cost 
and time are spent. Of course, knowledge is modeled as an imperfect representation of 
an objective reality. Most models distil project knowledge into a unique parameter, an 
overall degree of truth that has a similarly global uncertainty-reducing effect (see for 
example Krislman et al. , 1997). But severa! researchers found that even the best risk 
anticipation and uncertainty reduction efforts cannot eliminate the arrivai of totally 
unexpected events (Floricel and Miller, 200 1; Pi ch et al. , 2002) . The con tri butions that 
followed from this finding are discussed in the next subsection. 
1.1.4 The flexibility perspective 
The new focus on unexpected events and the increased attention to environmental 
dynamics and turbulence, which constantly generate genuinely novel circumstances 
that cast doubt on initial planning assumptions, led to a new approach in project 
management that calls for more flexible planning and a new relation with change 
(Collyer et al. , 2010; Koskela and Howell, 2002, MacCormack et al. , 2001 ; Williams, 
2005). The traditional four phases in the project lifecycle are not that distinct anymore; 
in particular, planning and execution intermingle in response to increasing complexity 
and unpredictability (Leybourne and Sainter, 20 12). Even more iterations are used 
between phases, while project activities are Jess formalized and more flexible to 
integrate new requirements and unexpected events. 
Ford and Bhargav (2006) support this perspective by concluding that more detailed 
resource allocation reduces project flexibility and by showing that resulting rigid 
structures lead to less successful projects in unpredictable environments. Williams 
(2005) goes even further by arguing that, especially in large and complex projects, it is 
actually counterproductive to allocate in detail resources in the planning phase, when 
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infonnation regarding future situations is stilllimited Projects that adapt to the frequent 
changes in the external environment, rather than rigidly protecting the initial plan have 
higher performance. 
Reviewing previous research, Collyer and Warren (2009) identified severa! strategies 
to manage projects in dynamic environments : environment manipulation, where 
project leaders reject changes and freeze project scope; specifie planning approaches, 
in which the most suitable for dynamic environments are Jess detailed plans in the 
initial stage; scope control, where the project flexibility is increased by breaking the 
project down in severa! smaller subprojects; controlled experimentation, in which only 
promising initiatives are further developed; lifecycle strategies that focus on iterations; 
management control , in which belief systems and interactive control can supplement 
the traditional diagnostic control ; develop an appropriate culture and communication 
strategies, which emphasize faster, more open and Jess formai collaboration; and using 
a more informai and pruiicipatory leadership style. 
In a similar approach, Sommer and Loch (2004) argued for the benefit of having a 
flexible structure in dynamic environments and proposed two types of strategies that 
projects can apply to adapt to the frequent changes: learning and selectionism. Leaming 
is a trial-and-error strategy. When facing unexpected events, the project team can 
imagine new and creative solutions to adapt to the new reality. Selectionism is a 
parallel-trial strategy. In this case, unpredictable events are solved by proposing severa! 
responses and by choosing the one that seems to work the best. By relying on variables 
such as the level of unpredictable uncertainty, the level of complexity, a11d the cost of 
each strategy, researchers found out that learning is preferable in most cases. 
Another stream of research analyzed the change itself and its relation with project 
performance. For example, Dvir and Lechler (2004) examined the impact of three 
elements on the project success : the quality of planning, in terms of schedule, budget 
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and scope; goal changes that occurred during project execution; and plan changes, 
which were defined as changes that would affect only the plan and not the project goal. 
They found that each category of changes has a stronger impact on project performance 
than the quality of planning, and the cumulative effect of changes makes planning 
efforts even less significant. In this sense, the authors recommend project managers to 
focus on adapting to and managing changes, rather than maintaining unmodified an 
initial plan that can easily become obsolete. Eventually, if the new reality jeopardizes 
project performance, managers could decide to adjust project scope correspondingly. 
DeChurch and Haas (2008) go further and distinguish between three types of planning: 
deliberate, contingency and reactive. Deliberate planning is what is usually understood 
by "planning" and would be the main course of action. In order to prepare for surprises 
and future changes, planners usuall y add sorne back-up plans or secondary courses of 
action, which are presented under the name of contingency platming. Finally, the 
response to these surprises could be formulated as reactive planning or adjustments of 
the existing plan to the new requirements or conditions. The authors analyzed team 
effectiveness in relation with each type of planning and conclude that the reactive 
adjustment plays the most important role, followed by the contingency planning. 
The need to change the initial plan because of unexpected events, was also addressed 
by researchers that m·e concerned with project contract design. The main issue they 
address is finding a way for contract parties to share the burden of unpredictable costs 
and risks. Von Branconi and Loch (2004) found eight levers that managers canuse to 
optimize the contract: technical specifications, priee, payment terms, schedule, 
performance guarantees, warranties, limitation of liability, and securities. In a similar 
note, Oliveira Cruz and Cunha Marques (20 13) argue that flexibility in con tracts could 
be either strategie, tactical or operational, and located within individual actors or at the 
intersection between them, the so-called interdependent flex ibility. Contracts are one 
valuable tool to deal with uncertainty and they should be designed to incorporate future 
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changes at a reasonable cost. However, high uncertainty means that there will still be 
aspects not covered in the formai agreements, because managers tend to use templates 
of contracts as provided by the parent organization, which are mal-adapted to the reality 
of each specifie project (Nysten-Haarala et al. , 201 0). This observation determined 
Badenfelt (2011) to suggest a broader range of solutions to deal with incomplete 
contracts, which he grouped in four strategies: assuring financial incentives, building 
long-term relationships, introducing change clauses, and clearly specifying the contract 
duration. 
In the context of searching for flexible structures practitioners, especially those from 
the software industry, led the way in proposing agile project management methods 
(Highsmith and Cockburn, 2001; Schwaber, 2004; Sutherland et al., 2009; Womack 
and Jones, 1996). The agile methods are highly iterative and very open to incorporate 
later technical changes. Among the most known methods are Serum are Extreme 
Programming. For example, in the Serum method (Schwaber, 2004; Sutherland, 2001), 
the goal is defined gradually and the product is built in small increments, deliverable 
at the end of each sprint (i .e. the smaller part in which the project is divided). The 
project is redefined in each sprint planning meeting that is held at the beginning of 
sprint cycle. Since then, new agile methods or refinements to existing ones have been 
proposed regularly, see for example the Iterative and Visual Project Management 
Method- IVPM2, developed based on case studies and an extensive literature review 
(Collyer et al. , 201 0). 
Information system practitioners were among the first to argue for more flexibility 
(Boehn1, 1988), because they were used to deal with clients that require late design 
modifications or with the constant emergence of opportunities and threats that cali for 
different solutions than those put in place at the beginning of the project. Rather than 
reacting rigidly, managers that adopt such methods are more open to negotiation and 
change. The plan becomes a moving reference point that is adjusted frequently, 
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sometimes every week. In this context, even the traditional performance measures (i.e. 
on time, on budget, and initial goal achieved) are not appropriate since all these 
elements evolve over time with new changes and requirements. 
Other types of projects, such as infrastructure construction have followed this trend, 
but more slowly and not as radically, because the nature of the artifacts they produce 
is less amenable to such frequent changes (Davies et al. , 2009). In spite of the fact that 
it has not been widely accepted yet, there are projects even in the infrastructure industry 
that are planned with a high level of flexibility. For example, Pitsis et al. (2003) talk 
about the "future perfect strategy" for unique projects with unpredictable possible 
future problems. 
Moreover, sorne researchers argue for adopting an agile planning approach in all 
industries as being the best solution to minimize project's struggles with unknowns in 
dynamic environrnents (Conforta et al., 2014). Already, project managers use elements 
of agile methods, such as creating the plan collaboratively and updating iton a weekly 
basis, but even more elements should be adapted to specificities of each industries. 
However, Conforta et al. (20 14) acknowledge the existence of certain barri ers that need 
to be overcome: superficial involvement of suppliers and clients, restriction to collocate 
all team members in large projects, difficulties in creating large multidisciplinary teams 
with ail competences involved, and so on. 
In this context, seeing value in combining the benefits of both perspectives, a third 
stream of researchers argued for a mixed approach (Koppenjan et al. , 2011 ; Miller and 
Olleros, 2000; Osipova and Ericksson, 20 13). Traditional planning, which emphasizes 
control and predictability is useful to focus resources, avoid unnecessary changes, and 
manage identified risks. Flexible planning, which emphasizes adaptation is needed to 
deal with unexpected events and unavoidable changes. Hartogh and Westerveld (20 1 0) 
identified elements of both extremes in a wide number of projects. Other researchers 
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proposed specifie combinations of traditional and agile planning methods (i.e. 
rigurozity and flexibility) , such as mathematical modelling and SCRUM (Jahr, 2014). 
Geraldi (2008) suggests that the two extremes could work fine for different projects . 
Using a combination oflevels offlexibility and complexity, she builds a map to assess 
this match and mismatch with four regions or organizational archetypes: (1) the 
creative-reflective archetype is appropriate in cases of high levels of flexibility and 
complexity; (2) the mechanic-structured archetype could be best used when both 
flexibility and complexity are low; (3) the chaotification of order archetype is 
recommended for cases with high flexibility and low complexity; and (4) the 
bureaucratisation of chaos archetype in high-complexity, low-flexibility situations. 
The flexibility perspective brings to the fore the conditions required for acting in the 
face ofunexpected events. It drew our attention to a large number of elements, ranging 
from technical architectures and activity sequences to resources and capabilities. But 
even the flexible perspective shares with those discussed previously a focus on the 
technical aspects of project planning and task management. Research in this stream 
shares a vision of project participants and abjects as an inert and malleable substance 
that higher-level managers can manipulate as they please and that will behave in rather 
predictable ways. These contributions tend to ignore social actors that play a key role 
in initiating action and advancing change and the fact that these actors are bound by 
many different types of physical, cognitive, communicational and other kinds of social 
relations. Surprisingly, practitioner-driven approaches, in particular Serum, pay more 
attention to the fact that identifying events, learning, and maintaining flexibility 
depends on organizing and motivating people. But their theoretical approach fails to 
ground recommendations in an understanding of the situated motives behind 
participants' action, of their passions, envy, interests, and so on. General! y speaking, 
all three perspectives reviewed so far see projects as objective, deterministic and 
dependent structures, which limits their capacity to explain the processes that occur in 
projects, in particular their difficulties in responding to unexpected events. Another 
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school in project management tried to address these limitations - the project as 
organization perspective, which is discussed in the next subsection. 
1.1.5 Projects as organizations perspective 
The adoption of the project as organization perspective represents a major shift in 
project management thinking (Hobday, 2000; Lundin and Sëderholm, 1995). Projects 
are no longer seen only as vehicles to reach a certain goal, completely subordinated to 
sponsoring organizations' systems of relations, routines and practices, but are 
conceptualized as developing their own social structure that acquires a degree of 
economy and evolves over time as new participants enter the project (Floricel et al, 
2011a; Pitsis et al. , 2003; Sëderholm, 2008). 
One distinctive characteristic of project organizations is their temporary nature. Lundin 
and Sëderholm (1995) used 4 elements to distinguish temporary from perennial 
organizations: time, tasks, team, and transition. In this sense, a project is a time-limited 
organization that exists only because it fulfils a task, in other words, the project 
activities. A team is designated to do that task. A project represents a transition between 
the moments before and after the completion of this task. At the same time, project 
participants experience a transition between a collection of individuals and a team. 
As opposed to the previously discussed perspectives, the project as organization view 
suggests that projects are shaped by different forces. Its structure complies with 
institutional requirements rather than being designed to reduce uncertainty or 
complexity (Dille and Sëderlund, 2011). Traditional planning tools have additional 
roles, such as building a distinct identity and a shared representation, which later 
influence participants ' actions and expectations (De Bakker et al. , 2012). For example, 
risk management is not only a tool to identify risks and suggest ways to cope with them, 
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but has the role of defining relationships between participant actors as weil as bringing 
them ali on the same page, creating a common understanding and perception of the 
problem (De Bakker et al. , 2011). Naturally, managers ' focus shifts from monitoring 
and following procedures towards developing and maintaining relationships, with the 
immediate implication that different managerial abilities are required (Alderman and 
Ivory, 2011). In general , in temporary organizations, interpersonal coordination 
through networks and social mechanisms replaces formai authority that characterizes 
the coordination style in perennial organizations (Beckhy, 2006). 
Not only are they built and look differently, but projects are organizations that evolve 
independently. In response to environmental pressures, they develop their own 
strategies, different from those of their parent organization (Vuori et al., 2013). The 
parent organization still influences project development, but it becomes just one 
important factor among ethers, such as: customers, competitors, suppliers, technology, 
legislation, or the broad economie environment. Ali these ether stakeholders ' interests 
as weil as internai participant actors ' behavior and individual choices shape the project 
structure (Alderman and Ivory, 2011 ; Leufkens and Noorderhaven, 2011 ). New, 
specifie routines and procedures could also be developed , for example when, under 
time pressure, managers use informai ways to manage deviations (Hallgren and 
Maaninen-Olsson, 2009). Project organizations even have what is called a reflexive 
capability that helps them deal with new, complex circumstances (London and Siva, 
2011). London and Siva (2011) developed a tool to measure this reflexive capability 
that they considered has three key dimensions: awareness or the capability to 
tmderstand the situation, responsiveness or the ability to be open and supportive to 
changes when needed, and adaptability or capacity to adapt changeable principles 
based on individual and organizational values, culture and procedures. 
Project leaders should accept change as a natural presence in project !ife and prepare 
projects to incorporate the impact of unexpected events. One way to do this would be 
1 
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to build, from the planning phase, a structure that will later enable the project to 
adequately react to unexpected events and uncertainty (Floricel et al., 2011a, Floricel 
and Miller, 2001; Verganti, 1999). For example, Floricel et al. (2011a) found that an 
appropriate response capacity of projects is characterized by a high level of three 
component dimensions, namely the cohesion between participants, the flexibility of the 
project structure, and the resources that can be accessed, redistributed or created by the 
project team. Even though the project structure is still defined in the planning phase, 
this is expected to evolve during project execution, especially as result of unexpected 
occurrences, and its main role is to facilitate project adaptation to the new reality and 
to enable project leaders to easily incorporate later modifications. 
Other researchers came to similar conclusions. Geraldi et al. (2010) also analyzed 
responses to unexpected events and found out that successful responses were based on 
a combination of three capabilities: responsive organizational structure, good 
interpersonal relationships, and competent individuals. On their side, Brady and Davies 
(2014) suggested that temporary organizations face two types of complexity, namely 
structural and dynamic. Structural complexity comes from the static components and 
their distribution within project structure, such as system hierarchy and 
interdependence among components, stakeholders ' relationships, socio-political 
complexity, and cultural differences. Dynamic complexity is associated with the 
ongoing change of relationships among partners and subsystems, which could be the 
result of market and technological uncertainty, pacing and urgency, interdependencies 
among components, and so on. In order to successfully manage complexity, managers 
need, among others, to adopta collaborative behavior and focus on maintaining good 
relationships with clients, and to be innovative and adaptive. Generally, a more 
dynamic (as opposed to static) structure is better equipped to address unexpected events 
(Hallgren, 2009). 
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While the human factor became important in the study of project organizations 
(Leybourne, 2007), a new stream of research (i.e. project as practice) took it even 
further and called for studying what participants are actually doing in projects rather 
than seeking normative refinements to the project planning principles (Blomquist et 
al., 2010; Cicmil et al., 2006). They joined the increasing number of researchers that 
have argued lately for the need of a practice approach in social sciences (Schatzki et 
al., 2001) and strategy (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009; Johnson et al., 2007; Johnson et 
al., 2003), asking for a micro-leve! analysis and a focus on the activities that managers 
actually perform, rather than on structural elements. In this way, practitioners could 
directly benefit from research findings and the gap between theory and practice will be 
significantly reduced. 
This perspective suggests that the organizational tissue of projects emerges from the 
interplay of three elements: praxis, practices and practitioners (Blomquist et al. , 201 0; 
Whittington, 2006). Praxis is the actual activity the project team does, such as daily 
tasks, meetings, discussions, site reviews, and so on. Practice is the set of routines, 
norms, rules, and procedures specifie to a certain domain or organization that guide the 
practitioner's behavior. In line with the Structuration theory, we can say that the 
structure (practice) shapes the action (praxis) which further changes the current 
structure. Finally, practitioners are the social actors that perform the activity, namely 
project managers, team members, consultants, etc. These actors could also be groups 
of practitioners, such as project management team, contractors, regulatory 
organizations, and so on (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009). 
Among others, the practice lens enabled Sèiderholm (2008) to analyze how project 
managers deal with unexpected events during project execution. He identified three 
types of unexpected events, namely re-openings, revisions and fine tuning, and found 
four ways in which project organizations deal with them: (1) innovative action 
approach, which assumes the flexibility of the structure, requires a creative and 
31 
experienced managerial team, and proposes radical new solutions; (2) extensive 
meetings approach, which still assumes flexibility, but aims for small incrementai 
changes; (3) detachrnent strategies approach, that tries to minimize the effect of 
unpredictable events by isolating them and applying local changes; and (4) re-
negotiating project conditions with stakeholders, in order to change either the input 
(involved resources) or the output (results, time limits) as a result of the presence of 
these unexpected events. 
In a similar fashion, Hallgren and Maaninen-Ollson (2005) discovered that deviations 
are managed according to four tactics: evident solution, controlled solution, diffuse 
solution and development solution, depending on the type of knowledge that is needed 
( exploitative or explorative) and the previous experience or familiarity with the type of 
deviation (high or repetitive and low or unique). 
Hallgren and Wilson (20 11) also identified four general responses to manage 
organizational crises and five practices used during these responses . As opposed to the 
examples above, which propose concurrent strategies that each works best in specifie 
circurnstances, Hallgren and Wilson suggest a sequence of four responses (i.e. 
mobilization, prioritization, normalization and responsibility) that could be found in 
any type of crises situations. Managers would start with a mobilization of participants, 
making sure everybody understands there is a crisis and is willing to participate. Then 
they prioritize the important tasks, reorganize activities and reallocate resources. Once 
the crisis is over, things get back to normal. Finally, the responsibility related with each 
activity is rearranged. Five organizational practices were fm.md to be associated with 
these responses: the initial call, maintenance of relative calmness, assessment of 
situation and assignment of responsibility, temporary permanency and crises response 
teams, and debriefings. 
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The project as temporary organization literature helped us uncover a multitude of 
factors and processes that have been neglected by the research streams discussed 
previously and which have, in our opinion, an even stronger impact on the ability of 
projects to respond to unexpected events. From this perspective we derived our 
emphasis on a wide range of relations between project participants and a focus on how 
these relations are broken, maintained or rebuilt in the processes of project organizing, 
in particular when responding to unexpected events. In turn, the practice view inspired 
us, first, to have a fresh look at the processes that occur in projects, a view as detailed 
and as unencumbered by preconceptions as possible given the nature of our theoretical 
framework and data. But because of its focus on projects that happen inside 
organizations and on the influence of host organization practices and structures such as 
project offices, as well as because of the micro-level perspective and the narrow time 
range that is often used by proponents of the practice view, this stream of research can 
miss sorne important determinants of project response that are reviewed in the next 
section. 
1.1 .6 The interorganizational project 
The last perspective that influenced this research was the multi-organizational project 
view (Alderman and Ivory, 2011 ; Artto and Kujala, 2008; Leufkens and Noorderhaven, 
2011; Ruuska et al., 2011). With projects becoming more and more popular (Whitley, 
2006), firms adapted their strategies to develop new economie activities. On the 
relationship firm-project, Artto and Kujala (2008) distinguished between: management 
of a project, where one firm manages one project; management of a project-based firm, 
where one firm manages multiple projects; management of a project network, where 
multiple firms jointly manage one project; and management of a business network, 
where multiple firms manage multiple projects . This thesis studies large projects, most 
of whom were developed jointly by multiple stakeholders, so the management of a 
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project network provided many useful ideas regarding how structuring events could 
occur and how they are managed. 
Multi-organization projects are very common, especially for large projects, where 
companies need a large amount of resources, a wide range of expertise, but also to 
share the high risk associated with large investments. Moreover, they are appealing to 
stakeholders, because large projects enable them to push the technological boundaries 
( engineers, designers, users ), to be associated with something visible and with 
numerous potential users (politicians), and to get important revenues for executing 
large work packages (contractors, suppliers, consultants, etc.) or investing in the 
production oflarge artifacts (investors, bankers, developers) (Flyvbjerg, 2014). 
However, as opposed to traditional hierarchie organization, multi-organizational 
projects have specifie issues due to the presence of multiple stakeholders with sensibly 
equal power. This is a major source of risks and unexpected events, since each 
participant has its own interests (Lehtiranta, 2014) and faces the traditional social 
dilemma to stay aligned with the project common interest or pursue its own interest for 
possibly bigger gains (Leufkens and Noorderhaven, 2011). Managing relationships 
between participants becomes cri ti cal (Lehtiranta, 20 14; Ruuska et al, 2011 ). 
Contracts, partnering sessions and other planning tools are useful, but not sufficient in 
maintaining a good leve! of collaboration all along the project lifecycle, since conflicts 
may arise even later due to various reasons (Calame! et al. , 20 12). Therefore, the 
project management team needs to develop a relational competence in order to keep ali 
participant organizations aligned with the project goal (Pauget and Wald, 2013 ). 
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1.2 Two sociological theories: Structmation theory and Actor-Network theory 
In this section, we present two sociological theories, namely structmation theory and 
actor-network theory, which enabled us to more clearly identify and define the key 
elements of project structuring as weil as better understand how the resulting 
organizational tissue is later challenged by tmbulent events and how the subsequent 
transformation actually takes place. But in order to provide a background that would 
highlight the insights that these theories provided us, we start with a very brief review 
of the main theories of organizational structme and, particularly, change. Then we 
present each fundamental theory in its initial form along with later developments. We 
end this section by identifying the common as weil as complementary elements related 
to change that helped us develop the theoretical framework detailed in the next chapter. 
1.2.1 Standard views of structure and change 
The dominant view of ongoing organizational structme combines functionalism with 
an open-system, contingent-adaptation view (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Thompson, 
1967). In this view, organizational structure is a set of mostly formai relations imposed 
upon organizational members by the requirements oftheir environment (Duncan, 1972; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). These relations concern mostly the 
differentiation and integration of the ir tasks as week as decision authority, in particular 
for task and resource allocation (Dougherty, 2001; Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and 
Lors ch, 1968). Su ch structmes can be designed by dominant ac tors (' strategists ') 
(Andrews, 1965; Chandler, 1962; Child , 1972); or emerge from actors ' collective 
efforts to find functional communication and coordination arrangements (Stinchcombe, 
1990); or be imposed by the externat enviromnent, either by the adoption or imitation 
of "institutionalized" models (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), often via coercive or 
normative pressmes (DiMaggio and Powell , 1984), or by the outright elimination of ill 
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adapted organizations (Harman and Freeman, 1977). The strategist-designed variant of 
this view is implicitly adopted by scholars concerned with project planning, in 
particular with the design of responsibility charts and of contractual arrangements 
between participants. 
A consequence of this view is a view of structure as a set of constraints externally 
imposed on the vast majority of organization members . Another consequence is that 
structure represents a functional architecture, but also a point of equilibrium between 
competing demands. Given the complexity of these demands and the imperfect 
knowledge with which actors, including designers, operate, a different functional 
structure is quite difficult to find and the outcome of changing the current structure is 
uncertain. Moreover, working within this structure, organizationaJ actors develop 
vested interests and taken-for-granted interaction routines, which increases even more 
the inertia of the structure (Selznick, 194 7; Weick, 1978). Ali these factors point 
towards a corollary of interest for our theorizing, narnely the assumption that structural 
change is an exceptional state for organizations, having disruptive effects for its 
activities (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986), and requiring 
significant efforts if it is to be implemented in a deliberate mann er (Huy, 2001 ). 
The emphasis on the stability or equilibrium of organizational structures has led to the 
widespread adoption by organization theorists of Lewin ' s ( 1951) view of change 
consisting of three stages: unfreeze the cunent structure, move elements into a new 
configuration, and refreeze the new structure. Weick and Quinn (1999) cali this family 
of theories the episodic change mode!, and argue that its proponents see change as an 
"occasional interruption or divergence from equilibrium" (p. 366). For most 
organization development theorists such change requires an external, goal-directed 
intervention (by another 'strategist' of sorts) . But this 'revolutionary' view of change 
also has many affinities with the punctuated equilibrium mode! that appears to 
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characterize many non-goal directed processes in the physical, biological and social 
realms (Gersick, 1991). 
Our proximate inspiration for the term structuring episode cornes from the work of 
Luhmann (1995), which belongs to the broad class of models discussed above. 
Luhmann (1995) argues that social structure consists of communicational ties between 
actors, which result in a coupling of their actions through language and shared 
significations. He espouses a functionalist vision of the organization, but one that is not 
directed by external goals and rather emphasizes self-referential processes at the 
expense of the adaptation to external environment. In other words, communications, 
including those about organizational boundaries, refer to and interpret any external 
signal with respect to the organizational system itself and its internai goal of self-
reproduction. Because they need a stable language and signification in the course of 
normal self-reproducing operation, actors cannat adjust their communicational 
coupling in the course of this kind of operation. Hence, episodes are special moments 
during which normal operations and communications are suspended, enabling 
organizational actors to discuss adjustments to their communication couplings (Hendry 
and Seidl, 2003; Hernes, 2007). 
Of course, episodic change has recently been questioned by a flurry of "continuous 
change" views, which see organizations as normally being unstable and far from 
equilibrium (Dooley and Van de Ven, 1999; Weick and Quinn, 1999). One, almost 
trivial, category includes lifecycle theories that see change as a largely deterministic 
pattern of evolution driven by intrinsic mechanisms (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003 ; 
Kazanjian, 1988; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Vohora et al. , 2004). A consonant view 
is also held by many project management theorists, except that the latter see the project 
!ife cycle as a deliberate, goal-driven sequence traced by planners and later developed 
by managers (Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001 ). But even research that adopts a project-as-
organization point ofview cannat neglect the fact that project organizations constantly 
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unfold, as participants and activities succeed each other, and can grow in size by orders 
of magnitude in a relative! y short time. Hence, the project organization cannat be seen 
as equally routinized and inertial as an ongoing organization; sorne level of continuous 
change is intrinsic in the nature of projects. 
This need to incorporate continuous change in any madel of project organization fits 
well with other theories that see change as a permanent and normal state of affairs in 
the world, including in ongoing organizations (Hernes, 2007) . For example Cooper 
(2005: 1689) argues that ' relationality ' is a defining feature ofhuman agency, which 
implies "the continuous work of connecting and disconnecting in a fluctuating network 
of existential events." This view questions the stability and inertia of organizational 
structures. From a simi lar perspective, Tsoukas and Chia (2002) theorize organizing as 
an outcome of ongoing ' becoming' processes, which begin with interactions between 
actors, and accomplish the "reweaving of actors ' webs of beliefs and habits of action 
to accommodate new experiences obtained through interactions" (p. 567) . In tmn, 
Weick and Quinn (1999) argue that strategists can intervene in such ongoing change 
by first revealing (freezing) current patterns of change, then rebalancing contributing 
processes and finally unleashing (unfreezing) the new patterns of change. 
Our framework of project structuring and change episodes incorporates bath 
continuous and episodic change. We rely, among others, on sorne of the contributions 
discussed in this subsection to explain bath inertia and self-organizing change. But our 
framework attempts to integrate these insights, often based on contradictory 
assumptions, using a parsimonious set of fundamental concepts. While the framework 
is original, it is useful, before we present it in the next section, to review in sorne degree 
of detail the two fundamental sociological theories that had the strongest influence on 
it. These theories caught our attention because they have a view of structure that 
depends on the decentralized action of social actors. However, they conceptualize 
actors and social relations in distinct ways, and highlight different consequences in 
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terms of organizational influence on action and inertia. They also provide contrasting 
perspectives on the origin, continuity and nature of organizational change, which 
helped us identify mechanisms that can explain the variety of complex patterns of 
change that we observed empirically. 
1.2.2 Structuration theory 
Structuration theory (STR) affirms that social actors do not act in completely 
independent ways, but are conditioned by the set of rules and resources that go vern the 
social system to which they belong (Giddens, 1982, 1984; Gulati, 1995). In turn, their 
action shapes the structure which will further condition actors' action; in fact, unlike in 
the more standard views discussed above, social structure does not exist outside the 
actions that reproduce it. Thus, structure has a dual nature, being both the medium of 
action and the outcome of that action. Despite the restrictive conditions, social actors 
have capability or intentionality, meaning that they could act in different ways, and 
knowledgeability or conscious (discursive consciousness) and unconscious (practical 
consciousness) knowledge with regard to society. However, actors have only limited 
information about the context oftheir action (i .e. unacknowledged conditions of action) 
and can predict the consequences oftheir action only to a certain extent (i.e. unintended 
consequences of action) . Structural change is in pari the result of these unintended 
consequences of action; this type of change usually has a smaller magnitude and occurs 
more frequently. Alternatively change can result from the intersection with other 
structures that have a very different set of rules and routines ; this change is more 
radical, but also less frequent. 
Giddens (1984) considers that social li fe can be regarded as a collection of 
distinguishable episodes. He proposes this view to facilitate the comparison of different 
forms of institutional change. The main aspects of an episode are: origin (where the 
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episode generates); type (in both senses the depth and the width of change the episode 
involves); momentum (the rapidity of change); and trajectory (the direction of change). 
However, episodes could be compared only to a limited extent, due to the particularity 
of each context in which these episodes occur, and to the influence of human 
knowledgeability on social change. 
The use of structuration theory in theorizing organizational issues went in two main 
directions. Scholars preoccupied with fundamental theoretical concerns focused on 
combining STR with other theories that were already used to explain organizational 
phenomena: social network theory (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati, 1995), 
institutional theory (Barley and Tolbeti, 1997), practice view (Orlikowski and Yates, 
2002), actor-network the01·y and routines theory (Pentland and Feldman, 2007), and so 
on. For example, Barley and Tolbert (1997) noticed that the institutional theory had 
been focused on empirical developments that neglected how institutions are 
fundamentally formed and modified, while the structuration theory had remained at a 
very abstract level with few empirical applications. They argue that combining the two 
theories would solve limitations ofboth and enabled them to further refine and ad vance. 
Similarly, proponents of the practice perspective argued that a micro-look at daily 
ongoing activities could make STR more empirically relevant and, among others, help 
researchers understand temporal aspects in organization research (Orlikowski and 
Yates, 2002). 
The interplay between structure and action was also used to explain the evolution of 
interorganizational networks of alliances (Gulati and Gargiulo , 1999; Gulati, 1995). In 
this sense, organizations are embedded in a network of alliances that dramatically 
influence their choice of a new partner. With the entrance of each new patiner into the 
network, the structure of that network suffers a noticeable change. This new structure 
will differently affect the organization's selection of future allies . At a more general 
leve!, we can say that is a mutual consecutive influence between social structures and 
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organizational actions . However, more recently, sorne researchers argued that the 
organization's individual interest has to be taken into account when analyzing alliance 
networks formation (Greve et al. , 2013). These networks are actually not that stable, 
and organizations could as weil leave the alliance if they are attracted by better 
opportunities in competitive alliances, for example when there is a better-matching 
alternative. 
The other stream of research used STR on its own to explain varwus aspects of 
organizational life: knowledge use (Hargadon and Fanelli, 2002), communicative 
actions (Orlikowski and Y ates, 1994), organizational change (Howard-Grenville, 2005 ; 
Yates et al., 1999), routines (D ' Adderio, 2014; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Labatut 
et al., 2012), and especially the role of technology (Barley, 1986; Orlikowski, 2000). 
For example, using a STR perspective, Hargadon and Fanelli (2002) distinguished 
between latent aspects of knowledge (i.e. its structural dimension), which have the 
potential to generate new, innovative organizational actions, and empirical aspects of 
knowledge (i.e. its action dimension) or actions that are actually performed, and 
replicated in daily organizational activities. Organizational communicative actions 
were found to evolve in a similar mam1er (Orlikowski and Yates, 1994). The genre 
repertoire or the set of types of communicative actions (i.e. genres) guides the 
employees' use of communicative actions in their daily activities. In tum, the repertoire 
is shaped by their decisions to change the frequency to which a certain genre is used or 
even the composition of the repertoire, by ad ding or renouncing to use a certain genre. 
One major development in the direction of continuous change came with the routines 
theory (D'Adderio, 2014; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland and Feldman, 2007). 
Feldman and Pentland (see, for example 2003) challenged the traditional understanding 
of routines as sources of stability and inertia and proposed a change-generating 
dimension of routines, their so-called performative aspect. Thus, routines could also 
generate change, due to reflexivity, the individuals ' characteristic that enable them to 
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perform actions in a particular way, which could be different from the way in which 
that action has been performed before. The performative aspect of routines includes 
specifie actions, performed by specifie people, in specifie conditions. At the same time, 
routines have an ostensive dimension that is more abstract and accounts for the stability 
and predictability that routines bring to organizational activities. The ostensive 
dimension could be found in either explicit f01·ms , such as procedures, or implicit, 
taken-for-granted norms. The interplay between the two aspects follow a similar STR 
logic: the ostensive aspects guide individuals ' actions, while these actions are 
performed (i.e. performative aspect) in a way that either reproduce or change certain 
ostensive aspects. Through repeated use or performance, the change later becomes a 
stable characteristic of the routine and part of its ostensive dimension. From this 
perspective, change could be either episodic or continuous, depending on which aspects 
(performative or ostensive) of the routine prevail in certain moments. In order to 
understand change, one has to look at the specifie circumstances that generated it. 
Howard-Grenville (2005) supported this view and emphasized the agency aspect to 
explain change in routines. In this sense, the organizational context acts as a guiding 
structure that influences the way in which routines are performed. However, 
individuals and groups have their own interests and understandings of the situation, so 
they sometime perform actions in a novel, innovative way, which leads to 
modifications of the initial routines. 
Another major development came from the special attention given to the influence of 
technology on actions and structures (Barley, 1986; Orlikowski , 2000). People interact 
with technologies and, as a consequence, enact structures that, in turn, shape their way 
of using that technology. In his famous paper, Bar ley ( 1986), explained how the 
introduction of a new teclmology, the CT scarmer, changed the way people work and 
interact in two different radiology departments. 
------------ ------------- - ---------
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Orlikowski (2000) adopted a similar perspective and found that structures change with 
the movement of people from inside to outside, from outside to inside, and from 
newcomer to full participant. Participants may experience changes in awareness, 
knowledge, power, motivation, or context, which lead to a change in their habits and 
way of interacting with that technology. These new ways of dealing with technology 
shape a different structure. Orlikowski (2000) identified three possible types of 
consequences of social actions: inertia, which involves reinforcement and the 
preservation of the status quo; application, which implies reinforcement and refinement 
of the status quo; and change, associated with the transformation of the status quo. The 
findings suggest that only changes at the structure level are generated by the unintended 
consequences of actors' actions, whereas changes related with technology or work 
practices are usually a conscious result of these actions . In other perspectives on 
organizational change, Y ates et al. (1999) talk about explicit and implicit structuring, 
depending on which kind of change is involved, conscious or unconscious change, 
respectively, and Bartunek and Franzak (1988) distinguish between first order change, 
or improvements within the current structure, and second order change, or 
discontinuous shifts in structures. 
While physical characteristics of technologies play a certain role, their social aspect 
was seen as particularly important to explain organizational actions and change. 
Reviewing two decades of research on the topic, Leonardi and Barley (20 1 0) found 
five distinguishable perspectives, depending on the social phenomena they study and 
the processes they use to ex plain how the construction occur: ( 1) perception - this 
perspective looks at attitudes, beliefs and values and uses the social influence 
mechanism to explain technology-related change; (2) the interpretation perspective 
focuses on schemas and frames and suggest that technology is constructed through 
transference; (3) appropriation - scholars within this perspective explain mainly 
patterns of deviation and conformity using intra-group interactions; ( 4) enactment -
this view looks at work practices and how they change in the interaction with 
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technology, due to situated improvisations; (5) alignment- intergroup interactions are 
used to explain roles and relationships . They end the review arguing for more attention 
to materiality and power in organization theory. 
This last development, that highlights the role of technology in shaping organizational 
activities, eventually led to a new school of thought - sociomateriality (Leonardi, 20 12; 
Orlikowski, 2009; Orlikowski and Scott, 2008). Analyzing papers that took into 
account the role of technology in organizations, Orlikowski and Scott (2008) 
distinguish between two streams: one that sees humans, organizations and technology 
as separated, independent entities with their own specifie characteristics, and the other 
that sees them as interdependent systems that influence and shape each other. Drawing 
on the latter perspective, that has its roots in STRand social constructivism, Orlikowski 
and Scott (2008) proposed the concept of sociomateriality, arguing that the social and 
technical dimensions of organizational life can be best understood if studied together. 
The role of non-human actors, here technology, and of agency and reflexivity in 
changing stable structures were increasingly taken into account in later developments 
of the structuration the01y However, these elements are central in the actor-network 
theory, the other main source of inspiration for our theoretical framework. 
1.2.3 Actor-network theory 
The actor-network theory (ANT) was first developed by the sociologists Michel 
Callon, Bruno Latour and John Law (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1997; Latour and Woolgar, 
1979; Law, 1992, 1994). In this perspective, the focal pointis the interactions between 
actors involved in the social life, because these interactions are the elements that 
actually constitute both social life and actors themselves. In this sense, participants 
could be either human or non-human and are defined through the heterogeneous 
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network of their relations (Law, 1992), hence the actor-network name. For example, 
one person is identified not only in relation with his or her body, but also considering 
his familial relations, educational and work background, actual job, friends, car, 
clothes, and so on. If any of these elements would be different, then he will be a 
different person. Similarly with non-human actors, a car is a network of roles played 
by its body, engine, wheels, mirrors, lights, driver, mechanic, and so on. Nothing exists 
beyond the network, elements are either connected, so part of the network, or non-
existent (Latour, 1997). 
In order to simplify the relation with certain network elements and avoid dealing with 
large complexity, successful networks are consolidated, the so called punctualization. 
Networks that are ptmctualized are perceived as black boxes. Taking the same example, 
the caris a transportation vehicle and the usual drivers are not concerned with any other 
detail until the car breaks. In that moment, they become aware of the existence of a 
who le network beyond that car: breaks, aU component elements of the engine, the need 
to periodically change certain parts of the car and so on. The equilibrium in 
consolidated networks is still precarious, as the car can break anytime under the action 
of various elements. 
Actor-networks have preferences and tend to prioritize certain relations, depending on 
their own momentary interests. In order to overcome this centrifugai force, participants 
adopt various ordering strategies, such as translation (Callon, 1986). Callon describes 
4 moments of translation in the effort to impose a definition of the situation on other 
participants: (1) problematisation, where project leaders, for example, define the 
problem in a certain way and try to convince other participants to accept the same 
definition or obligatory passage point; (2) interessement, where certain roles are 
assigned to each actor-network who is convinced to accept the role through force, 
seduction, or solicitation; (3) enrolment, where participants are persuaded to play the 
assigned role, again through various means: physical violence, seduction, transaction, 
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or consent without discussion; finally , ( 4) mobilization of allies, where project leaders 
ensure that representatives of different collectivities involved in the translation process 
are indeed listened and followed by their collectivity. 
Callon 's mode! and especially the idea of translation and mobilization of allies has been 
used in nurnerous studies since then (see, for example, Blackburn, 2002; Missonier and 
Loufrani-Fedida, 2014; Sage et al. , 2011 ; Tryggestad et al. , 2013) . Project manager ' s 
main role is to develop and maintain relationships with different actors and so build 
convergent projects, where obligatory passage points are recognized and accepted by 
participants (Aldeman and Ivory, 2011 ). The se participant actors could be as diverse 
as: project team members, sponsoring organizations, steering groups, users, and many 
others, commonly identified as project stakeholders. They all could pull the project 
apart and, with its emphasis on actors and their role in the project, an ANT approach 
helps managers focus on this important source of project disturbances (Blackburn, 
2002) . An ANT perspective is even preferable to social network the01·y, because it sees 
stakeholders' relationships in their true color, namely dynamic, changing and 
emerging, and because it accentua tes the importance of improving act ors ' involvement 
(Missonier and Loufrani-Fedida, 2014). 
The key role of nonhuman actors has been another idea highly applied to better 
understand, among others, strategie planning (Bryson et al. , 2012), project failure 
(Tryggestad et al., 2013), new software implementation (Pollack et al. , 2013), project 
complexity (Sage et al., 2011), relationship with stakeholders (Blackburn, 2002), and 
so on. For instance, project management processes were found to be managers ' 
important allies in maintaining relationships with stakeholders, since they offer a 
framework and means to regularize and improve interaction (Blackburn, 2002) . 
Nonhurnan and human actors have an equally important role when conceiving and 
managing a project. In an ANT perspective, the strategie plan could be seen as a 
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complex network of actors and ideas (Bryson et al., 2012). AU these component 
elements interact and impact the project plruming and development. Similarly, project 
complexities are generated and managed by and with the help of both human and 
nonhuman actors (Sage et al. , 2011 ). For example, the success or failure of a new 
software implementation could not be explained only by looking at the humans 
involved in the process, as the software itself provides critical limitations (Pollack et 
al. , 2013). Moreover, nonhuman actors indirectly involved in the project could lead to 
its failure as well. Tryggestad et al. (2013) presents the case of a construction project 
that had to be stopped because it would destroy the habitat of a protected species (i.e. 
the moor frogs). An activist organization, the Society for Nature Conservation 
intervened and succeeded in convincing the regulatory authorities to stop the project. 
Let us now look at the various insights the two theories can provide to facilitate the 
analysis and the understanding ofproject evolution, the occurrence oftriggering events, 
and the development of structuring episodes. Combining them is not something new, 
Pentland and Feldman (2007) explicitly drawing on concepts from structuration theory, 
actor-network theory and routines theory when proposing the concept of narrative 
network to describe information and communication technologies in use. As already 
mentioned above, severa! other researchers also relied on insights from both theories, 
especially along the !ines of the ro le of technology vs. the role of nonhuman actors in 
organizational change as well as the role of agency in changing seemingly stable 
structures. 
1.2.4 Comparing and combining the two theories to explain project evolution 
Both theories focus on actions and relations between actors to define the social 
structure, rather than on external elements. They both see the structure as evolving 
rather than static, through the continuous action of participants. The episodic 
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representation of the social life can be applied in both cases . There is also a similar 
approach to avoid complexity and simplify relations and actions, through routinization 
(STR) and punctualization (ANT). However, while in the STR equilibrium is a natural 
state, in ANT equilibrium is precarious and depends on actors' self-centered actions. 
In the structuration the01·y perspective, actors are primarily unconsciously driven by 
structures and they tend to reproduce them. This is why, internally, changes can come 
only from the unintended consequences of actors' actions. When an unexpected event 
occurs and the usual path cannot be followed anymore, actors open the black box, 
nam ely the stratification mode! of action (Giddens, 1984): they think about the reas on 
for which they act in a specifie way, explain and reflect upon their actions . Actors have 
knowledgeability, but this is bounded by both unacknowledged conditions of action 
and unintended consequences of action. 
In the actor-network perspective, actors consciously choose their action. However, the 
richness of information that exists in society determines actors to build certain 
shortcuts, the so-called punctualized objects, similar to the routinization process in 
STR. As opposed to STR, where social actors tend to repetitively follow the existing 
paths without questioning them once agreed on their rationale (because these actors are 
able to rationally explain, if asked, the reason for which they act in a ce1iain way and 
how they act exactly), in ANT, actors are more driven by their own interest, urges and 
desires (or potentialities, for non-human actors) and are ready to change the path as 
soon as another one seems more attractive or as soon as interactions with different 
actors seem more attractive than those that have shaped the actors' behavior until that 
moment. 
In STR, change is Jess intentional and more reactive to intersections with different 
structures, for example. Actors change on! y if they must change, because the cunent 
structure cannot incorporate the impulses generated by the intersecting structures. On 
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the contrary, in ANT, change is implicit, because ali actor-networks are continuously 
following their own interest and can be easily distracted. 
Table 1.1 A comparative look at structuration theory and actor-network theory 
Elements Structuration theory Actor-network theory 
Focal po int lnterplay between structure and 1 nteractions between actor-networks 
action 
Actant Hu mans Human or non-human actor-networks 
lntentionali ty Actors have capabili ty, but act Actor-networks are driven by se lf-
routinely; refl ex ivity interest 
Role of the context Important, it conditions actors' Complete ly subordinate to actors' 
actions self-ce ntered actions 
Social structure Stable and profound ; tendency A temporary effect in precarious 
towards routinization equ ili brium ; tendency towards 
diss ipation 
Strategy of dea ling Routinization Punctua lization 1 network 
with complexity conso lidation 
Source of Internally, from un intended Actors fo llow their own interest 
structuring consequences of actors' actions or 
refl exivity; externally, fro m 
intersection with other di fferent 
structures 
Change Usually reactive, actors change lmplicit, actors can be eas ily 
when they have no other option; distracted and restructure their 
sometimes might come fro m relations 
reflexivity 
Episode Certain rules and routines are The actor-network re-arranges its 
adjusted priorities 
Role of practice Action that shape the structure Interactions that defi ne actor-
networks 
Role in Explain how so rne triggering events Explain how sorne tr iggering events 
understanding occur and how subsequent occur and how subsequent structuring 
structuring episodes structuri ng episodes actually episodes actua lly develop 
develop 
-- ---- -· ----------------
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In STR, internai sources, through unintended consequences of previous actions, 
generate mainly small transformations of the project structure. External sources, such 
as interactions with other structures can generate either major or minor changes, 
depending on the depth of this interaction and on the difference between the two 
systems. The ANT does not distinguish between small and large changes, but the 
source is always the actors' egocentric actions. For a summarized comparison, see table 
2.1. We use insights from both theories to build the theoretical mode! that will be 
presented in the next chapter. STR and ANT offer a complementary perspective that 
could help better understand how triggering events occur in large projects and how the 
subsequent structuring episodes actually develop. 
1.3 Brief sumrnary of existing perspectives 
In this chapter, we looked at the previous literature and their limitations in explaining 
major transformations in large project organizations. We started with the existing 
perspectives in project management, which we grouped in five schools, according to 
our topic of interest: traditional, event anticipation, uncertainty reduction, flexibility, 
and projects as organizations. We identified their limits in adopting a dynamic 
perspective that could more adequately explain how major transformations actually 
take place in projects, as well as in going for the deeper understanding of these 
processes and their generating events. In spite of their limitations, these project 
management schools provided severa! useful ideas for this thesis. While not fully 
identifying with any of the schools in project management, we combined 
compiementary insights regarding project structure and its evolution during the project 
lifecycle. In this sense, we adopted the view that, regardless of the effort put in the 
planning phase, unexpected events do occur and they affect projects irreversibly. 
However, in order to successfully deal with later unforeseen occurrences, the 
50 
anticipatory measures that seek to increase the flexibility respons1veness and 
adaptability of the project structure are not sufficient. Because projects are distinct 
temporary organizations, affected by complex and autonomous structuring processes 
which have unintended consequences, the planers ' and strategists ability to channel and 
control their response to events is limited. Therefore we believe that it is important to 
deepen our understanding of these processes, both in how they lead to the emergence 
of an organizational tissue in projects and in how they affect the evolution of project 
organizations in response to unexpected events. We consider the human factor, with its 
unpredictable nature, critical in these processes, but we also believe that understanding 
them requires a deeper and more systematic grasp of the social and material relations 
between project participants oftheir dynamics. 
Therefore, as recommended by Floricel et al. (20 14) and others, we answered to recent 
calls to use insights from broader organizational theories in project management. In 
this sense, we sought inspiration in severa! sociological theories, such as structuration 
theory, actor-network theory and Luhmann ' s systemic view as well as in recent 
perspectives on organizational change. While incurring certain limitations, they 
provided us with useful insights that will enable us to build a coherent perspective on 
transformations in major project organizations, as it will be explained in more detail in 
the next chapter. For example, Luhmann ' s idea of episodes (1995) and the ptmctuated 
equilibrium mode! (Gersick, 1991) inspired the core concept of this thesis, namely the 
structuring episode. At the same time, elements from structuration theory and ANT 
guided our effort to build a new representation of the project structure that would 
provide a deeper understanding of the elements involved in major transformations. 
The following chapter ex plains how we used these sources of inspiration in more detail. 
CHAPTERII 
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE TEMPORARY ORGANIZATION 
STRUCTURE AND ITS EVOLUTION 
In this chapter, we introduce the theoretical framework that guided us in collecting and 
analyzing our data. The theoretical development presented in this section grew out of 
our reflection regarding current theories of organizational change, and their limited 
ability to account for the frequency and diversity of patterns of major transformations 
occurring in complex temporary organizations. This reflection led us to realize that the 
specifie nature of project organizations, which emerge from interactions between ad 
hoc participants and grow as well as change continuously in the course of project 
planning and execution, would benefit from a relational view of organization and from 
a ri cher theorizing of the emergence and change of underlying relations. 
As a result of this reflection and drawing upon sorne existing organization theories, we 
begin this chapter by proposing a new four-strata framework for temporary 
organization, which emphasizes cognitive and, respectively, volitional connections 
between project participants. The four-strata framework results from the distinction we 
propose for each type of connection between, on the one hand, connections that rely on 
factors that are internai to organizational actors, namely implicit representations and 
spontaneous interests, and, on the other hand, connections that are expressed in the 
project social arena as explicit representations and regularized interests. 
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This theorization of connections enables us to define project organizations as evolving 
networks in which actors are connected simultaneously by various types of 
representational and volitional relations. These relations vary in terms of strength and 
durability; sorne of them are qui te ephemeral , while others are fragile with respect to 
various events that occur in projects. The overall nexus of multidimensional relations 
is able to support and respond to a range of smaller deviations and events, but it cannot 
deal with major events. When confronted with major events, the configuration of 
relations undergoes significant transformations and a new configuration of relations 
emerges. In the second part of the chapter, inspired by the punctuated equilibrium 
theory, we suggest that these major transformations occur episodically and we 
introduce the new concept of "structuring episodes" to explain these revolutionary 
transformations. 
In the third part of the chapter, we explain that major transformations are generated by 
triggering events and, after a brief literature review, we elaborate on how these events 
could look like in our perspective, where they could occur, and why they could lead to 
structuring episodes as opposed to regulru· structure adaptations. We end the chapter 
with sorne considerations on structuring episodes. 
2.1 A New Perspective on the Project Structure 
In this section, we present our new perspective on understanding the project structure. 
Drawing on various existing theories, but being particularly inspired by structuration 
and actor-network theories, we distinguish between the network of actors ' 
representations about the project and the network of their interests in the project. We 
further refine this framework by highlighting hidden and apparent elements that 
constitute this structure, to end with a new model of the project structure that consists 
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of four strata: implicit representations, explicit representations, regularized interests, 
and spontaneous interests. 
2.1.1 Organizations as Networks of Actors ' Representations and Interests 
We see the social structure of projects as a heterogeneous set of relations between 
actors. Inspired by a long line of theorists in philosophy, sociology and organization 
science (Blumer, 1969; Callon, 1986; Cullen et al, 2000; Giddens, 1984; Levinthal and 
Rerup, 2006; Nietzsche, 2000; Schopenhauer, 1966), we make a first distinction 
between the two main forces that govern the development of any human and, in 
particular, any organizational activity, namely volition, or the network of actors ' 
interests that compose a project, and representation, or the network of cognitive 
connections. 
Dichotomies mind-body or spiritual-material have long been present in most of the 
world's religions and philosophical schools. Social sciences followed the trend. Sorne 
schools of thought such as cognitivists in psychology, symbolic interactionists in 
sociology and decision-making theorists in organization sciences, gave primacy to the 
mind, with its ability to construct a representation of the world, and to the rational 
aspects of human action. Others, such as behaviourists in psychology and conflict 
theorists in sociology and organization science, focused on the material, instinctual and 
emotional aspects of human and nonhuman actors. Inspired by Schopenhauer (1966), 
in the following, we use the term volition (or "will") to designate the material, 
biological and instinctual aspects of human actors, su ch as urges, desires, affinities and 
pathologies. Likewise, we use ' representation' to designate the cognitive aspects, 
including mental frames, tacit knowledge and routines but also externat 
representations, such as plans and procedures. While the "dualism" tradition attempts 
to separate the two aspects (Descartes, 2003), we argue that they are intertwined in 
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social actors and organizational life; they equally hamper or facilitate organizational 
activities . Schopenhauer (1966) argues that volition and representation are two facets 
of the same coin. Nietzsche (2000) concurs, by suggesting that social actors have both 
Apollonian and Dionysian drives to act; put otherwise, they act, based on reason and 
logical thinking as weil as on emotions and instincts. Even Descartes (2003) agrees that 
mind and body continuously interact and influence each other. 
In our perspective, the volitional side is the result of natural selection, which is 
imprinted in actors via biological mechanisms and their emotional and action-drive 
correlates. In its natural expression, volition includes ali spontaneous impulses, affects, 
desires and urges of any social actor. While this side of human actors is totally 
subsumed to the forces present in the physical and biological reality, in its social and 
organizational manifestations it appears as the realm of free will , self-determination 
and power. For example, it is the driver behind managers taking decisions based on 
instinctual logic, gut feelings (Damasio, 1994) and apparently incomprehensible 
rationale (Taylor, 2006). 
Evolution imprints in most living beings a certain representation of the ir world, which 
in its primitive fonns is as simple as the ' image' of a single molecule that can be 
ingested. More advanced species have the ability to form and update through learning 
a much more complex image of the external world. But, it is important to note that this 
representation is constructed via biological and cognitive processes and serves the goal 
of survival in the world. In human societies, representations are also socially 
constructed; they are a sort of illusions transferred and instilled from one generation to 
the next (Berger and Luckman, 1966). In our framework, representations are the result 
of actors' cognitive process of perceiving and interpreting the world. In the 
organizational !ife, these representations could take the form of categorizations, 
routines, procedures, scripts, drawings or any other elements that are used by 
participants to portray other actors, the project and its context. 
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In recent years, other organization science scholars have acknowledged the 
omnipresence of this duality in organizational activities. For instance, Zbaracki and 
Bergen (20 1 0) identified both cognitive and motivational aspects incorporated in 
truces, while Marengo and Pasquali (2012) found that principals face both conflicting 
interests and diverging cognitive visions and, in order to deal with them, appeal to 
either existing structures and routines or incentives and authority. Finally, analyzing 
trust and commitment in alliances, Cullen et al. (2000) argue for the equal importance 
of both hard or rational and soft or emotional aspects in starting and maintaining an 
alliance. Actors would choose their partners not only for rational reasons, but also if 
they feel they could trust them and believe their partners will make everything in their 
power to make the alliance work. 
The two aspects are intertwined because representations are constructions produced by 
a cognitive apparatus that is evolutionarily attuned to align with the lines of force 
present in nature. In turn, cognitive outcomes, such as calculations regarding an actor 's 
interests and the best way to attain them or rules for behaviour expressed in social 
norms, can amplify, tame or delay satisfaction for certain volitional urges. These two 
interrelated aspects are present at all time in organizational actors, but at sorne moments 
one of them may take precedence over the other. We will use this differentiai 
expression to account for the unexpected durability or fragility of project organizations, 
as well as for the complexity and variety of patterns in the structuring episodes. 
2.1.2 Apparent and Hidden Elements of the Structure 
A second distinction we make is between the apparent and hidden elements of the 
structure (Brown and Duguid, 2001; Polanyi, 1966). Sorne elements are more visible, 
or exposed in the social arena (Goffman, 1969), where all participant actors but also 
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external observers could see them. This kind of connection is many-to-many, and, 
because of this, it abstracts from many specifies of ac tors and proj ect elements. These 
connections establish, for example, a primary course of action (DeChurch and Haas, 
2008) and represent a reference point that guides participants in the development of 
their respective activities or in solving later misunderstandings and conflicts. Other 
relations are internai to social actors, and define their connection to specifie 
organizational elements such as an object or task, orto another actor or local group of 
actors; most other actors in a project are unaware of these connections. They remain 
hidden during project development, and wweil only in critical moments, as we can see 
below. 
With the representational and volitional aspect and with the further division into 
apparent and hidden relations we obtain the four strata that compose our framework, 
which we call, respective! y, implicit representations, explicit representations, 
regularized interests and spontaneous interests (see Figure 2.1 ). 
Volitional 
connections 
lmplicit representations: habits, categorizations, activity 
routines, spatial trajectories, and interactions scripts 
Regularized interests: commitments and agreements 
that allocate responsibilities, rewards and risks 
Spontaneous interests: impulses, desires, urges, 
affinities, animosities, and fears 
Figure 2. 1 A new perspective on the project structure - the project as a network of 
cognit ive and vo li t iona l connections 
Explicit and implicit representations 
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The im pli cit representations are a set of hidden cogni t ive connections, such as 
categorizations, act iv ity ro uti nes, spat ial trajector ies, interactions scri pts , bel iefs, and 
habits (Fe ldman and Pentland , 2003 ; G iddens, 1984). They are in tensive ly used by 
soc ial actors to lower the compl exity of everyday organizationa l !i fe and activ ities. 
They subtly gui de actors ' actions , so these do not need to reflect upon each and every 
step and dec ision that has to be taken. 
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There are two main groups of implicit representations: pre-project and project-specific 
implicit representations. Actors join the project with a set of their own pre-project 
representations and these are cognitive connections developed during prior activities 
(Nysten-Haarala et al., 2010; Prencipe and Tell , 2001). Organizations have their own 
routines and habits about how to perform a certain action, how to interpret a specifie 
technical drawing or how to communicate with other participants. In new 
circumstances, actors will still tend to use them and this might sometimes come in 
con:flict with other actors' pre-project implicit representations, as we will discuss 
below. At the same time, during project lifecycle, actors also develop project-specific 
implicit representations that are their interpretation of project explicit elements. These 
are expressions of a situated understanding (Lave and Wenger, 1991) re garding how to 
collaborate with specifie partners, how to perform specifie activities in particular 
contexts, and how to read a specifie scheme made by a certain actor. 
Explicit representations could be seen as explicit projections of the project goals, form 
and benefits, as well as of interaction patterns, such as procedures, rules, principles, 
contracts, work breakdown structures, organizational charts, etc. (Levi-Strauss, 2008; 
Weick and Roberts, 1993). They go beyond defining responsibilities and allocating 
resources, and aim to develop agreement among participants (Okhuysen and Bechky, 
2009). They are meant to synchronize perceptions and so build a shared interpretation 
about the project and its corresponding activities (Bartunek, 1984; De Bakker et al., 
20 Il; Pilbeam, 2013 ). This shared understanding is more successful if all relevant 
actors participate in its conception (Weick and Roberts, 1993). Explicit representations 
are ultimately the public compromise of actors ' understanding or interpretation of 
reality, negotiated among different cognitive systems. They could be either formai , 
such as a project organization chart, or informai , such as mutually agreed 
interpretations or socially accepted reputations (Bachmann and lnkpen, 20 Il) . 
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Explicit representations could be further interpreted in different ways by social actors 
(Orlikowski, 1992). For instance, an electrical diagram might specify all component 
elements, but might be less clear with regard to certain technical specifications, such 
as manufacturing procedures, rated data, or materials to be used to build these 
components. Similarly, unless clearly specified, delivery dates and accepted quality of 
deliveries might be interpreted in very different ways by the supplier and the client. For 
these reasons, a high level of details is sometimes used in contracts, which limits the 
diversity of possible interpretations (Badenfelt, 2011 ; Von Branconi and Loch, 2004). 
Considering that implicit representations are actors ' own interpretations of the project 
reality, they have a strong tacit component and so are difficult to understand by other 
partners. Project managers build explicit representations to facilitate collaboration and 
coordination (Valentine and Edmonson, 2014) and to connect activities ac ross space 
and time (Floricel et al. , 2011 b ). Due to these explicit elements, knowledge can flow 
easily between different actors (Brown and Duguid, 2001 ; Dogherty, 1992) with 
positive effects on the end result. 
Implicit representations have cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), so actors will tend 
to use them and impose the use of their own implicit representation to other actors . 
That is why explicit representations need to be built to have also an integratory role 
and prevent the use of individual ac tors' inapplicable implicit representations that could 
later come in conflict (Heimeriks et al. , 2012). Failing to achieve this integration could 
have a major impact on the project goal and development, as we can see in the last part 
of this chapter. 
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Spontaneous and regularized interests 
The actors' volition is naturally in the form ofwhat we cali spontaneous interests, such 
as impulses, urges, desires, but also affinities, animosities and fears . Feelings and 
emotions influence actors' behavior, sometimes decisions being made on the basis that 
organizations and individuals feel or believe the others will behave with good will 
(Becker, 1960; Damasio, 1994; Johnson et al., 1996; Mowday et al., 1982). In general, 
previous research bas found that rational and emotional aspects are equally present in 
organizationallife (Kramer, 1999; Moorman et al., 1993). Although this topic is less 
often mentioned in the literature, charisma, physical attraction, greed, and even disease, 
including mental illness, can be the source of attachment to other participants, to 
objects and to the project itself. The literature in social network and alliance formation 
shows that similar motives can be extended to inter-organizational relations. . 
Organizations have been found to select their collaborators not only for rational 
reasons, but also because they feel they can trust them and they believe their partners 
will be committed to the alliance (Cullen et al., 2000). Organizations also prefer 
partners that are strong or prestigious (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart, 
1998), that have a similar status (Chung et al. , 2000), with whom are compatible 
(Brouthers et al. , 1995), to whom would be proud to cooperate (Cullen et al., 2000), or 
that have a collaborative culture (Brouthers et al., 1995). For these reasons, they often 
prefer to collaborate with prior partners whom they know they can trust (Gulati, 1995). 
Spontaneous interests often lead to seemingly irrational behavior, for instance when 
actors neglect to follow the traditional, well-developed and widely-accepted 
recommendations and ways of action. This is beneficiai in dynamic or uncertain 
environments, since it generates creative ideas and solutions to new and complex 
problems (Brady and Davies, 2014; Obstfeld, 2012), but could also produce 
misunderstandings and conflicts since the partners do not expect such unpredictable 
behavior (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003 ; Werder, 2011). 
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A project brings together organizational actors with a large diversity of spontaneous 
interests and ali try to satisfy their desires and impose their own interests: project 
management team, parent organization, other departments within the parent 
organization, contractors and subcontractors, clients, regulatory authorities, local and 
national authorities, local comrnunity, activists and other groups of interest, scientific 
comrnunity, media, general public, and other actors that may somehow have an interest 
in the project. AU these actors are aligned and kept under control through regularized 
interests, understood as mutual agreements that allocate responsibility, rewards and 
risks (Lenfle and Loch, 201 0). Regularized interests are not al ways formai and can take 
the form of comrnitments or mutual unofficial agreements. 
The regularized elements enable project managers to interest and enroll participant 
organizations and to mobilize the support of sponsors and other players (Blackburn, 
2002; Callon, 1986). This implies that actors will not be distracted by other networks 
of interest or by other competing relations within their network, and will stay aligned 
with the project and contribute toits success. For example, contractors will assign their 
best teams to the focal project rather than to other projects in which they are involved 
and, when facing challenges, will stay close and put all their effort toward the interest 
of the project rather than seek to maximize own gains. 
Different tools and strategies are used to build and strengthen these regularized 
elements, such as partnering sessions (Aarseth et al., 2012; Ross, 2009), contracting 
strategies (Hallgren, 2007; Von Branconi and Loch, 2004), or joint risk management 
sessions (De Bakker et al ., 2012; Osipova and Eriksson, 2013). For instance, contracts 
ensure that the two pruiies will both act in the interest of the project owners and will 
satisfactorily collaborate in the face of future challenges (Floricel and Lam pel, 1998; 
Von Branconi and Loch, 2004). Joint risk management sessions define relations and 
allocate responsibilities between actors, while integrating different interests and 
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perspectives (De Bakker et al., 20 12). Partnering sessions link actors at different levels, 
develop trust and friendship, and transform weak ties into strong ties (Ross, 2009). 
Proj ect formation 
This distinction between hidden and visible elements enables us, among others, to 
explain how projects are initiated. A project is not a chaotic collection of 
representations and interests of participant social ac tors, but ali these elements are (and 
have to be) brought into a temporary equilibrium by project managers. Social actors 
have their own spontaneous interests . In order to have a project, the project initiators 
have to bring ali these spontaneous interests together and align them with a common 
goal- the project goal or, in a richer perspective, with a part of this common goal (or 
build a coalition- Callon, 1986). The project then results from the complex conjunction 
of these interests. To ensure certain stability and project support, they regularize these 
interests in formai or informai agreements and commitments (build punctualized 
abjects in ANT terms). 
Similarly, each actor can be seen as belonging to a network of cognitive connections 
with its own representations of the organizational reality (for example, the set of 
routines and procedures about how to develop certain activities that the actor bring 
from the organization from which she originates). When building a project, project 
initiators have to also take ali existing implicit routines of different participants that 
will be further involved in the project and bring them together under a common agreed 
and visible form (Weick and Roberts, 1993), for instance, an explicit framework of 
procedures to be applied in that project. These forms shape future project-specific 
activities, which in turn are repeatedly reproduced and routinized until they become 
taken for granted (Feldman and Pentland, 2003 ; Giddens, 1984; Rerup and Feldman, 
2011). 
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In a sense, building a project is similar with creating boundary abjects (Carlile, 2002; 
Di Marco et al., 2012; Spee and Jarzabkowski, 2009), because ultimately the project 
lies at the intersection of multiple cognitive systems and divergent interests . Project 
initiators create explicit representations and regularized elements to establish bridges 
between conflicting views and promote a common language and understanding. These 
elements facilitate later coordination and allow actors to understand their role, position 
and responsibilities within the project structure (Sca.rbrough et al. , 20 15). 
2.1.3 The role of the four strata 
In projects, the anchor is the visible part of the structure. Projects are temporary 
organizations, constituted more or less on an ad-hoc basis. Therefore, they need time 
to develop specifie implicit cognitive connections and spontaneous affinities with 
project elements and with other participants. This is why the common aspects accepted 
by ali actors, namely the visible elements, guide the project development, participants' 
actions, and mutual relations. 
Because projects experience a high turnover of involved actors as they advance in 
planning and further into implementation, we see the implicit side of cognitive 
connections as playing a role that is less inertial than that suggested by structuration 
theory (Giddens, 1984 ). The main role of the mutual categorizations and routines that 
emerge from the relatively brief span of interactions between participants is to separate 
their paths (Floricel et al., 2011 b) and so to guide actors to act in non-colliding ways. 
These implicit representations will fade into oblivion or will be reshaped by the 
unintended consequences of participants ' actions as the network grows (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003; Giddens, 1984 ), but also by the intersections with new cognitive 
systems, as actors will join or leave the project (Giddens, 1984; Hanisch and Wald, 
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2011 ). As much as possible, pmticipants tend to follow the tentative paths and on! y 
react when collisions become unavoidable. However, in our view, explicit 
representations have the strongest stabilizing impact in projects. Our argument differs 
from the ones found in institutionalization theories, which argue that only 
representations that become taken for granted can ensure stability in organizations. In 
projects, the fixity of explicit representations ensure that participm1ts can continue to 
work efficiently instead of continually renegotiating agreements and plans. Because of 
the reasons explained above, there is simply not enough time for action routinizing 
based on repeated interactions to achieve a similarly comprehensive coordination and 
agreement between participm1ts. Hence, participants have an interest in maintaining 
explicit representations unchanged, with the exception of their w1folding into 
increasingly detailed forms during project development and planning activities. Actors 
will resent changing these representations if no major problem appears and will 
continue to follow the guidance offered by these representations. In doing so, they force 
other actors to do the sa111e thing, because otherwise this will lead to conflicts. This 
amounts to a sort of reinforcing mechanism that keeps the representations, and the 
organizational networks they co1mect, stable. 
On the other hand, we suggest that the spontaneous side of volitional connections is 
more unstable. In theorizing these connections, we were inspired by actor-network 
theory, which sees actors as continuously distracted by other connections, actors and 
opportunities, and argues that maintaining the organizational network requires a 
constant effort to co-interest and motivate all actors (Latour, 1997; Law, 1994). In 
discussing the volition stratwn, we interpret this theory as insisting on the creation of 
material conditions and stimuli, as opposed to cognitive fran1es , that attract and bind 
participants to the project. For spontaneous volition, maintaining the network relies on 
dyadic attraction and repulsion that results from creating such conditions. Given the 
changes in actor composition, the competing stimuli and the continuing change in 
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actors ' urges, the eff011 required for maintaining the stability of the network is very 
high. 
In order to prevent actors from leaving the network or from acting opportunistically 
against the interests of the project, actors also build regularized elements that 
emphasize control (Lenfle and Loch, 201 0) . Concretely, in projects, they may consist 
of formai agreements and commitments that translate in material elements such as 
fences, designated paths and surveillance systems, with differentiai rights to access 
areas, to verify the completion of tasks, and to effect inputs into information systems, 
such as approvals and payments. For reasons that are similar to those presented for 
explicit representations, organizational actors have an interest to maintain the stability 
of these regularized interests. It is difficult to find a network configuration that strikes 
a balance between key ac tors ' interests, let al one one in which the se interests become 
interlocking. Therefore, within certain limits, key actors may develop a vested interest 
in maintaining the balance that has been fow1d, which en sures a certain stability of the 
network of regularized interests. However, researchers have also fütmd that, as opposed 
to perennial organizations, in temporary organizations the relational coordination 
through networks and social mechanisms has to complement the formai authority 
(Beckhy, 2006). Moreover, when facing challenges, the network of organizational 
actors will collaborate better if they managed to develop a specifie project relational 
identity (Clark et al., 201 0; Hogg et al. , 20 12). 
However, aberrant and opportunistic behavior is inherent, for example, because 
participants seek to optimize results for their own organization rather than the project 
(De Man and Roijakkers, 2009) and because their cognitive frames often change and 
collide. These observations raise the question: how does the project structure deal with 
these constant challenges? The focus of this thesis is to answer this question. With this 
aim in mind we propose the concept of structuring episode, which will be explained in 
the following sections of this chapter. 
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2.2 The Expected Project Evolution 
In this section, we present our perspective on the project evolution during its lifecycle. 
Inspired by the punctuated equilibrium mode!, we introduce the concept of structuring 
episode to explain the short revolutionary transformations that punctuate the long stable 
periods of incrementai adaptation of the project structure. We also use insights from 
structuration theory and actor-network theory to build on the four-stratum model 
introduced in the previous section. 
2.2.1 Organizational change - continuous or/and revolutionary 
We argue that the project structure is not static, but dynarnic and evolving, because it 
must adapt to new realities. The need to change is real and has to be taken into account 
to reach greater performance. The fact that the relational framework we presented in 
the previous section includes elements that instill different degrees of stabilization in 
the project network enables us to seek inspiration in the punctuated equilibrium theory 
to combine perspectives on organizational change that claim this could be either 
continuous (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Rindova and 
Kotha, 2001) or revolutionary (Kuhn, 1970; Lewin, 1951; Meyer, 1982). 
Previous research has argued that the natural state of organizations is ongoing change, 
since organizations need to continuously adapt to transformations in their environment 
as well as incorporate new experiences and knowledge created through ac tors' mutual 
interactions (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). In the project management discipline, flexibility 
and projects as organizations perspectives have particularly supported this view 
arguing that the project structure needs to be constantly renegotiated arnong actors as 
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new participantsjoin the project or existing actors change their role (Sommer and Loch, 
2004; Sutherland et al., 2009; Verganti, 1999). This view is in agreement with actor-
network theory, in which networks change as they are maintained (except for black-
boxed networks). Sorne interpretations of structuration theory could also be included 
here, since theorists saw organizations in continuous morphing as structures are shaped 
and reshaped with every actor ' s action (Feldman and Pentland, 2003 ; Rindova and 
Kotha, 2001). 
Another stream of research suggested that change is sporadic and results from 
organizations ' adaptation to turbulent events (Meyer, 1982; Staw et al., 1981 ; Piperca 
and Floricel, 2012). Especially in project management, with its emphasis on planning 
and controlling for deviations, change occurs only when the existing project structure 
is challenged by a force too powerful to be ignored (Beckhy and Okhuysen, 2011 ; 
Hallgren and Maaninen-Olsson, 2009). Most theories of organizational 
institutionalization, including the traditional understanding of structuration theory 
(Barley, 1986; Giddens, 1984), would suppo11 such views. 
However, other researchers claimed that organizational change could be either 
continuous or episodic, depending on which cognitive concepts or structural relations 
are involved in the process (Mitchel, 2014). Continuous change entails refinements of 
the status quo and generally a stable and recognizable structure, while episodic change 
involves a significant transformation of the status quo and a shift in structures 
(Bartunek and Frarrzak, 1988; Orlikowski , 2000). The routine theory scholars used the 
leve! of inertia displayed by routines to explain the distinction, strongly inertial 
structures being associated with a more continuous change and innovative ones with 
episodic change (D' Adderio, 2014; F eldman and Pentland, 2003). In the ir turn, 
Orlikowski and Hoffman (1997) related the two models of change with the type of 
environment: the episodic change as described by Lewin (1952) is a planned change 
and is appropriate for stable organizations and environments; on the contrary, the 
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ongoing change is improvisational and more appropriate for dynamic environments. 
Finally, the two types of change were also found to follow a different logic, the episodic 
change employing the Lewin' s unfreeze-transform-refreeze mode!, as opposed to the 
freeze-rebalance-unfreeze used in the continuous change (Weick and Quinn, 1999). 
In this study, we mainly rely on a modified punctuated equilibrium mode! to explain 
how project structures evolve over time (Ambos and Birkinshaw, 2010; Ballinger and 
Rockman, 2010; Gersick, 1991 ; Sloan and Oliver, 2013). The traditional punctuated 
equilibrium mode! suggests that long stable periods in which same activities, relations 
and routines are reproduced are suddenly interrupted by demands to readjust the project 
structure and incorporate the impulses generated by various internai or external forces . 
Our equivalent of the equilibrium period is a period of what we call controlled 
unfolding in which bounded change takes place continuously. Controlled unfolding 
re fers essentially to the 'waterfall ' increase in the detail of explicit representations and 
the appending of new actors to the regularized volition assemblage, together with the 
interactions that follow from these explicit elements. The bounded continuous change 
that accompanies this controlled unfolding refers to the limited mutual adjustments in 
interactions routines and in the dyadic attraction-repulsion relations which enable the 
project organization to overcome a host ofrelatively minor events and problems that it 
encounters on an ongoing base. 
On the other hand, challenging events require more important changes that may be in 
conflict with the current system of explicit representations and regularized volition. 
Such events sometimes launch periods of revolutionary change that lead to a significant 
restructuring ofthese explicit relations. The inertialmechanisms described above make 
such major transformations relatively rare, which makes our mode! very similar to a 
punctuated equilibrium pattern. 
-------------
----------------------------------
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We find that both structuration theory and actor-network theory are compatible with 
the punctuated equilibrium model, so we use insights from both theories in our 
endeavor to explain the evolution of temporary organizations. As presented in the 
previous section, we find the more inertial mechanisms depicted in Structuration theory 
as a great source of inspiration to understand how the network of actors ' cognitive 
connections evolves and this could be particularly applicable during stable periods (see 
also London and Siva, 2011 ). We suggest that similar mechanisms apply during 
revolutionary periods, transformations in the cognitive network being more ine1iial and 
reactive, and tending toward equilibrium. In turn, we use the higher leve! of agency 
assumed in the Actor-network theory as a base of our explanation regarding how the 
network of volitional connections evolves. Radical changes would also unfold 
foUowing a more active and hectic pattern. 
We suggest that extraordinary incidents launch revolutionary periods and we caU them 
triggering events. In this sense, during stable periods, implicit representations separate 
trajectories and spontaneous interests, although changing aU the time, are in a relative 
equilibrium, being kept under control through regularized elements . The triggering 
event perturbs the smooth operation of routines and generates clashes between different 
cognitive systems that eventuaUy lead to major transformations in the project structure. 
Similarly, at times, interests are expressed with such a power that overcomes a certain 
threshold and only significant transformations of the status-quo would keep the actors 
aligned and interested in the project. 
2.2.2 Episodes as Expressions of Organizational Change 
Social actors prefer structural stability and clarity in order to be able to work - build, 
design, operate (Swartz, 2008). They pay less attention to structural influences and 
shortcomings until facing a problem that reveals new aspects that draw their attention. 
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To deal with the problem, they activate specifie change-making activities. Inspired by 
the previous literature, we see major project transformations as occurring in episodes 
(Gersick, 1991; Hendry and Seidl , 2003 ; Luhmann, 1995; Miller and Olleros, 2001). 
Therefore, we define the structuring episode as the process of transition from an 
existing for rn of organizing project activities ta a new one, as a result of participants' 
response ta interna! or externalforces. 
In stable periods, routines work as intended (non-intersecting trajectories) and 
spontaneous interests are aligned with a common goal or parts of it. The project is not 
completely frozen, it still evolves, but only in increments, through small adjustments, 
because the project structure has the ability to incorporate ali the necessary 
modifications. Structuring episodes occur when, at certain moments in time, the 
impulse generated by a triggering event overcome the capacity of the current structure 
to absorb it. For example, such an event could be an unexpected technical malfunction 
that requires major interventions - a critical technical element has to be replaced, in 
consequence the work on that subproject has to stop, new additional resources are 
needed, along with new agreements between parties to clarify responsibilities, and so 
on. 
The idea of episode was inspired by the work of the German sociologist Niklas 
Luhmann (1995), in the sense of an exceptional period in the organizationallife when 
different rules and routines apply and the organization takes its time to reflect on the 
situation and initiate change (see also section 1.2.1 ). The idea was later adapted to 
describe the decision-making process during strategy workshops and led to the concept 
of strategie episode (Hendry and Seidl, 2003; Jarzabkowski and Seidl, 2008; Johnson 
et al. , 2010). Giddens (1984) also used the concept of episode to depict the emergence 
of a functional structure, while other scholars also highlighted the role of episodes in 
organizational change (Michel, 20 14; Miller and Lessard, 2001; Miller and Olleros, 
2001). 
_ 1 
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In the last section of this chapter, we will discuss the concept of structuring episode in 
more detail, but first we focus on understanding the event that triggers this 
revolutionary transformation. 
2.3 Triggering events 
In this subchapter, we briefly rev1ew the existing literature on turbulent events, 
presenting the main types of events that have been found to affect organizations and 
projects. We use insights from the structuration theory, actor-network theory and 
project management literature to explain the locus of generation and the logic of 
occurrence of these events. We suggest that triggering events are expressions of 
colliding implicit representations or divergent spontaneous interests that overcome a 
certain threshold beyond which the existing project structure cannot incorporate 
challenges anymore and a structuring process is required. 
2.3 .1 Triggering events in the literature 
Turbulent events have been a major concern in organization studies, since they can lead 
to major losses and the affected organization has to react in a way that might completely 
change its strategy, system of routines, partnerships, competitive advantages, markets, 
etc. Depending on the angle of analysis researchers have called them: crises (Hwang 
and Lichtenthal, 2000; Kahn et al. , 20 13), anchoring events (Bal linger and Rockrnann, 
201 0), me ga events (Tilcsik and Marquis, 20 13), field-configuring events (Hardy and 
Macguire, 201 0; Schüssler et al. , 2014 ), cri ti cal events or incidents (Ahola et al. , 2011 ; 
Chandler, 2014; Sloan and Oliver, 2013), unexpected events (Geraldi et al. 2010; 
Piperca and Floricel, 20 12; Soderholm, 2008), surprises (Beckhy and Okhyusen, 2011 ), 
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or precipitating influences (Power and Reid, 2005). The occurrence of these events 
could vary from the very rare mega-events and natural disasters (see for example 
Tilcsik and Marquis, 2013) or field-configuring events (Schüssler et al., 2014) to the 
extremely high frequency of critical events that can occur in projects developed in 
extreme environments (Aubry et al., 2010; Hallgren and Maaninen-Olson, 2009). 
Previous research has adopted different approaches regarding what typology of events 
is more relevant for theory and useful for practitioners. Sorne researchers focused on 
the impact of events distinguishing between local, when one event affects one activity 
or sub-project, and global impact, when its effect propagates at the leve! of the entire 
organization (Yates et al., 1997). In project management, Thamhain (20 13) further 
refined the global impact, differentiating between events that affect sub-projects, the 
whole project, or the project and the whole parent organization. Other researchers 
looked at the mode of occurrence: abrupt events occur suddenly, while cumulative 
events become stringent intime (Hallgren, 2009; Hwang and Lichtenthal, 2000). Yet 
others analyzed the locus of generation, identifying exogenous events that regard for 
example technology, economical situation, market, or institutions, and endogenous 
events that are related with management, capabilities, strategy, resources, culture or 
power (Liguori, 20 12; Piperca and Floricel, 20 12; Vuori et al , 2013 ). 
In project management, turbulent events required an even greater deal of attention. A 
whole subdomain, risk management, was dedicated to predicting and preparing for 
turbulences. Theoreticians and practitioners alike focused on understanding them by 
looking at the component elements of the project structure that could be affected. For 
instance, events may affect the project scope, schedule or resources (Kendrick, 2003) 
or the product, the process or people involved (Wallace et al ., 2004) . As more and more 
projects became larger and more complex, two other perspectives emerged. The first 
regards the multi-organizational aspect in projects (see also section 1.1.6) and suggests 
that events could also be predicted and understood by loo king at actors and their mutual 
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relations, for instance project team, contractors, top management, other projects or 
departments within the parent organization, partners, etc. (Aaltonen et al., 201 0; Artto 
et al. , 2008). The second refers to the international aspect of projects and draws 
attention to local conditions and cultural and national differences (Orr and Scott, 2008; 
Steffey and Anantatmula, 2011). Finally, other researchers discuss the level of 
predictability of unexpected events, arguing that sorne although predicted had a higher 
impact than initially previewed, others could have been predicted but were not, while 
a third category were virtually unpredictable (Piperca and Floricel, 20 12). 
We draw on this literature, but also on insights from structuration theory and actor-
network theory to explain our perspective on the events that trigger revolutionary 
transformations of the project structure. We suggest that these events could generate 
mainly in the two hidden strata as expressions of either colliding implicit 
representations or diverging spontaneous interests (see Figure 2.2 and 2.3). We present 
our rationale in the following sections. 
2.3.2 Events as colliding implicit routines 
As opposed to perennial organizations, temporary organizations experience a different 
logic of action and evolution. In perennial organizations, visible elements co-exist with 
specifie hidden elements. The latter enrich and strengthen the former and the 
organization becomes a homogenous whole. For instance, work procedures are 
understood and applied through associated work routines, which, in turn, are refined 
over time to correct misunderstandings and illuminate unclear aspects . On the contrary, 
in temporary organizations, specifie implicit representations are scarce, since they need 
time to develop and in the time-limited organizations this is often impossible (Engwall 
and Westling, 2004; Hanisch and Wald, 2011). In large projects, that last several years, 
implicit representations have more time to develop, but they are continuously 
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cha llenged smce actors jo in or leave the proj ect, as the ir partic ipati on IS onl y 
temporary. Moreover, actors cannat integra ll y use, fo r example, routines deve lo ped in 
prev ious projects or inherited from their parent organizations, as each project is unique 
in terms of goa ls, partic ipants and acti viti es (Hani sch and Wa ld , 2011 ; Hobday, 2000) . 
In consequence, the implic it representati on stratum would be composed ofoccas iona ll y 
co lliding e lements that continuous ly need to readjust to ensure a smooth deve lo pment 
of acti viti es. 
While the proj ect structure has the ability to inco rporate sma ll f ri cti ons between 
ac tors' different interpretati ons and representati ons of project goa ls, schedule and 
acti v ities, at times di fferences are substantial. Representati ons do not play the ir ro le 
to separate traj ectori es anymore and the co lli sio n overcomes a certa in thresho ld 
beyond which signifi cant transformati ons of the CUITent stru cture are required (See 
Figure 2.2) . Thi s usua ll y in vo lves changes in the network of expli c it representations, 
but co uld a Iso irradiate to affect the network of vo l iti ona l connecti ons. 
Triggering event 
(coll iding implicit 
.------------~~~~-~r::ep~r::e:_se~ntati_o_ns_) _________ _ 
lmplicit representations 
Regularized interests 
Spontaneous interests 
Figure 2 .2 T riggering events as co lliding impli c it representati ons 
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Where could these major collisions generate? In the existing literature, we identified 
three main sources : colliding ac tors ' pre-project representations, conflictual 
interpretations of project-specific representations, and emerging conflicts between 
implicit representations. Firstly, as mentioned before, actors tend to keep and use the 
implicit representations with which they are familiar (Ruuska and Brady, 2011) or that 
were suggested or imposed by their parent organization (Andersen et al., 2009; Rees-
Caldwell and Pinnington, 2013; Vuori etal., 2013), but which might not be adapted to 
the particularities of the new project (Burchel and Gilden, 2008; Nysten-Haarala et 
a/.,201 0; Power and Reid, 2005). Moreover, these implicit representations may not be 
compatible with other participants' pre-project implicit representations (Artto et al., 
2008 ; Levina and Orlikowski , 2009; Orr and Scott, 2008 ; Schmidt and Tannenbaum, 
2000). 
Secondly, project-specific representations may also come in conflict, as actors 
understand and apply them in different ways. This type of implicit representations is 
built around project-specific explicit representations. Despite efforts to synchronize 
understanding and perception (Ross, 2009), actors would still interpret them in their 
own specifie way (Aaltonen et al , 2010; Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013; Tukiainen et 
al., 2010; Weick and Roberts, 1993), which might generate contradictory implicit 
representations. 
These first two types of colliding representations are conflictual from the first moment 
they are used in the project, but the conflict might become obvious only later on when, 
at one point in time, they actually prevent actors performing their tasks. The third 
category of events regards implicit representations that might be compatible initially, 
but evolve into becoming (more) conflictual , due to actors ' reflexivity and w1intended 
consequences of the ir actions (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Giddens, 1984; 
Orlikowski, 2000; Weick and Roberts, 1993). Although subject to a high leve! of 
inertia, each action is performed in a slightly different manner and, if the deviation 
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from the initial form reaches a certain point, this could also lead to collisions and even 
structuring episodes (Howard-Grenville, 2005; Howard-Grenville et al., 2011). 
2.3.3 Events as divergent spontaneous interests 
The project management team aims to align actors ' different interests with the project 
goal and puts in place regularized elements to better connect actors to the project (Hogg 
et al., 2012; Sloan and Oliver, 2013). Moreover, through different mechanisms, such 
as partnering sessions or risk sharing approaches, the project management also intends 
to motivate participants and so create spontaneous interests that would push for the 
project (Floricel et al., 2011a; Meng and Gallagher, 2012). However, actors have a 
tendency toward maximizing their own gains and choosing the relational 
configurations that advantage them the most (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; 
Granovetter, 1973 ; Latour, 1997; Law, 2004; Malhotra and Gino, 2011). 
Despite the various attempts to make participants share a common interest in the 
project, their focus is ontologically different. Previous literature have identified 
divergent interests between the project and : the parent company (Hobday, 2000; Vuori 
et al., 2013); future client (Cooke Davies, 2002; Savolainen et al., 2012); contractors, 
subcontractors, or suppliers (Aaltonen et al. , 201 0; Artto et al., 2008); local 
stakeholders in international projects (Aaltonen et al., 201 0; Gibson and Gibbs, 2006; 
Kraemer et al., 2013); or community activists (Van Wijk et al., 2013). For example, 
project owners and project managers have different interests, as they focus more on the 
strategie versus operational success of the project, respectively (Atkinson et al., 2006; 
Cooke-Davis, 2002; Krane et al. , 2012; Samset, 2003 ; Ward and Chapman, 2008). The 
owners have a long-term vision and are not only interested on a successful project 
development, but also on its subsequent sustainability and ultimately exploitation 
revenues. Moreover, the project is often just one step on a broader strategy of the 
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company to enter new markets, deve lop new re lati ons or products, and so on. On the 
othe r hand , proj ect managers are primarily looking to fini sh o n time, o n budget, and 
achiev ing the initi a l goa l. They first want to be able to successfull y hand over the 
proj ect to its sponsors, s ince are rare ly in vo lved in the subseq uent ope rations and 
ma in tenance. For example, in IT/ IS often companies externa lize software development 
proj ects to othe r compani es (Savo la inen et al. , 20 12). 
During stabl e peri ods, regularized e lements manage to keep under contro l actors ' 
tendency toward o pportuni sm, th rough e ither adh es ive or coerc ive cohes io n (F ioricel 
et al. , 20 11 a; Flor ice l and Lampe!, 1998; Meng and Ga ll agher, 20 12 · Yaaland and 
Hakansson, 2003). However, at ti mes, certa in inte rests are manifested in a way that 
overcomes the ability of the proj ect re lationa l structu re to accommodate them 
(Frooman, 1999; Mitche ll et al., 1997), which enta il s a reco nfig urat ion of actors ' 
vo liti ona l connecti ons (see Figure 2.3) . For exampl e, thi s co uld occur w hen o ne actor 
has enough power, legitimacy and urgency to impose its w ill (Mitche ll et al., 1997). 
Regularlzed interests 
Spontaneous interests 
d Triggering event 1 (divergent 
soontaneous interests) 
F igure 2.3 T riggering events as di vergent spontaneous interests 
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There is a variety of spontaneous interests that could launch structuring episodes. For 
exarnple, sorne initial spontaneous interests are not aligned properly, because they were 
genuinely overlooked or purposefully ignored (Werder, 2011). The project might 
function well for a while, but at one point in time, the changing context may make these 
interests too conflictual, or the affected actors, too insistent to be ignored. Moreover, 
existing or new actors might express new interests or desires (Emirbayer and Mische, 
1998; Latour, 1997; Werder, 2011). Social actors are continuously distracted by 
alternative connections in their relational network (Abuja et al. , 20 12; Greve et al., 
2013; Latour, 1997) and those with appealing competing options will be difficult to 
realign (Malhotra and Gino, 2011). 
Colliding implicit representations and divergent spontaneous interests that overwhelm 
the project structure ability to incorporate them lead to revolutionary transformations 
that occur in what we called "structuring episodes". In the next section we present 
severa! characteristics of these episodes. 
2.4 Structuring episodes 
In this section, we elaborate on the concept of structuring episode, suggesting a 
preliminary model to represent the episode as well as its relationship with our new 
perspective on the project structure. We also propose sorne characteristics that will 
guide us in the later process of data collection and analysis. 
2.4.1 A Preliminary Model of the Structuring Episode 
The episode is launched by a triggering event. These are perturbations of a system in 
(dynarnic) equilibrium. In the stable state, the explicit representations and regularized 
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interests are sufficient to ensure the smooth operation of routines and the beneficiai 
convergence of spontaneous urges. An externat event that precludes actors from 
implicitly following the routines brings in a new concept that disrupts the cognitive 
coherence of the explicit representation. A strongly expressed, new or aberrant urge 
(including those expressed by new actors) disrupts the legitimacy (or the lock in) of the 
network of interests. In both cases adjustments are needed. 
But events become important and transformations revolutionary only if they are 
brought into the explicit arena (Mead, 1932; Obstfeld, 2012; Zbaracki and Bergen, 
201 0) . Latent conflicts become overt and ac tors aware of them (Deetz et al., 2000; 
Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). Being exposed, the respective networks of cognitive 
or volitional connections become Jess taken-for-granted and additional conflicts might 
be revealed (Lanzara, 2009). 
We use a preliminary mode! of the structuring episode (see Figures 2.4; 2.5; and 2.6) 
to help us focus our data collection and analysis process (Eisenhardt, 1989). In order 
to benefit from the richness of qualitative data, we keep this mode! as simple as 
possible, suggesting that, like any process, the structuring episode could be represented 
as having three phases: the initiation phase, the transition phase, and the concluding 
phase (see also Hendry and Seidl , 2003). During the initiation phase, the questioning 
of relations triggered by colliding representations or divergent spontaneous interests 
'moves ' to the social arena (the two central strata) and a broader swath of the current 
structure is questioned. In the transition phase, explicit elements need to be modified 
or added to rebalance the project structure. This implies a highly iterative process 
(Vuori et al., 2013), since the solution has to be negotiated with all relevant 
stakeholders (Vaast and Levina, 2006) and has to be compatible with the existing 
cognitive and volitional set of connections. Once involved actors reach an agreement, 
the new connections are presented over the whole structure (Gersick, 1991). The 
episode ends in the stabilization phase, when the new connections are integrated, 
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intere ts reali gned and representations re-interpreted. The resulting structure will reach 
a new temporary equi librium (Jarzabkowski and Se idl , 2008). 
Triggering 
event 
• Initiation 
Current structure 
is questioned 
Transition 
.... Actors attempt to 
rearrange structure 
Figure 2.4 A preliminary model of the structuring episode 
Triggering event 
(colliding implicit 
representations) 
Regularlzed 
interests 
Spontaneous 
interests 
Initiation 
Current 
structure is 
questioned 
Transition 
Act ors 
attempt to 
rearrange 
structure 
.. 
.... 
Stabilization 
New structure 
coalesces 
Stabilization 
New 
structure 
coalesces 
Figure 2.5 The structuring episode generated by co lliding representati ons 
Spontaneous 
interests 
Triggering event 
(divergent spontaneous 
interests) 
Initiation 
Current 
structure is 
questioned 
Transition 
Act ors 
attempt to 
rearrange 
structure Stabilization 
New structure 
coalesces 
Figure 2.6 T he structuring epi sode generated by di vergent interests 
2.4.2 Attr ibutes of Structuring Ep isodes 
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A lthough inspired by Luhmann ( 1995) and Hendry and Seidl (2003), we understand 
the epi sode in a broader sense, for example in c luding the stab ilizatio n phase when 
actors actually perform actions that ref1ect their acceptance and harmoni zed 
understanding. For thi s reason, the epi sode in o ur perspective has no o bvious ending 
and cannot be eas il y distinguishable by externa l observers. Moreover, we hi ghli ght the 
di ffe rence between structures before and after the ep isode, and not between outside and 
inside the episode. This is supported by the argument that in projects, the anchor is the 
explicit part of the structure, and not the implicit one. ln our pe rspect ive, we actually 
combine the Giddensian understanding of an episode as a specifie stage in the structure 
deve lopment with the actor-network theory view as a translation (Callon, 1986). 
Severa! characteristics of the structuring episode need to be hi ghl ighted. First, in a 
structuring epi sode, the transformation in vo lves both apparent and hidden structural 
-------
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elements (Gersick, 1991 ). Second, while the triggering event pla ys the key role in the 
existence of a structuring episode, this might also determine the unfolding pattern of 
episodes, depending on its entry points: as spontaneous interests manifested with 
significant strength or as colliding implicit representations. Third, it would be 
interesting to see if different events generate different patterns of episodes. Fourth, the 
episode is not an episode unless all phases are covered, including the final rebalancing 
and realignment. 
In a more quantitative way, the episode could be analyzed in close relation with the 
different project structure strata involved in the process of transformation. In this sense 
we propose the concept of episode length, namely the number of stratum transitions 
that occur in the process. This can eventually become an empirical and practical 
measure for the intensity of organizational restructuring. A close concept could be that 
of episode depth, defined as the number of different strata that are involved in the 
development of each episode. In relation to the project lifecycle, we could also observe 
when episodes are more frequent or when they have a higher impact on the project 
structure. 
In sum, a structuring episode occurs when a triggering event questions, in severa! 
possible ways, the stable project structure and this structure is not able to properly 
address the event. We postulated that there are two main entrance points, corresponding 
to the more fragile elements of the project structure, the implicit-representations and 
spontaneous-interests strata. Thus, in the former case, different actors ' representations 
collide, resulting in conflicting routines and intersecting trajectories that are brought in 
the social arena and have to be resolved, by modifying or establishing other explicit 
representations with regard to those elements that perturb the relative! y stable structure. 
In the latter case, spontaneous interests are manifested in an unequivocal and decisive 
manner - the nonaligned interests become stronger cumulated with the limited power 
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of regularized elements to realign them. Again, the pro cess 'mo v es ' to the social arena, 
as new agreements are required between project participants. Therefore, in the initial 
phase, the focus mo v es towards the central part of the framework (or the central part 
of Figures 2.5 and 2.6). The transition phase will be developed mainly there. In the 
stabilization phase, the focus will move back, towards the extreme (high and low) parts 
of the figure . At the end of the episode, the project returns to an equilibrium state: the 
explicit representations are internalized through repeated application; or the new 
agreement is accepted by all parties involved and their interest is realigned with the 
project goal. In consequence, we argue that the transformation ofproject organizations 
is a complex process, which involves changes at both apparent and hidden levels. 
Specifie research questions 
Following the guidance of the above framework, we focused our effort around major 
transformations in large project organizations, trying to understand how these are 
generated (the here-called triggering events) , how they evolve (the structuring episodes 
per se) as weil as how the overall project structure is affected by or deals with such 
situations. Giving the particularity of our perspective, we mainly looked at the 
interfaces between different actors, keeping a broad understanding on what could be 
included as a connecting element at each of the representation or interest level. 
More precisely, we entered the field with the following specifie questions in mind: 
• What is a structuring episode? What are the underlying stages of an episode? 
• How is the episode triggered? 
• How does the project structure evolve over stable periods? 
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• How do structuring episodes reshape complex projects? How do various 
episodes follow each other or intertwine to produce the overall evolution of a 
project? 
The next chapter presents severa! methodological considerations regarding the process 
of data collection and analysis. The following chapters present the results of these 
analyses, structured around the key dimensions of this thesis: an illustration ofthe new 
representation of the project structure and its evolution, the triggering event, patterns 
of structuring episodes and their impact at the project level. 
CHAPTERIII 
METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, we present our methodological approach and describe in detail the data 
collection and data analysis processes and the tools we used. We end with sorne quality 
concems, where we mention a set of activities that we performed to ensure a higher 
quality and objectivity of the data analysis process and its output. 
3 .1 Research strategies 
This thesis focuses on project organizations, with their underlying structural elements, 
in order to understand two processes. Our proximate interest, at the micro leve!, is the 
unfolding of structuring episodes. But on a broader leve! , we attempt to explain how 
projects evolve during both stable and dynamic change periods, how episodes reshape 
projects, how structuring episodes condition subsequent episodes and how project 
leaders manage projects through structuring episodes. These topics require a rich 
description and deep understanding of the forces at play in various aspects of project 
organization. Therefore, from the beginning, our preference went to qualitative 
methods. 
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The more specifie methodological perspective we adopted is theory-building from 
multiple cases. Theory-building methods are preferred to theory-testing when 
phenomena under study are relatively unknown (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Eisenhardt, 
1989). Moreover, they are recommended when studying complex processes and aiming 
to discover meanings and patterns of action (Barley and Kunda, 2001; Langley, 1999; 
Symon and Cassel, 1998). 
At the same time, the multi-case perspective, as opposed to single-case studies, 
increases the transferability of results and the practical usefulness of findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007 ; Yin 2009). The emerging theory is 
validated in cross-case comparisons, which makes it more likely that it will retain its 
relevance and transferability in different industries and project contexts. 
The w1it of analysis is the structuring episode. It has to be noted that our main intent 
was to document the most important transformations in each project and, based on that, 
to elaborate a theory ofproject evolution. We did not aim to list ali events that occurred 
in these projects. In this sense, we preferred to discuss the same events and episodes 
with different interviewees in order to find more details and a variety of points ofview, 
that would help us better understand the transformation. Moreover, in most cases we 
invited our interlocutors to express their own opinions about which events were more 
significant and had a higher impact on the project organization. 
3 .2 Data collection 
We collected data on 18 large proj ects, from three industries, in Europe and North 
America. The rationale behind selecting these particular cases has more dimensions. 
First, a theory-based sample strategy was used to ensure the variety of cases (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002). Floricel and Dougherty (2007) identified three 
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knowledge-reproduction cycles across most industrial sectors, namely science-
technology coevolution, technology-recombination and experience-accumulation. 
These endogenous and self-sustaining cycles influence the nature and dynamics of 
innovation in the respective sectors, which creates very different strategie 
environrnents for the companies working in this sector. This, in turn, shapes the 
parameters within which projects in these sectors have to be developed and executed. 
Ail things equal, projects face different time pressures, numbers of unexpected events 
as weil as levels of resource munificence. As a result, we chose to concentrate on one 
emblematic industrial sector for each cycle, respectively, bio-pharmaceutical, digital 
products and systems, and infrastructure. Second, our sampling was influenced by our 
goal to study more than 4-10 cases, the number recommended by Eisenhardt (1989) for 
multi-case studies, to ensure that we reach a certain leve! of saturation for our rather 
nurnerous conceptual categories (Johnson et al. , 2007). Third, we sought to have 
severa! projects in each industry to be able to test the theory both within and between 
sectors (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). Finally, the availability of top project managers 
and the convenience of their location played a role, because our financial and time 
resources were limited. A list with ail cases, the industry to which they belong, the 
number of interviewees and other details are provided in Table 3.1. 
There were severa! issues in selecting both projects and participants. Given the nature 
of phenomena under study (i.e. structuring episodes and project management) 
respondents needed to have a good perspective about the project and as much as 
possible to have been participated in ali project stages. In order to ensure both well-
informed and distinct perspectives, which enable a sort of triangulation, we aimed to 
interview the leaders of the core project management teams in each project, as weil as 
the project managers of contractors or other partners involved in the project. The latter 
criterion proved to be more problematic. Large projects, especially in the infrastructure 
sector could last over a decade and people rare! y stay on the same position for that long. 
There was a case in which the project manager had been retired for severa! months, but 
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still kindly accepted to participate, and many others where project managers had 
changedjobs either within the same or in a different company. We tried to address this 
issue by interviewing whenever available more than one person in each project and 
thus having multiple recollections of the stages that had taken place sometimes years 
before the interviews. However, in certain cases this was not possible due to the 
unavailability of respondents. Moreover, in two cases (PharmaS and EnergyTP), 
projects could not be completed for different reasons and respondents were reluctant to 
discuss about unsuccessful past activities. In EnergyTP, we had had an interview 
scheduled with the project manager from the partner company, but the respondent 
cancelled it at the last moment, as his company had just applied for bankruptcy 
protection. 
At the same time, we needed a complete picture of each case, to capture multiple 
structuring episodes, to observe their outcome, and whether the project team used the 
same strategy to cope with subsequent challenges or tried something new. Therefore, 
we aimed to study projects already finished or close to completion. On the other hand, 
interviews deal with participants' memory and perceptions and time is always a threat. 
In long projects, there is a risk that respondents may not remember ali relevant 
information. However, focusing only on structuring episodes that led to significant 
project transformations diminished this risk, as important events are easier to recall by 
participants. 
We used mainly two sources of data: semi-structured interviews and archives. We 
conducted between 1 and 8 interviews per case, for a total of 53 , with high-level 
members of the project team, such as project managers, coordinators of sub-projects, 
leaders of contractors' teams, and so on. The targeted respondents were initially 
approached by phone and then by electronic-mail. Those open to find out more about 
this research were provided with an introductory letter, containing a brief presentation 
of the research team, the research idea and solicitation of an interview guaranteeing 
---- ----- -----------
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anonymity and confidentiality. Finally, those who agreed to participate received the 
interview guide and the confidentiality agreement before the actual meeting. We were 
fortunate to have a very good response rate, around 50% of the people approached 
accepted to take part in our research. Out of more than fifty people that confirmed, only 
one cancelled the appointment at the last minute and another one that was uncertain 
about his availability could not eventually meet us . Fortunately, in both cases, we had 
arranged other interviews in the same period and in the same city. 
Ali interviews were face-to-face, lasted between 1 and 2 hours and were conducted at 
a location at the interviewee ' s convenience, usually his or her office, to increase their 
comfort, but also, in most cases, to give us the opportunity to have sorne basic 
observations of the project site. Ali but one were digitally recorded. Also the 
interviewer(s) took notes during the interview and especially copied (photocopied, or 
even took pictures of) the respondent's explanatory drawings. For the interview that 
was not taped at the respondent's request, interviewers took more detailed notes and 
one of them elaborated a verbatim-like copy of discussions that was refined and 
validated by the other interviewer. Eventually ali interviews were transcribed and the 
verbatim copy compared one more time with the audio file. 
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The other major type of data came from written documents. We used various sources 
such as: 
• the official website of the project, the website of the sponsoring company(ies) 
and of the main contractors: general and specifie information regarding the 
project, in form of brochures, flyers , annual and financial reports, press 
releases, strategie or master plans, white papers, etc. 
• internai documents, such as presentations, internai project-related documents 
and other material provided by respondents; 
• articles in journals, magazines, newspapers ; 
• project users' forums of discussions; 
• other specialized or general sources. 
We applied a triangulation logic when using these sources and for contradictory 
findings we tried to look for more information. Moreover, the collection methods 
overlapped and interesting or controversial project aspects could be brought into 
discussion during subsequent interviews. 
3.3 Data analysis 
In our data analysis activities we were guided by the basic principles oftheory-building 
from multi-case studies approach (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994 ). In line with this litera ture, we developed the following activities: 
wrote case narratives, represented episodes in theory-driven constructs, elaborated 
data-driven constructs to better understand and classify episodes, compared within and 
across episodes, produced new theoretical insights, and compared and contrasted those 
with the extant literature. The whole process was highly iterative (see the quality sub-
section). 
L__ ___________________ ------- -- ---------
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Typically for inductive studies, the first step is to build individual case narratives for 
each project (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). This provided us with a better overall 
picture of each case, the context in which structuring events happen, and a chronology 
of these events (Langley, 1999). While interviews were al ways the primary source of 
data, documents were particularly useful in this step by offering a greater leve! of 
details and a clearer ch.ronological representation. These reports were also sent to 
respondents in exchange for their time and effort. They included a description of the 
key structuring episodes identified in each case. The respondents' feed-back was an 
additional tool in validating the researcher's interpretation. 
Second, we aimed to fully benefit from the advantages of visual representations 
(Langley, 1999), so we elaborated severa! elements to help us during the analysis 
process. We first elaborated detailed chronology tables that would provide us an overall 
visual representation of the structured information about the case, while still containing 
a significant amount of detail. We also created figures to represent the project timeline 
with project phases, milestones, events and episodes, so that we have triggering events 
and structuring episodes placed, in order, on this timeline. This helped us identify 
temporal patterns such as agglomerations of episodes. One such example could be 
found in Figure 3.1. We also had sun1marizing tables of each project, across key 
dimensions, for quick reference and inter-projects comparisons. Finally, we drew 
pictures to represent ali main organizational actors involved, to have a clear visual 
description of participants and of relationships among them. 
We also grouped data around initial theoretical constructs, here around cognitive and 
volitional connections, which enabled us not only to illustrate the initial framework 
( see Chapter 4 of the current the sis), but also to disco ver certain small transformations 
ali along project !ife cycle. Further detailing these small changes in terms of 
connections involved in each case eventually led us to the new concept of translations, 
to explain project evolution during stable periods (see Chapter 5). 
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Before going further it is important to clarify two more aspects, namely the kind of 
revolutionary transformations that we considered, and how we distinguished 
revolutionary change from smalier transformations. 
For the first aspect, we decided to look at ali kinds of transformations as long as they 
were revolutionary. For example, Orlikowski and Hoffman (1997) identified three 
types of change: anticipated or changes that where planned and prepared by the project 
management team to significantly improve existing structure; emergent or changes that 
occurred after an accumulation of stressors; and opportunistic or change that was 
generated by turbulent events (see also Yates et al. , 1999). In a similar approach, 
Bartunek et al. (20 11) emphasized the active-or-reactive dimension, distinguishing 
between planned change (e.g. managerial decisions) and reactive change that is 
developed in response to events. In the end, we considered ali types: planned decisions, 
emergent calls for change as well as reactions to turbulent events. 
This leads to the latter question, what is a revolutionary transformation? While keeping 
an open-mind, we took sorne hints from the existing literature to help us in focusing 
our effort. First, we relied on the interviewees ' persona! perception, asking them to 
identify severa! transformations that they considered more important during the project 
lifecycle (Sloan and Oliver, 2013). Second, we looked for changes that affected deep 
structures (Gersick, 1991) or a wide range of cognitive and volitional connections 
(Romanelli and Tushman, 1994), and implied a shift in structures (Bartunek and 
Franzak, 1988), paradigm (Kuhn, 1970) or existing archetype (Liguori , 2012). For 
example, in line with Liguori (20 12), we considered incrementai transformation the 
modifications of project structure that are consistent with the existing pattern of 
cognitive and volitional connections, and revolutionary change the transformations that 
involves shifting to a new pattern of connections. 
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At the episode level, we aimed to identify similarities and differences between 
episodes, with the ultimate goal of understanding this new concept and identifying 
patterns of structuring episodes. In this sense, we started by collecting all data related 
to each episode and prepare a detailed narrative, considering the chronological but also 
relational aspects of the episode unfolding. We then organized data in line with the 
theory-driven constructs, namely building figures with main structuring or structuring-
like episodes, distinguishing between their three main components (i.e. the moment of 
initiation, the process of transition and the outcome), on the one band, but also between 
elements that could be included in each of the four strata (i.e. forms of implicit and 
explicit representations, and spontaneous and regularized interests), on the other hand 
(see Chapter 2). A special attention was given to identify the implicit representations 
and spontaneous interests, which have not a widely accepted format the project level. 
However, these elements are easily observable by those actors directly involved in the 
connection or affected by the other party ' s decision. In any case, while explicit 
representations and regularized interests could also be identify from documents, for the 
hidden elements, we mainly relied on data collected via interviews. 
To understand the way in which the transition from the current to a new status quo 
actually happens, we further analyzed each episode in detail. We elaborated short 
surnmaries of these descriptions, but also visual representations with post-its (see 
Figure 3.2). This also enabled us to observe potentially-interesting aspects in each 
episode, which formed the basis for building data-inspired constructs. 
We started this in-depth analysis with the best documented episodes and moved on 
until we reached a theoretical saturation. The constructs were constantly refined and 
validated in comparisons within and across groups, at different levels, namely episodes 
and projects, to recognize repetitive patterns and intriguing contrasts (Barley 1986; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). This strategy allowed us to eventually unveil the mechanism of 
development in each of the 8 patterns of episodes we identified, and so elaborate a 
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theory re garding the new concept of structuring episodes. The remaining episodes were 
used to further test the theory against other ' real ' examples. This strategy enabled us to 
make good use of even less-well documented episodes or of the cases where only one 
interviewee was available for discussion and that could be in danger of offering a biased 
perspective of that particular actor. In this way we managed to maintain in our data 
sample the bio-pharmaceutical sector and the only two cases of completely failed 
projects (all cases with only one interview each), as well as sorne particular episodes 
that would have been otherwise ignored. The the01·y was finally refined and validated 
in relation with extant research. The last step was a new look at the projects with this 
new theoretical approach to seek a final confirmation from the raw data that we 
collected. 
3.4 Quality concerns 
In qualitative research and particularly theory-building approach, there are multiple 
concerns related to the objectivity of researcher, validity or credibility of constructs, 
generalizability or transferability of findings , and applicability of the new theory 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011 ; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 
2009). We already mentioned sorne of the measures we took to increase the quality of 
this research. Inspired by previous researchers (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Patton 2002), in the following part of this chapter, we summarize 
sorne ofthe strategies that helped us develop a high-quality data analysis process and 
elaborate a valid theory. 
The credibility of qualitative studies could be increased by usmg triangulation, 
appealing to respondent validation, and relying on good research practice (see, for 
example, Lincoln and Guba, 1985). First, we have focused on using triangulation, 
whenever possible. In this sense, for each project, we used multiple types of data 
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sources (e.g. interviews and docwnents), we tried to have more than one respondent 
and more than one source of docwnents, but also more than one interviewer. This 
helped us capturing different points of view and developing a better understanding of 
the phenomenon under study. We treated the cases with only one respondent more 
carefully, recognizing their limitations and using them only to later corroborate and test 
the findings inspired by well-docwnented cases. Second, when sending the case report, 
we asked participants to validate our interpretations at different stages and/or the final 
results. While sorne were not available for detailed feedback, sorne manifested interest 
and read our report and even participated at one academie presentation. Third, ali along 
the research process we were guided by the recommendations of best researchers in the 
field, sorne of which have been cited in this thesis . The data selection and analysis 
process was also described in the previous sections and aimed to follow the best 
practices in doing qualitative research in social sciences. For example, we developed a 
highly iterative process of data analysis at every stage: raw data, theory-driven 
constructs, interpretations, data-driven theoretical insights, comparison to extant 
research, and elaboration of new theory. Besicles the within and across groups 
comparisons, the data-inspired constructs were tested by going back to the initial 
description of the episode and sometimes even to the verbatim copies of interviews. 
This ongoing re-examination of data led to nwnerous improvements of the constructs 
and final results and further details are provided in each respective section. 
Regarding transferability of the research findings, as explained at the begüming ofthis 
chapter, we tried to have a sufficient number of cases to caver a wider variety of 
contexts and industries (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, we also paid attention to 
providing a ' thick-er description ' of the research process (Geertz, 1973), so that readers 
can judge for themselves if findings can be transferred to other contexts. For example, 
apart from the explanations provided in this chapter, we also included a detailed and 
maybe tedious Chapter 4, which we find useful to illustrate an intermediary phase in 
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our analysis - the identification of different forms of implicit representations, explicit 
representations, spontaneous interests and regularized interests. 
Finally, we aimed to ensure an appropriate leve) of dependability and confirmability 
by using sorne elements that could resemble an audit approach. In this sense, we asked 
for advice from colleagues and more senior researchers on both data collection and 
analysis steps as well as resulting theory. Also, we relied on reviews and comments on 
academie papers and presentations built on ideas from this thesis. 
With regard to ethical issues, the research was conducted respecting ethical principles 
of University of Quebec in Montreal. Respondents' anonymity and confidentiality of 
information were a major concern. We prepared and shared confidentiality agreements 
with all our interviewees. 
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CHAPTERIV 
TEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONS AS COMPLEX NETWORKS OF 
VOLITIONAL AND COGNITIVE CONNECTIONS 
In this chapter, we use examples from data collected in 18 complex projects to illustrate 
our new four-straturn framework. We bring empirical evidence of the coexistence of 
cognitive and volitional connections in temporary organizations and of the role played 
by the hidden versus apparent elements in their development. 
Numerous organizations and project teams were involved in developing the 18 above-
mentioned projects, so we had the chance to observe how these were embedded in a 
vast network of connections, both cognitive and volitional. Face-to-face interviews and 
various documents helped us unveil the project configuration of connections and a part 
of this pic ture is presented in this chapter. 
4.1 Explicit Representations 
We have identified a wide range of explicit representations that were used in these 
projects, such as plans, drawings, schemes, budgets, schedules, contracts, procedures, 
work breakdown structures, organizational charts, and so on. We will not insist on the 
common forms, but will provide examples of representations that were very specifie to 
certain projects, in arder to illustrate the range of explicit representations. We also 
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suggest ways in which these representations connect actors, even though actors may 
not perceive connections as their primary role. Sorne of these representations were 
involved in certain transformations, as we present later in Chapter 5 and 7. 
We begin by discussing the organizational role of explicit representations, which can 
be essentially divided in two. The first role was to create convergent interpretations and 
eventually a common base ofunderstanding for the project, its elements and activities. 
This helped hold the project organization together. The second role was to separate and 
coordinate the actions of various project participants. This helped separate participants 
and ensure that they do not interfere with each other. But, as it will be explained in the 
next section, this kind of representation provided only limited, incipient guidance, 
which had to be complemented by the development of implicit representations. 
A ubiquitous type of explicit representations depicted the finality of the project, for 
example the artefact that it intends to create. This finality was pictured to social actors 
in more or less detailed drawings, prototypes, models, etc. For example, all airport 
projects used detailed artistic or architectural renderings to show how the future 
terminal would look and this led to a clearer understanding of the overall goal. 
Sometimes representations had their own nicknames, such as "champagne glasses" for 
the initial design of the railway station and its surroundings in the project InfraST, 
which shows a strong presence and awareness of particularities in the mind of 
participant actors. This suggests that certain representations helped increase the 
convergence of participant goals, and that sorne of them become ' actants ' in their own 
right, by triggering emotional reactions, such as attraction, desires or irony. 
But in sorne cases, such as one prototype for project DigitS, such explicit 
representations created confusion and delays, because the solution development 
process considered only the work procedures and environmental conditions of the 
project leader' s parent company and country of origin, and disregarded cultural, market 
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and geographical specificities of other locations where the solution would be 
implemented. In other words, explicit representations could create negative feelings 
and rejection, as illustrated by the following citation from project DigitS: 
"( .. .) le directeur de projet était véritablement quelqu'un de [DigitS} et 
beaucoup plus à l 'aise sur le fait d 'éprouver un prototype en [Location of 
Headquarters - country}. Donc le prototype a été fait sur 1 'image d 'un site en 
[Location of Headquarters - country} et pas à 1 'international. C 'était une 
technique de compression, on va faire vite, on va valider ça, on va valider le 
prototype et puis on va déployer. Seulement ça se révélait être une grosse, 
grosse bêtise. Parce que le réseau natif en [Location of Headquarters -
country}, un réseau de [DigitS} qui n 'est pas le même à l 'international. Donc 
c 'est pas les mêmes éléments de configurations. Et quand on est passé au 
déploiement à 1 'international en s 'étant dit qu 'on avait passé la phase de 
prototype, ça marchait pas. C 'était pas bon les câbles, c 'était pas bon la 
configuration, les applications du client ne passait pas et donc on a eu pas mal 
de soucis que je pourrais vous énumérer. " (Interviewee 1, DigitS) 
The same externat representations were used to depict the agreed interpretation of the 
intended form of the project between key participants, such as the client, the designer-
engineer and the construction manager. For example, participants in project TerminaiS 
used what they called 30/60/90 drawings, namely drawings with a 30%, 60% or 90% 
level of detail depiction. The three above-mentioned actors would discuss 
requirements, and as the plan gets clearer and more detailed, a drawing with a higher 
level of detail- 30%, 60% or 90%- was used to picture the output of this agreement. 
In public projects, stakeholders could relate to and actually patiicipate in developing a 
network of project representations through their interpretations, opinions, comments 
and questions regarding these externat representations. For instance, TerminalE project 
went through a long public scrutiny that ended up with a list of conditions - another 
form of representation - that project planners had to take into account before 
developing the project. 
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"The planning inquiry for [TerminalE} started in the 90s, 1995 1 think, and 
went on for 4 years, longes! planning inquiry in British his tory. Ultimately, 1 
think it was in 1999 the inquiry ended, that 's the public inquiry where people 
can offer objections and have them heard and put up alternatives. Then the 
planning inspector, the inspector that has heard the inquiry then writes it up, it 
took him a couple ofyears to write his report. So his report was issued, 1 think 
it was in 2001 and at that point, the inspector made sorne recommendations and 
the government has to conjirm those recommendations. There were also sorne 
outstanding issues. So we had to do somefurther work, infact. The government 
then issued a consent but with sorne conditions (. . .) that you have to clear be fore 
you are allowed to start constructions. So we cleared sorne further conditions 
and that then allowed us to start construction." (Interviewee 6, TerminalE) 
The form of external representations, as opposed to their content, also played a role in 
minimizing the risk of conflicting interpretations and misunderstandings. For example, 
in the project TerminalL the software Primavera was preferred because most 
contractors were used to it: 
"On our scheduling sheet, (. . .) we insisted on Primavera, not thal Primavera 
is any different, they're al! fine, (. . .) they al! work! We insisted on it, be cause 
we wanted to be able to have those people communicate with each other. We 
picked Primavera because the [Transit Commission}, was insisting that their 
customers use il, their consultants use it, so ... And here, in [city name}, most 
of the big constructionfzrms and the consultingfzrms that we were dealing with 
were familiar with Primavera because of the [Transit Commission} 
requirement. So, that just helped, because you know, the re 's no big educational 
exercise, you're trying to avoid being a burden. And so, we insisted on thal. And 
these three levels, the master schedule and their program manager schedule, 
and then the project manager schedules, (. . .) they would communicate back 
and forth for the roll up" (Interviewee 1, TerminalL) 
Likewise, sorne explicit representation forms were preferred over others for their 
simplicity and clarity. The TerminalL project team used simple visual schedules as 
opposed to more complex diagrams or critical path representations for subcontractors 
at the operational level, to overcome cultural and language barriers and facilitate the 
understanding of schedules and sequences of activities: 
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"We did use a lot of visual schedules. Aga in, you know, sorne guy that was born 
in Portugal. He's got a great technical education, he's really good at doing tiles 
or jloors, but he doesn't know anything about critical path, diagrams, nor that 
he car es . . . he 's gonna work on his package . . . So we did a lot of schedules, 
forget about al! the Janey CP M diagrams, ... showing a computer simulation, 
we need you in he re at this particular time, and we want the floor do ne on this 
fashion, and workfrom that, and give them things that they can stick in, geta 
visual image and then tie that to a calendar in their minds and .. . magic! ft 
worked real! y well, again, we Jo und that a very effective tool. " (Interviewee 1, 
TerminalL) 
The second role of explicit representations, separation and coordination (Floricel et al., 
20 11 b ), also transpires in the two above quo tes referring to the TerminalL proj ect. B y 
understanding when their turn to act will come, participants can avoid interfering with 
the work of others. A more radical separation can be illustrated by the project InfraST, 
which was developed by two partners, each with its own part resulting in two almost 
independent projects. The project design drawing used a color code to emphasize this 
separation: 
"The project [InfraST} is the blue and the red and the yellow parts. (. .. ) The 
yellow part is do ne by the [na me of partner 1 ], the blue part is do ne by [ name 
of partner 2}, and .. . yeah, the re is always a place where we me et each other 
and that 'sin the red part. " (Interviewee 4 InfraST) 
The quotes presented above also suggest that the form of external representations was 
also different along several dimensions, such as the leve] of detail , visibility, the use of 
colors etc. Another important distinction is that not all explicit representations, even 
those that played a crucial structuring role, were formai. For example, collocated teams 
of software developers in project DigitA created a wall with post-its that contained 
questions about and solutions to sorne of the technical issues they encountered, while 
tean1s in DigitBIS, which were located in three diffe rent sites in the same city, created 
an informai working database with the same purpose. An even more interesting 
example is the project DigitPTIS, in which, after a leadership change, the new project 
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manager formulated a set of five princip les and shared it with the who le project team. 
This created a new fundamental understanding of the project as a frozen-goal entity 
that would not accept any further modifications. 
"C'est là qu 'on a mis des principes, [nom du nouveau directeur} a mis des 
principes directeurs. Et ils sont sur le mur derrière vous. Ils disent, un moment 
donné, le compte est gelé et toute addition sera dans une phase deux. Donc on 
en est là vraiment à gérer que toute addition aille dans une phase deux." 
(Interviewee 2, DigitPTIS) 
Although common to all projects, sorne types of explicit representations had different 
levels of detail in various sectors. For example, construction and IT/IS projects had 
detailed budgets and schedules for the whole project lifecycle, while pharmaceutical 
projects, in which the outcome and the pace had a higher leve! of uncertainty, decided 
upon their budgets and schedules annually or biennially: 
"And what we usually try ta do is .. . a more exact detailed planning for the next 
2 years, ta have real/y a good view, a/sa with respect ta resources and budget 
for the upcoming 2 years. And then, for the longer term on/y, ta define the big 
expensive things a bit more in detail, but for the rest we keep off in the generic 
plan, be cause you need ta adjust this anyway over ti me, when you get your new 
data. " [Interviewee 1, PharmaS] 
Finally, the way representations were used strategically (Goffman, 1969) also differed. 
For example, the five principles used by the new leader of the DigitPTIS project were 
openly and conspicuously posted, and strongly promoted to all participants. When 
sorne participants wanted to add new requirements to the project, the leader staunchly 
defended the principles by going to the highest leve! executives and threatening to 
resign if the princip les were not respected. In other projects the visibility differentiated 
between participants in order to achieve certain strategie goals. An interesting example 
cornes from the use of explicit representations in a way that includes an additional 
buffer toward project performance. These representations would not correspond to 
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rea1ity, but wou1d be presented in a way that creates the illusion of rea1ity for the rest 
of the project team. For instance, the project manager of Termina1L shared a budget 
with the rest of the team that included the usua1 15% contingencies expected in the 
industry, but kept secret the additiona1 15% management reserves of which on1y he and 
the financia1 director were aware. In this way, the other project participants wou1d put 
in an extra-effort to stay within this known budget. 
"(. . .) if the architects know that it is .. . the management reserves were such and 
such. They want to spend it to get into architectural digest. If construction 
manager knows it, you know, he 's gonna pass the trades you 're gonna do, you 
know, he's not gonnajight with the trades same ways you don't have any money, 
right? ( .. .) so I make two points: (1) you want to have large management 
reserves,· and (2) you don't want anybody to know that you have that reserve ... 
'cause they would have spent itfor you." (Interviewee 1, Termina1L) 
On the contrary, the project director of TerminaiS shared the actual planned schedule 
with his team and contractors, but publicly advanced a date that was six months later, 
to ensure that the organization fulfills its promises to the public and its clients. 
"Quand. .. l 'entrepreneur général est arrivé en poste, on nous a dit ... - Le projet, 
on pense qu'on peut livrer le ... je pense c'est le 1er septembre ... Moi, j'ai dit -
Okay.. . On va livrer le ... avril 2004. Tout le monde ... tout le monde pensait 
que la date était avril 2004. On a livré le 12 octobre 2003 .. . à toutes fins 
pratiques.. . tout le monde pensait qu 'on était six mois plus tôt que prévu." 
(Interviewee 2, TerminaiS) 
For external observers, the visibility of explicit representations had different levels. 
While internai projects, such as DigitA, DigitS or PharmaB were virtually invisible for 
outsiders, the infrastructure projects, that were seriously affecting local communities, 
made themselves more visible to the public. For example, project InfraS set up a special 
communication office and periodically printed brochures and flyers to keep locals 
updated with the advancement of the project and how future step would specifically 
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affect their daily !ife: noise leve!, which part of the street will be closed, relocated bus 
stops, delivery options for local businesses, etc. 
In sum, in line or not with the intentions of their creators, explicit representations 
appear to cmmect participants as visible stimuli that attract, repulse and direct other 
actors, and, especially, as vehicles for the construction and sharing of meaning, as weil 
as by setting up virtual boundaries intime and space between project participants and 
their actions. Their structuring influence may vary. While sorne representations, such 
as agreements and explicit management principles, stay fixed for sorne time, others 
seem to evolve, either by becoming more detailed or by changing in significant ways. 
Project actors can also strategically influence the resulting relations, by changing the 
form, the leve! of detail and the degree openness of the representations that they create 
and control. 
4.2 Implicit representations 
In their turn, implicit representations were generally hidden to other actors and only 
became obvious when colliding with other implicit representations. We identified two 
main categories of implicit representations in our projects: pre-project implicit 
representations that actors bad developed tlu·ough their participation in previous 
projects and activities and by force of habit kept using dming the focal project; and 
project-specific implicit representations, which actors developed dming project 
lifecycle, through repeated interactions with other participants and the local 
interpretation, application and understanding of project explicit representations. 
Pre-project implicit representations came in forms of specifie work routines and habits 
related to project management processes (scheduling, budgeting, controlling, allocating 
rotes and responsibilities, etc.), but also to specifie work activities, orto collaboration 
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and information sharing with other participants. For instance, project teams and 
subteams involved in activities they had done in the past, re-applied the same work 
routines. Project management teams of EnergyEX, EnergyTP, EnergyH, InfraS, 
PharmaA, PharmaS and DigitA had the experience of developing similar projects 
within the parent company, so re-applied same old planning routines. In all projects, 
teams and subteams of contractors that were performing similar tasks, re-used work 
routines they had used before. 
The use of pre-project implicit representations was acceptable as long as this did not 
interfere with the smooth project development. For example, the project management 
team ofTerminalL imposed to their contractors and subcontractors the use of software 
Primavera for scheduling activities, but in certain cases they accepted sorne 
subcontractors using their old scheduling routines: 
"Dawn here with the threads, sorne of them used Primavera, like electrical 
contractors, 'cause it's a very controlled environment, they're very 
sophisticated, but the guys doing tiles or jloors, they scheduled on the back of 
the cigarette package, so they wake up in the morning, they come in so, we were 
much more flexible here ... " (Interviewee 1, TerminalL) 
However, this habituai replication (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) was sometimes 
inadequate, since it failed to consider the new project specifie settings and the new 
actors or collaborators. Project DigitPTIS experienced major incompatibilities between 
deliveries of the two main contractors, because each contractor had its own work style 
and they did not communicate at all to overcome these differences. Sorne contractors 
in InfraR and EnergyH came with their own work safety routines, which were not 
acceptable in those projects and the management team had to intervene to make them 
raise the level of safety. Another example is one project team in PharmaNA who took 
its routines in applying tests on patients in a different country and encounter difficulties 
in collaborating with local companies and patients. Similarly, plumbing contractors in 
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Project InfraR realized that they cannat use their work routines when dealing with very 
old technology and had to develop specifie routines (in this sense see also Barley, 
1986). 
The second main category of implicit representations consists of th ose representations 
that were developed specifically while working and collaborating in the project, often 
as an internalization of project explicit representations. Actors' background and 
experience played a key role and so the project was represented differently in the mind 
of electrical, mechanical, IT or construction contractors. For example, in the TerminalE 
project, representatives of the main airline that would use the future terminal, IT 
contractors, and the construction manager each understood the project priorities, its 
schedule and corresponding flexibility in their own way, which eventually led to delays 
and a major technical problem in the opening day. 
Sometimes, even simple and apparently clear standards were interpreted differently by 
different contractors, such as in project EnergyTP: 
"For instance, if the specifications say: "it has fi re protection to ... su ch and 
such a standard. " Weil ... then when people come together, and say: "Weil, 1 
might dispute what that standard me ans ... The way we interpret that standard 
may be different than the way the engineering company did or the way [name 
of the project owner} does... '"'(Interviewee 1, EnergyTP) 
When explicit representations had an insufficient leve! of clarity, affected actors 
interpreted them either by extrapolating their past experience, such as in project InfraR 
and TerminalE, or in a way that is more advantageous for the respective actor, such as 
in DigitA and DigitBIS. One of the two partner organizations in InfraR supposed to be 
responsible only for the planning part of the project and future operations, and allow 
its partner to take the lead for project development. But, since in previous projects this 
partner was used to manage all the way through the project lifecycle, it interpreted the 
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actual demarcation of areas of responsibilities in a way that enabled them to interfere 
in the decision-making process. On the other hand, unclear tasks allocation allowed 
two key members of the project management team of DigitA to only assume 
responsibility for tasks each considered a priority for his position, leaving sorne tasks 
unfulfilled. 
The language spoken and the culture of origin were other elements that affected 
interpretation of explicit representations in international teams. One special case was 
the project DigitPTIS where although the project management team and the main 
contractor spoke the same language, the cultural differences between the two countries 
of origin played a very important role and led to misunderstandings and different 
interpretations of similar concepts: 
"Il y avait effectivement cette langue-là à laquelle on ne faisait pas attention 
parce que c'est notre langue. Dès le début, on ne faisait pas attention. Quand 
je vous parle, je me dis que si vous n 'êtes pas habitués en .français, je ne suis 
pas sûr ... je vais peut-être vous le répéter (. . .)Alors qu 'avec eux, on n 'avait 
pas cette garde-là qu 'on aurait avec un anglophone. (. . .)Avec le temps, on les 
a connus et on s 'est aperçu que des fois on utilisait le même mot. Si c'était un 
mot inconnu, il demandait ce que ça voulait dire mais si c 'était un mot qu 'il 
utilise aussi, lui il pense qu'il sait ce que ça veut dire. Des fois ce n 'est pas 
pareil du tout. " (Interviewee 3, DigitPTIS) 
As opposed to the abstract explicit representations (Floricel et al., 2013 b ), implicit 
representations had a more concrete role in daily activities, so actors used them to 
perform their work routines, communicate and collaborate. At the same time, while 
explicit elements symbolized a shared representation of the project goal, procedures 
and areas of responsibility, implicit representations were particular to each actor, being 
situated interpretations of the ir tasks, relations and environment. There were two main 
types of implicit representations, as the interplay between project ephemerality and 
actors' seemingly repetitive attributions led to the co-existence ofboth pre-project and 
project-specific implicit representations. 
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4. 3 Regularized interests 
Actors' spontaneous interests were aligned with the project goal through a series of 
elements that we call regularized interests. These were agreements and commitments 
that would motivate actors to stay together and work for the same goal. We identified 
a wide range of approaches to achieve this alignment, which emphasized either 
coercive or adhesive aspects (see also Floricel et al., 2011a). 
Coercive elements were used to forcefully convince actors to stay aligned when they 
had divergent tendencies. In sorne cases, such as EnergyTP, EnergyH, DigitS and 
DigitPTIS, this approach was adopted at the project level and roles and responsibilities 
were very clearly allocated. EnergyH and DigitPTIS even required additional 
guarantees - security deposits - to ensure contractors would behave as expected. Their 
project management teams coped with any attempts to deviate by evoking these 
coercive elements. 
"Dans le contrat du barrage, ( .. .) il y avait un dépôt de quelques millions de 
dollars pour garantir. Il aurait pu dire « Bon, je laisse mon dépôt là, et je me 
retires 'ils ne sont pas d 'accord», sinon ils sont obligés de réaliser le contrat 
( .. .) c 'est un gros levier ... " (Interviewee 1, EnergyH) 
"J 'ai les cordons de la bourse. Quand le rôle d 'intégrateur n 'est pas joué à 
mon goût, j 'arrête de payer. J 'arrête de payer les deux. ((Money talksl». " 
(Interviewee 2, DigitPTIS) 
In other cases, this approach was used on! y for sorne parts of the project orto ensure 
cohesion of sorne of the actors. For example, Termina!L and EnergyEX used fixed-
price contracts for small sub-projects with low risk and clear specifications, while 
lnfraR and TerminaiS switched to this type of approach only in the second part of the 
project, when they realized this would suit better their needs. 
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Coercive elements were also present in projects in less formai ways, such as political 
influence or market position. Project owners that have enough power or a dominant 
market position could easily dictate their conditions and keep smaller actors aligned 
under the threat of no future collaborations, such as in EnergyH or DigitPTIS. 
However, this was a two-way street, as these contractors were also interested in 
maintaining good relations with their biggest client. Moreover, in projects that adopted 
a more collaborative approach, smaller companies were proud to be associated with the 
prestige of being involved in the largest project in the area (TerminaiS) or in projects 
with great visibility (InfraST, TerminalE or DigitBIS) . 
"Les gens voulaient travailler sur ce projet-là ... Les gens voulaient la visibilité 
que ce projet-là apporterait. .. voulaient mettre ça sur leur résumé .. . leur CV .. 
Alors, la qualité de la main d'oeuvre qu'on a eue ... le workmanship était. .. très, 
très impressionnant. Il y avait une fierté ... à travailler sur ce projet-là ... " 
(Interviewee 2, TerminaiS) 
Other projects emphasized a collaborative or adhesive approach, considering coercion 
only as the last means of realigning. These projects used special agreements to enrol 
actors and to build stronger ties to the project than to their respective parent companies. 
Project TerminalE is an excellent example: 
"lnterestingly, at the core of our project is the [TerminalE] agreement,· the way 
in which we took the commercial risk but this was therefore a behavioral 
contract not a transactional contract. Most contracts are transactions,- we 'Il 
give you sorne mo ney if you give us this, this was about developing the right 
relationships sa you could put anything into this behaviorally and it was very 
interesting. (. . .) This requires a mature way of working,· it requires people ta 
form what we called integrated teams. Sa you couldn 't see the architect and 
maybe the engineer, and clans, and the contractor, the specialist contractor, 
the systems guys and maybe the commercial guys. We 're all 1 team. We took 
off our company cap badges and we all operated as a single integrated te am. 
At the center of the [TerminalE] agreement was this notion of how you win 
certainty through the brie/, you deliver things through integrated teams and you 
build up a leve! of trust. " (Interviewee 6, TerminalE) 
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Projects TerminalL and TerminaiS used partnering approaches to develop a similar 
sense of community which helped later, when facing threatening situations. 
"So, partnering 1 think had a great contribution to setting up sorne of those 
communication and relational ... relations that we were talking about earlier. 
Plus, the lifespan of the project helps, because p eople, over a period of lime, 
start to understand, you know, how to react with each other. So, the partnering 
then structured sorne of the communications. And the partnering was do ne by 
the [project owner }, or initiated by the [project owner ] , at various levels. There 
is a partnering amongst their own stakeholders, there is a partnering amongst 
the contractors, and it was then partnering bringing al! of us together and 
identifying sources of communications, sources of issues, sources of how to 
escalate. " (Interviewee 5, TerminalL) 
If not ample partnering sessions, all projects used at !east other common means to 
ensure a high level of commitment. Whenever possible, teams were collocated to 
facilitate development of friendly relationships and improve communication and 
information sharing on bath formai and informai channels. When not collocated, such 
as in DigitA that used two international teams to help the core project team, the leaders 
organized weekly meetings at convenient times, encouraged frequent email exchange, 
and sent senior members of the core team to mentor the other teams located overseas. 
Similarly, members of the core team in EnergyH paid weekly visits at the construction 
site to communicate with contractors and subcontractors and made themselves 
available through phone caUs, emails and videoconferences whenever needed. In 
general, in all projects, managers organized frequent meetings - weekly for sub-teams 
or multi-teams and monthly at the strategie leve! with representatives of all major actors 
involved, such as in DigitPTIS, EnergyEX, InfraR or DigitBIS. 
Another way to motivate actors to work for the interest of the project and ignore 
possible distractions was to involve them in planning and strategie decisions and 
constantly inform them about significant changes and challenges. The projects that 
built airport terminais involved the airlines operating there in the planning phase, so 
115 
their spontaneous interest were incorporated from the beginning. Most projects 
involved the future operator or client for similar reasons. Projects InfraST, InfraR, 
InfraS , EnergyH and EnergyEX reached out to local communities and took into account 
their desires. Projects DigitPTIS, DigitMIS and DigitBIS invited representatives of 
other departments within the parent organization to provide their input. 
Developers oflarge projects in remote areas had troubles finding local contractors large 
enough to carry on the allocated tasks and had to convince non-local companies to jo in. 
In order to co-interest these actors, they offered special work conditions (EnergyEX) 
or more advantageous contracts (project InfraR) . For instance, project management 
team of EnergyEX took severa! decisions in this sense: they used off-site construction 
of small modules, so those contractors would not need to move their teams in the 
remo te area; for those that had to be in the area, they built a who le village with attractive 
housing and leisure facilities and proposed a fly in 1 fly out approach that would allow 
teams to spend 20 da ys working on the site and the remaining 10 da ys of the mon th at 
home, with their families. 
"We try to build stu.ff outside and bring it complete, almost al!, so that we limit 
the number of people at the site. (. . .) We build up modules (. . .) that you can put 
on a truck and transport them to site. So for this mine project, we are building 
something like 350 modules and for the Upgrader project, we are building 
about 600 modules. We build them in big cities such as [name of the cilies} and 
then, put them on the truck. And when they come to site, it is like a Lego set, 
you just put them on top of each other, ho ok them up, weld them ... This is one 
way of ensuring that we mitigate the risks of finding people togo to this remo te 
area in the hardship. " (Interviewee 1, EnergyEX) 
AU projects used a combination of adhesive and coercive regularized interests to align 
the participant actors. In sorne cases, the approach moved from adhesive to coercive, 
such as in DigitPTIS, TerminaiS, PharmaA or InfraR, as new project conditions and 
unfortunate past experience recommended it. For example, the project management of 
116 
InfraR assumed contractors would behave in good will, so initially opted for a high 
level of autonomy, but later realized more control is needed to keep actors interested: 
"Then .. . we have another thing thal we saw .. . (. . .) the contractors, they have 
the self-check thal they have do ne... the right thing and they have do ne it 
correct/y. And we ... we see that, after sorne years or so, that this doesn 't work 
as well ... the contractors are taking too easy on this fact, so we had to put in 
sorne of our own staff to check them ... to help them ... to check themselves. " 
(Interviewee 1, InfraR) 
In fewer cases a coercive approach became more adhesive, such as in DigitMIS, where 
the project management coped with the significant opposition to the project by 
encouraging discussions between different departments, organizing meetings to 
explain the project goals and details, and using project supporters to mediate between 
the project team and the affected departments. 
We found both cohesive and adhesive elements in all projects. Sorne projects preferred 
one approach over the other, but they all used all types of elements to align actors 
maintain their interest in the project. Between the two extreme forms , we also found 
intermediary types of regularized interests, for example wh en ac tors had a certain level 
of influence and sorne leverages to use it, but could not fully impose their will in ali 
circumstances. Somehow unexpected, we noticed that sorne ofthese elements were not 
actually used as intended, such as powerful coercive elements being completely 
ignored or used only as a last means, as well as strong adhesive elements completely 
failing to align one or more actors. 
4.4 Spontaneous Interests 
Actors' spontaneous interests are always present and are continually involved in 
forming ties based on direct, materially-conditioned attraction and repulsion. Most of 
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the time, project-relevant interests remain regularized, as actors respect agreements and 
commitments. However, despite project participants ' continuous effor1 to maintain 
these commitments, spontaneous interests push actors to reconsider their commitments, 
eut old ties and form new ones, all ofwhich sometimes triggers significant restructuring 
processes. In this section, we briefly present examples of situations when spontaneous 
interests pushed actors outside the framework of regularized interests . We leave for the 
next chapter a more detailed discussion of those instances that led to small 
transformations or even major structuring episodes. 
Actors express affinities and animosities during project development, preferring to 
collaborate with certain partners and wishing to avoid ethers. We encountered many 
examples of animosities between certain contractors in InfraR and TerminalL, between 
the project management and the main airline in TerminalE, between the main 
contracter and local unions in EnergyH, between different members and groups of the 
management team in TerminaiS, DigitS and EnergyH, between contractors and the 
project management team in EnergyEX and DigitPTIS, between certain partners in 
DigitPTIS, between the project team and different departments of the parent 
organization in DigitMIS, DigitBIS and PharmaS , and so on. Most animosities were 
solved during project development, although this sometimes involved firing or moving 
on a different position the leaders of those contractors ' project teams involved in the 
conflict. One particular case is the project TerminaiS, which was developed in two 
phases and the owner, trying to avoid conflicts within the project management team 
adopted a completely different approach in the second phase, which, indeed led to a 
very harmonious collaboration within the team, but to major animosities between the 
project management team and the main contracter. 
"We had a site supervisor with [the main contractor} that ... 1 wasn 't very 
impressed with ... He ne ver step foot outside of the trailer .. . He was ne ver on 
site. And for me, a site supervisor should be on site ... He spent his entire ti me 
going through the drawings ... trying ta fi nd errors and omissions from the 
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designers ... in or der to make claims for changes, for ma king mo ney. And 1 used 
to joke - Are you getting a percentage .. . of the se? Is that why you are so ... I 
am re ally outspoken. I am known to be outspoken. I will cal! a spade to spade. " 
(Interviewee 1, TerminaiS) 
Animosities couid sometimes arise from unsatisfied demands of actors with strong ti es. 
One interviewee expiains the issue of ignoring spontaneous interests of colleagues to 
whom he had worked in the past within the parent organization: 
"C'est une entreprise très relationnelle. Tout le monde se connaît. Il y a un chef 
d 'opération qui peut rn 'appeler avec qui j'ai déjà travaillé. Peu importe si je 
suis rendu quatre niveaux en haut, il va rn 'appeler en haut: «[Interviewee 's 
name}, peux-tu mefaire ça?». C 'est comme ça ici. C 'est correct pour faire du 
transport mais pas pour faire des projets parce que dans les projets, (. . .) il y a 
tellement de variables dans l 'équation. Tu as huit, dix variables, ça prend dix 
équations pour résoudre ça donc ça devient bien complexe. On ne peut pas 
répondre à tout le monde. Et là les gens quand on ne leur répond pas, ils 
pensent qu 'on leur en veut. Ils pensent qu 'on est fâché, qu 'on ne les aime plus." 
(Interviewee 2, DigitPTIS) 
Affinities were also present in most projects, actors enJoymg collaborating with 
specifie teams and individuais. The above-mentioned owner of TerminaiS hand-picked 
the members of the project management team and certain contractors for the second 
phase of deveiopment: 
"[The owner J actually saw what happened in phase 1. .. and they ki nd of hand-
picked who they wanted for phase JI. (. . .) In phase II, the airport decided that 
the only ... project manager they wanted for phase II terminal building was 
[project manager name}. And so they went to ... the board of directors ... and 
were able to putforward an argument ... I don't know what that argument was, 
but they were able to put forward ... an argument to the board of directors ... 
and get approval from the board of directors ... to award the project 
management phase II to [project manager name}. So, they knew who they 
wanted ... in phase II. And even though the civil ... was publicly tendered ... they 
knew they wanted it togo [contractor name} and they wanted [contractor 's 
project manager name}. And they got [contractor 's project manager name}. So 
it was more ... hand-pickedfor phase II. " (Interview 1, TerminaiS) 
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TerminalE were particularly successful in building adhesive volitional connections, 
which in turn generated spontaneous interests to align and collaborate with other actors 
in the project. These ties actually stayed with them even after the end of the project: 
"But 1 would say anyone now; 1 bumped into a man in the street the other day 
that 1 hadn 't seen in ... 1 don 't know how many years, but he worked in 
[TerminalE}. The first thing we do is embrace. There is a camaraderie 
associated with having worked on the project which 1 think [the project owner J 
engendered among us and encouraged which 1 have never seen on another 
project." (Interviewee 3, TerminalE) 
Other spontaneous interests were manifestations of actors preferring a certain level of 
comfort when realizing their assigned tasks. In InfraR and EnergyH, certain contractors 
tried to eut corners and compromise the task performance, aiming to put Jess effort 
while receiving the same payment. Severa! departments of the parent organization in 
DigitMIS opposed the project fearing the higher leve! of control this would bring. 
Unions and sorne departments of the pattner organizations in DigitPTIS were also 
reluctant, fearing the project implementation would involve their requalification and 
acquiring of new skills. Finally, project sub-teams in DigitBIS took advantage of the 
Jess clear allocation of a certain work package and avoided it for being too difficult and 
requiring specifie knowledge and expertise. 
Spontaneous interests are manifested because different actors, functions or departments 
have different goals. For example, since they are paid according to their sales, the 
marketing teams focus on selling. The solution that would be implemented by project 
DigitBIS was sold way before being ready, which caused a major project restructuring 
to compromise with the timeline mentioned in that transaction. In the project PharmaB, 
many discussions occurred between the marketing team and the legal team, the 
marketing team aiming to embellish the product to an extent the legal team could not 
agree, since it was going beyond its actual characteristics. 
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"Oui, en terme de malentendu, c'était contrôle réglementaire et marketing sur 
les différentes clés que l 'on mettait sur la boite notamment et dans certaines 
brochures marketing. Donc en général le marketing essaie de pousser au plus 
loin possible les revendications jusqu 'à ce que le réglementaire dise non, ça on 
n'a pas le droit de le dire parce que ... , donc il y a le marketing qui revient à 
la charge oui mais ça on le voit dans d 'autres produits qui l'ont fait passer, 
donc qu 'est-ce qu 'on ne pourrait pas essayer pour le faire passer comme ça. 
Donc ça été un petit peu un jeu de ping-pong entre les deux, jusqu 'au lancement 
du produit même après durant les différentes campagnes marketing, pour 
essayer que le marketing fasse passer ses idées et donc derrière avec la 
modération du réglementaire qui dit non, ça on ne peut pas le faire. " 
(Interviewee 1, PharmaB) 
Certain actors expressed desires to develop their tasks in a particular manner and 
refused to comply with the project requirements of delivering a workable solution 
within the timeframe allocated for the task. One of the DigitA team leader insisted of 
being perfect regardless the time used, when this was not expected : 
"In the initial phase of the project, fast summer, also one of the team leaders 
and corresponding team created sorne frustration because they went outside 
the borders oftheir responsibility. ( .. .)they were changing things that were not 
necessary to reach the required function. Be cause they had the .. . the system 
manager involved is one of these pers ons who wants to make il right, so what 
did to ... become a nice-looking solution and.finds il very hard to compromise 
or .. . .finds it very hard to fi nd the right compromise. So, he can propose 100 
compromises, but then he goes for the optimal solution from a long-lerm 
perspective and we not ... 1 mean, even if we had a fair/y long project he re, we 
needed to deliver, ( .. .) we had quite sorne stress in many areas, so we couldn't 
waste effort, so ... on things that were not necessary to change. So, in thal te am, 
and due to the te am leader that was a bit the same type of persan, loo flexible 
in are as where flexibility was not needed, 1 mean, improving things that didn 't 
need improvement. " (Interviewee 1, DigitA) 
Sorne spontaneous interests were left unaligned with the project goal and respective 
actors manifested them during project development. This was particularly the case of 
social activists that were fighting for the preservation of the initial destination of the 
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construction site in project InfraMC, of environmental activists in EnergyEX that were 
opposing ali projects in the oil industry for generating pollution, and of 
environmentalists that were opposed to certain parts of the project InfraB for negatively 
affecting a bird habitat in one protected area. 
Another example of spontaneous interests left parti y unaligned is the attempt of one of 
the partner organizations to impose its point of view and lead in project DigitPTIS. 
This partner had tried before to initiate a similar project with no success and saw it as 
a matter of pride and prestige. For these reasons, they had tried to get the lead in the 
focal project as weil, but were unsuccessful. During project development they 
manifested different interests that made the project director accuse them of sabotaging 
the project: 
"Oui, il y a un agenda caché, que je vous ai mentionné au tout début de la 
rencontre, à savoir que, je soupçonnais le [partner #2 J de faire en sorte qu 'ils 
pourraient se réjouir d'un échec du projet. C'est très dur ce que je dis, mais je 
l 'ai dit à tout le monde. Je l 'ai dit au conseil d 'administration de la [partner 
#1}, aux directeurs généraux, dont le président directeur de la [partner #2} qui 
était là, en disant « Vous souhaitez que ça ne marche pas, pour faire la preuve 
que vous êtes seul capable de faire des projets régionaux. »" (Interviewee 1, 
DigitPTIS) 
Finally, severa] actors manifested spontaneous interests to increase their financial 
advantages in the project. Blue-collar workers tmions threatened the EnergyH project 
so they can get more work Joad, while local businesses demanded more financial 
compensations from InfraS for disturbances of their regular activities. Some 
contractors demanded higher penalties to be paid by the project owner when changes 
were required, such as in EnergyH, InfraR or EnergyEX. As also mentioned above, the 
main contractor for the second phase of development of project TerminaiS even hunted 
for unclear specifications and mistakes that would involve costly changes. 
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We observed a wide variety of spontaneous interests with a high level of volatility, 
which is in line with our presurnptions inspired by the actor-network theory - any 
connection that defines the actor-network could tempt him to join a different coalition 
of interests. We found that actors manifested spontaneous interests as a result of their 
affiliation with specifie parent organizations, departments, professions, or of their 
specifie roles in the project, but also as a reaction to mutual connections with other 
project actors. Being neglected or improperly aligned led to the same result. Finally, 
actors manifested specifie desires and interests simply because they aim to get a 
privileged position and recognition with minimum effort. 
In conclusion, understanding the project structure as a network of cognitive and 
volitional connections enabled us to unveil the key elements that compose a project, 
make the project recognizable, and fuel actors' actions and interactions. We found 
evidence that the four strata coexist within ail projects. We also found that each type 
of connection could take a wide variety of forms although resulting in similar roles for 
the development of the project. 
The two visible strata consist of elements that were purposefully built for the project, 
taking into account the specifie goal , context, and actors involved. The two hidden 
strata include a combination of pre-project and project-specific implicit representations 
or convergent and divergent spontaneous interests, respectively. When joining the 
project, actors bring work routines, interaction scripts and categorizations from their 
prior connections, experience and background. Symmetrically, they also import 
interests aligned with these prior connections, for example parent organizations' 
regularized goals . On top of those, they also develop specifie implicit representations 
to reflect their own interpretation of the project explicit elements, as well as aligned 
spontaneous interests as a result of their commitment to the project interests. 
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However, we noticed that these interests and representations are not completely 
identical over time. They actually change with the advancement of the proj ect during 
its lifecycle, as a re suit of ac tors ' quotidian actions and interactions, but also in response 
to major conflicts and collisions. We consider the first two categories as expected 
adjustments in temporary organizations, so treated them as the smooth evolution of the 
project structure during stable periods. We label them translations and discuss them in 
detail, in the next chapter (Chapter 5). The third category involves dramatic alterations 
of the project configuration of cognitive and volitional connections, or what we cali 
structuring episodes in our theoretical framework and this is discussed in the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis . 
CHAPTER V 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROJECT STRUCTURE 
DURING STABLE PERIODS 
As explained in Chapter 2, we distinguish between stable and revolutionary periods in 
the project lifecycle. While the revolutionary transformations will be discussed in the 
following chapters, we focus here on shedding light on the nature of cognitive and 
social interactions during stable periods. Giving their temporary and unique nature, 
projects, as opposed to organizations, go through continuous renegotiations of relations 
and interpretations between participants. The project structure is not entirely frozen 
over a certain period oftime, but rather stable, with only small changes and adjustments 
that occur on a continuous basis. Generally, the existing structure has the ability to 
absorb disruption through various mechanisms, which we call translations - the 
specifie transitions that occur within or between strata. We identified ten such 
translations: drift, re-conceptualization, re-attaching, agitation, thematization, 
positioning, routinization, acceptance, conceiving, and interpretation (Figure 5.1 ). 
The idea of translations emerged during initial stages of analysis. We observed many 
examples of cognitive and volitional connections that changed over time, but were 
considered as normal occurrences in the project participants ' daily life. We decided to 
analyse them into more detail and realised they are simple, one-step transitions, with 
generally clear generating factors , direction of change, and final results. On the 
contrary, structuring episodes involve ambiguity, many connections that need to be 
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reset, and unclear direction of change as each step during transformation process has 
to be thoroughly negotiated, sometimes even with actors not directly involved. After 
severa! iterations between concepts of stability, change and episode, on the one hand, 
and data, on the other, we developed the concept of translation to explain these 
incrementai adaptations of the project structure. 
In this section, we first present each of these translations in more detail and conclude 
with a short discussion about our observations and reflections regarding the equilibrium 
and minor transformations that occur during stable periods. 
5.1 Drift- Implicit representations to implicit representations 
This translation occurs exclusive! y in the stratum of implicit representations as a result 
of small collisions between different actors ' implicit representations and leads to 
refinements and readjustments of these representations. Exclusively means that 
implicit representations are both inputs and outputs in this translation. Actors almost 
unnoticeably modify their initial implicit representations to synchronize them with 
representations with which these come in conflict. In consequence, no new implicit 
representations are created, only existing ones are refined. lt also means that the 
collision is solved discretely, without modifying other explicit cognitive or volitional 
connections, and without taking the matter into the project social arena. These other 
types of collisions will be discussed Jater, in the thematization section - for small 
collisions - and in the triggering event chapter - for major collisions that involved 
structuring episodes. 
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We observed frequent collisions between both pre-project representations and 
representations developed specifically during project lifecycle. For example, when 
collaborating on specifie tasks, two sub-teams from different participant organizations 
had to change their work routines to better fit each other' s style, such as in projects 
DigitA, EnergyEX or lnfraR. Teams from different departments of the parent 
organization had to also adapt and work together in PharmaS, DigitS and DigitMIS. 
The project DigitBIS included in the project team 50% externat consultants who were 
gradually adjusting their routines to not collide with those of the owner's team. 
Projects that were developed in an innovative manner particularly experienced 
collisions between actors ' pre-project routines and habits and the new reality. Projects 
EnergyEX and TerminalL adopted a modular approach to shorten the project schedule, 
but not all contractors and designers were used to it. For example, the engineering 
contractor in EnergyEX had to constantly adapt its routines to comply with the project 
construction approach. 
"Those guys that are doing the engineering ... They are used to do engineering 
the classical way, which is ... you do drawings, you buy the pump and the switch 
ge ar ... you se nd the two together to the site which is this building, you build it 
together. But now, we are doing it different/y ... we are building modules ... So, 
1 don 't want to se nd it direct/y ... 1 want to build tho se Le go sets. So, those have 
to finish earlier be cause when 1 finish them, then 1 take them to site. This guy 
who does the design is not used to finishing things earlier because he does the 
conceptual design first, and he do es the basic design... and. .. he buys the 
equipment, he gets ... information from the pump manufacturer ... After he gets 
the information from the pump manufacturer, he can build the foundation 
design ... and so on. And be fore ... he gets al! this information .. . he is tao la te 
to give that information to the module fabricator ... So, what happens ... the re 
is delay. So, they had to adapt, they had to change the ir way ... of doing things. 
And fabricating those, 1 told you, 1000 modules that we needed . . . (...) this 
happened severa! times. " (Interviewee 1, EnergyEX) 
Sometimes, old routines and habits could not be applied in new projects and even 
routines developed in certain sub-projects or initial stages of the same project were 
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inadequate in other parts of the project or in its later stages. This could be understood 
as a cognitive dissonance between actors' understanding of old explicit connections 
and the emerging project reality (see Ambos and Birkinshaw, 201 0). Projects DigitBIS 
and DigitPTIS aimed to introduce an information system that was already in use in 
other countries and organizations. In this sense, the project management teams decided 
to involve individuals and contractors that had participated in similar projects and 
benefit from their experience and expertise. While the technical solution itself could be 
broadly replicated, their work routines and habits of communication had to be 
continuously adjusted. 
Project specifie implicit representations were also a source of collisions, since actors 
often understood explicit elements in different and conflicting ways (see Tukiainen et 
al., 2010). For instance, in projects like EnergyTP, EnergyH, TerminaiS or DigitPTIS, 
contractors, suppliers and the project management had severa! conflicting 
understandings of technical specifications for certain sub-projects, but these were 
solved after several rounds of discussions. The main contractor and one supplier in 
EnergyH had different understandings ofrequirements and different routines to realize 
sluicing gates and they only synchronized after meetings and discussions : 
"Il y a eu ... disons des conflits, si on veut dire du côté du fournisseur de vannes, 
mais ça ne veux pas dire qu 'il n 'était pas bon. Il y avait une certaine. .. donc 
compréhension entre les deux, entre nous et eux (. . .) Ils voulaient faire à leur 
façon, puis nous on avait notre façon, on leur avait donné une certaine 
conception, ils voulaient changer ça, il y a eu des discussions, ils n 'arrivaient 
pas livrer je ne sais quoi qu 'est-ce que c 'est .. . quel était leur problème, mais 
ça a causé un peu de friction de ce côté-là.(. . .) Mais tout ça se règle avec les 
discussions et les réunions. " (Interviewee 6, EnergyH) 
These different interpretations were facilitated by insufficiently detailed explicit 
elements. In project EnergyTP, unclear designs allowed specifie interpretations of the 
main actors involved: 
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"[. . .}the document just talks about the standard ... with interpretations ... So ... 
we have got to resolve this. So, I mean, in the perfect world, you would like to 
add your engineering advance to great percent age to complete a full design. So 
then, you can have a rally ... on who le set up ... design drawing you could attach 
to the contract to the extent that .. . To get the project going, to get even the 
engineering underway, you start a contract ... You will be doing iton kind of 
design basis... not full drawings. So then, you le ave. .. opportunities for 
misunderstandings or disputes around. .. specifie specifications .. . " 
(Interviewee 1, EnergyTP) 
Projects with multinational or multicultural teams and contractors, such as InfraR, 
EnergyEX, EnergyH, DigitA, DigitPTIS, DigitS, DigitBIS, PharmaA and PharmaS, 
struggled with conflicting understandings and routines in performing even usual tasks. 
Regular meetings, teams collocations, visits of project management team members to 
each site and frequent discussions helped harmonizing routines and, in general, 
avoiding major transformations of the project configuration. 
We observed that, in temporary organizations, most implicit representations collide 
because they are incompatible with each other from their conception and not because 
they become incompatible during project development. Most routines and habits are 
inherited from parent organizations or, in general, from past experience and they are 
rarely compatible. Moreover, implicit representations developed during project 
lifecycle could also collide with sorne of these pre-project representations. We also 
observed that the way in which actors refine their implicit representations is very 
similar with the logic suggested by the structuration theory and routine theory scholars. 
Stability is needed and highly valued in projects (Becker, 2004; Swartz, 2008), so 
actors make an effort to maintain the status quo by quickly adjusting their cognitive 
connections with as little impact on the project configuration as possible (see also 
Heaphy, 2013; Howard-Grenville et al. , 2011). In this sense, they use their capacity to 
reflect upon actions and upon different environmental conditions, and so perform tasks 
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slightly differently, in a way that would avoid future collisions with other routines 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003 ; Giddens, 1984; London and Siva, 2011 ). As a result, 
routines re-take their role of separating trajectories, re-become non-intersecting and 
non-conflicting. 
5.2 Reconceptualization- Explicit representations to explicit representations 
We cali reconceptualization the translation that occurs exclusively in the stratum of 
explicit representations and so involves only this kind of project connections. The 
project paradigm of development does not change (Liguori, 2012), but its visible 
elements become more and more detailed and new cognitive connections are explicitly 
added as the project goes through different phases. This translation corresponds to 
sorne extent to the understanding of the traditional school in project management of a 
project development as a technical task (King and Cleland, 1988; Slevin and Pinto, 
1987). 
As the project advances, its plan becomes more and more detailed and the final goal 
clearer. As we already mentioned in the previous chapter, in the initial phase of 
TerminaiS, the architects sequentially elaborated drawings with 30%, 60% and 90% 
level of details, as the client requirements became more concrete and the final idea 
clearer. Similarly, the team of DigitA only later full y defined the scope of the project: 
"When we start the project, we know about 60- 70% of the scope and then, we 
.fil! it up as we go. Now, it's a bit different 5. 0 was a bit different in the sense 
that we had sorne three major interoperability things to do, which meant that 
the scope was fairly full, at !east for the first 6 months. But then, we did have 
sorne small changes at the end, or additions at the end. " (Interviewee 1, DigitA) 
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In the case of pharmaceutical projects, if initial tests are successful, in later stages the 
future drug is tested on more people, with different aims (i.e. ideal dosage, efficacy, 
safety, etc.), and in multiple countries. Eventually, the official application is prepared 
and submitted to different regulatory authorities. Sometimes, the project scope is 
adjusted according to tests results, such as in PharmaNA who had to narrow down the 
scope as the drug proved to work in less therapeutical areas than initially expected. 
Projects often use specifie explicit elements such as milestones and toll gates to certify 
the completion of certain stages. For example, project DigitA used toll gates to confirm 
completion and product codes to assert product quality: 
"So, we have toll gates, we have, in sorne cases, milestones, etc., but at [DigitAl 
here 1 would say that we have the toll gates, and then you have a number of 
product codes. And the product codes, that states, 1 mean, the . . . not the 
readiness but the quality ... the progress and the quality of the product. And 
then you have a product code that is called PRA, product ready for acceptance, 
1 think it stands for if you spell it out. And ... so ... and PRA is a ... you do an 
assessment and you assess basically that everything is do ne, in ter ms of tes ting 
(. . .) So, PRA is an important, 1 would say, milestone for the project. " 
(Interviewee 2, DigitA) 
Modular projects are a particular case of reconceptualization as more than one sub-
project advances at a time, so multiple explicit representations are enriched in parallel. 
In our sample, airport projects constructed not only the terminal building, but also a 
parking garage, streets and bridges, a new runway, and other additional facilities, such 
as a control tower in TerminalE. All these subprojects were somewhat overlapped, so 
explicit representations were used to both track down subprojects advancement and to 
situate actors in the bigger picture of the overall project. Similarly, project InfraR 
included the construction of the railway station, of an interconnected metro station, of 
a parking garage, and the fitting out of the surrounding area. Energy projects, InfraR 
and DigitS could also be included here. 
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To conclude, this translation occurs naturally, as the project advances during its 
lifecycle. Due to the high environmental uncertainty, scope ambiguity and inevitable 
surprises (Beckhy and Okhyusen, 2011; Floricel, 2008; Jensen et al., 2006), explicit 
representations are developed gradually. Intime, completion procedures are added to 
development procedures, which in turn were added to planning procedures. Work 
packages are formulated and awarded at different moments in time, as the financing 
becomes available and activity deadlines approach. 
5.3 (Re)attaching - Regularized interests to regularized interests 
This translation occurs exclusively in the stratum of regularized interests and aims to 
connect new actors and re-connect existing ones. The functioning mechanism is very 
similar to that explained above for reconceptualization. As the project advances, actors 
change their roles and new actors come on board. Project managers build regularized 
elements to motivate them to commit, convince them to stay aligned, and discourage 
them to seek better alternatives among their other connections. 
Not all needed actors are attached to the project network of interests from the initial 
stages. We observed that, in general, the project is driven through the planning phase 
by a coalition of members of the management team, client representatives, experts in 
specifie domains, and representatives of several functions within the parent 
organization. Large infrastructure projects may also involve designers and sometimes 
a construction manager. Other teams, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, etc. are 
only connected in later stages, as they join the project to help with its fulfillment. For 
instance, project TerminalL first involved the architect team because they needed to 
clarify the project interest in terms of cost estimates and detailed solution. lt then 
attached the project management consultant to help with project coordination, 
contracting, scheduling, controlling and so on. Construction manager organizations for 
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different subprojects - terminal building, central utilities plant, parking garage- came 
on board gradually after that, with the design builder for the infield subproject joining 
last. All other subcontractors and suppliers were connected subsequently, as needed. 
Sorne projects are implemented in multiple locations, so local actors are aligned 
progressively. Project DigitS aimed to implement a new telecom system in tens of 
different international locations, and it did that sequentially, so local teams and 
collaborators came on board gradually. The new high-speed railroad in InfraR was built 
over 190 km and included the refitting of se ven railway stations along the way. The 
project managers split the construction in four relatively autonomous sub-projects and 
although these overlapped to sorne extent, they awarded work packages at different 
moments in time. 
PharmaA planned to develop a new drug that would be sold internationally. Once the 
initial tests showed its potential, the project team moved to an international scale and 
did more tests in multiple international locations to confirrn its efficacy and safety on 
different ethnie groups. After receiving positive results, they applied for approvals to 
severa! regulatory authorities. In this sense, the management team gradually built more 
regularized elements, as new clinics, laboratories, patients or legal advisory teams 
joined the project. 
We observed that often the process of reattaching takes place at the political and 
volitional level and is developed in parallel with the process of reconceptualization, 
which takes place at the cognitive and technical level. As the project goes through its 
lifecycle, new visible elements are created to reflect decreasing ambiguity and new 
actors become involved and others withdraw, as they take on or complete their assigned 
tasks . Reattaching means expanding the coalition that would adequate! y support project 
completion. 
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5.4 Agitation- Spontaneous interests to spontaneous interests 
The network of actors' spontaneous interests is rather unstable, actors are in astate of 
restlessness and manifest new, often diverging interests. Sorne of these spontaneous 
interests could lead to major changes and we will discuss these in the next chapter. 
Sorne others are taken to the project social arena and lead to the creation of new 
regularized elements or modification of existing ones, in arder to align the newly 
displayed spontaneous interests; we named that translation positioning and discuss it 
in a later section in this chapter. In our view, agitation refers to spontaneous interests 
that are manifested at one point in time and then either completely abandoned or 
temporarily disregarded. 
Actors could exhibit spontaneous interests, but sorne are simply ignored by the project 
management tearn or by the other actors. Encouraged by the initial success in imposing 
sorne of their interests, when they managed to significantly shorten the project InfraS 
schedule (this episode will be discussed later in this thesis), the association of local 
businesses repeatedly asked for more advantages, ali along project lifecycle, in order 
to compensate for the disturbance of their daily activities. Although sorne claims were 
taken into account, most of them, such as tax exemptions or a further shortening of the 
schedule, were either not under the jurisdiction of the project tearn or considered 
unreasonable by the project management. 
"C'est sûr que eux autres [les commerçants}, y ... criaient tout le temps ... y 
voulaient qu'on baisse leur taxe ... C'était leur inquiétude ... La première chose 
qu'y nous disaient- Mais nous, on était pas là pour ça ... On était là pour les 
aider à passer à travers le chantier ... " (Interviewee 2, InfraS) 
"On disait tout le temps ... ces réunions là sont là pour tout ce qui touche le 
technique .. . Moi, tout ce qui était technique, j'avais aucun problème... Quand 
y venait le temps de nous demander ... de ... de pas payer de taxes, de pas payer 
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des choses comme ça .. . Y arrivaient, nous le demandaient . . . Mais on pouvait 
jamais rien faire ... Ça, c'est d 'ordre plus politique. C'est pas au point de vue 
technique qu'on peut répondre ... (. . .) Ça, ça devenait pénible parce que à 
chaque mois, y nous revenaient avec ça mais nous, on pouvait pas rien faire . 
(. . .) On avait beau leur expliquer ... C'est un aspect qu'on touche pas ... les 
exemptions de taxes " (Interviewee 1, InfraS) 
Another example could be that of groups opposing projects in the oil and gas industry 
(EnergyEX) or the construction of new hydroelectric power plants (EnergyH). They 
manifested their disproval, but the project management ignored the demands, 
considering that projects had been properly planned- for instance, project EnergyEX 
even won an award from a prestigious non-profit organization for being the most 
environmental friendly project in the oil industry of the year. One final example in this 
category cornes from the project DigitPTIS, where one partner unsuccessfully tried to 
get more power and impose its view on severa! different occasions. 
Sorne spontaneous interests were manifested, but their impact on the project was 
negligible. Different animosities determined three project managers to leave the project 
TerminaiS, one by one, but a member of the management team was al ways able to fill 
in. Similarly, leadership changes in EnergyH insignificantly affected the overall project 
development. First, the project director quit EnergyH to pursue his career at a higher 
level and the site manager smoothly replaced him. Hoping to be the new site manager, 
one of the sub-project managers was not happy with the persan actually chosen and 
purposefully started to be Jess collaborative and assumed responsibility out of his 
designated area. The new project management team ended up deciding to replace him 
before the project would suffer any negative consequences. 
"Ce gars-là avait déjà été chef chantier, sur un autre projet plus petit, et il 
aurait voulu être chef chantier, il avait un tempérament qui faisait qu 'il avait 
de la difficulté à accepter de ne pas avoir été nommé chef chantier. Donc, 
souvent l 'information qui partait de chez lui et qui montait là, c 'était 
problématique, ce n 'était pas tout à fait transparent (. . .) Bien, le plus gros 
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point, c'est que lui, il aurait voulu avoir la job de lui, et il gérait ses 
entrepreneurs et sa façon de faire avec son équipe, parce qu 'il y a plein de 
monde en dessous, d 'une façon qui ne plaisait pas au chef chantier. Il avait 
beau lui dire (( Non, non, ne fais pas ça comme cela », ça ne se corrigeait 
jamais. Ça faisait quelques fois que le directeur avait averti ce monsieur-là(. . .) 
Donc, moi j e suis allé le rencontrer. Mais avant,} 'ai parlé à mon boss, en disant 
((Là lui, je le sors de là, j 'ai un plan pour le relocaliser à telle place. » Je suis 
allé le rencontrer et je l 'ai sorti du chantier. On en a mis un autre à la place. " 
(Intreviewee 2, EnergyH) 
In the projects InfraR and DigitBIS unclear performance criteria allowed sorne 
contractors to behave opportunistically and deliver products and services below the 
expected quality and with short delays, but this also had a minimal impact at the project 
level. Signs and panels were vandalized over one night by unknown individuals, but 
the development ofproject InfraS was not perturbed. 
Another mechanism to translate spontaneous interests is by referring to the 
corresponding regularized elements that were put in place to prevent exactly that kind 
ofbehavior. Contractors could often manifest their financial interests and make money 
claims but, when the agreement is clear, the project manager could easily realign them, 
such as in projects EnergyH, DigitPTIS, InfraS or TerminaiS. For example, facing an 
unexpected situation, the main contractor of EnergyH had to acquire a particular 
technology to be able to continue its work. An agreement was reached, regarding the 
extra work load and the associated financial compensation. On top ofthat, to make sure 
no additional issues occurred and to also motivate the contractor, the project manager 
agreed with purchasing additional tools, as reserves. Despite that, later on, the main 
contractor still asked for a re-evaluation of the agreement, but the project manager was 
able to refuse it based on the revised regularized elements governing their relationship. 
Tensions, animosities or pride were also kept under control with the help ofregularized 
elements. Divergent interests and persona! animosities affected collaboration within 
the core team of TerminaiS, but partnering sessions helped improve sorne of the 
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relationships. Others did not change, but contractual agreements and project manager 's 
coordination managed to impose a decent level of collaboration, in spite of persona! 
animosities. Similarly, the project manager ofPharmaS coped with regular attempts of 
different functional teams to assume a more important role in the project on the basis 
of their scientific primacy, by referring to the initial agreement and by using her 
coordination skills to balance all teams influence. 
Finally, in a few cases, actors willingly renounced manifesting their spontaneous 
interests, because the motivation to work for the project and the friendly ties with other 
actors were stronger than their divergent interest. This is how sorne contractors 
overcame their conflicts in projects TerminalL and TerminalE or how teams dealt with 
problematic deliveries in DigitA, DigitBIS and EnergyEX. Similarly, the project 
manager of DigitS changed his mind about quitting his position within the project, 
despite strong dissensions with the representatives of the owner and the client 
organizations. 
In conclusion, agitation refers to spontaneous interests that actors manifest at one point 
intime, but with no significant impact on the project. This happens because actors do 
not have sufficient power on that matter to impose their will , exhibit the interest but do 
not act in consequence, or simply change their mind regarding the manifestation of 
their desires or regarding the moment in which these desires are displayed (see Mitchell 
et al. , 1997, but also Ross, 2009 and Sloan and Oliver, 20 13). Our findings are in line 
with previous perspectives, such as actor-network theory and stakeholder theory, with 
regard to the existence and exhibition of diverging spontaneous interests and with 
regard to the limited impact on the project - because actors fail to gather a coalition to 
suppmt their claims (Callon, 1986) or do not have the required power, legitimacy or 
urgency to reach their goal (Mitchell et al. , 1997). 
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5.5 Thematization- Implicit representations to explicit representations 
Thematization is the process of translating implicit representations to explicit 
representations. This occurs when certain colliding routines or habits can be (re-
)separated and harmonized only by building corresponding explicit elements that 
would (better) define the cognitive connection. Thematization could lead to either 
creation of new explicit connections that have been previously missing or to the 
modification of existing ones that have been unclear or incomplete. 
Planning activities involve many thematization processes, as different pre-project 
implicit representations need to be harmonized. The final design is a compromise 
between perspectives of many different functions and actors. Sometimes, even within 
the same domain, actors can have diverse practices to which they find difficult to 
renounce. One interviewee explained the struggle of dealing with two engineering 
teams in designing a solution for one subproject in TerminalE: 
"The other problem with something like bomb-blast doors is you get a lot of 
very technical engineers ta! king to each other (. . .) A lot of engineering is about 
opinion: "-J'Il use a factor of 1.21", "-Oh no, I never use that, 1 use 1.35! ", 
"-And what 's that based on? ", "- Well, it 's just what we use!" ( .. .) But, then 
you 've got to get them in the room and they do talk a very strange language. "-
What does thal mean? Explain that! Okay, you want a decision on thal, can we 
do that? " "-No, you can 't do that because ... " "- Well, somewhere in the middle 
we have to get sorne agreement here!" (. .. ) So, I think the people had to get in 
the room and say right, you know, explain to one another what you 're talking 
about and honestly a lot of it I couldn 't understand. But, you can understand 
that you are getting to a point where a decision needs to be made if there is 
sorne agreement and we 're not leaving this room until this is sorted out. And 
people with laptops are showing each other graphs and: "-Do you now agree? 
Well, write down that you both now agree that that 's okay! On a very detailed 
leve!! " (Interviewee 5, TerminalE) 
Other activities could be seen as thematizations as well. For instance, risk management 
sessions are a way to put together different actors ' implicit representations about future 
139 
uncertainty and threatening events, and so build a common explicit representation of 
this future. While ali projects carried on risk management activities, large infrastructure 
projects were particularly careful with these exercises and involved not only members 
of the project core team and representatives of different functions and contractors, but 
also external experts. 
One other type of thematization was generated by the collision between actors ' pre-
project representations about how certain activities are done and the project specifie 
implicit representations regarding how these activities were actually developed. This 
collision required later changes in explicit representations such as procedures, budget 
or schedule to harmonize the plan with the new project reality. In projects EnergyEX 
and TerminalE, the initial plan did not take into account details of certain activities, so 
the budget ofthose activities needed to be later adjusted. The number of people needed 
in one subproject in EnergyH was also under estimated, so the plan incorporated sorne 
changes in team distribution, composition and schedule of activities . Conflicting 
understanding of the railway station design between the architect team and the main 
constructor in InfraST resulted in budget increases. Tests required to validate sorne 
technical solutions took more time in DigitBIS and in consequence the schedule and 
order of related activities were changed. 
Sometimes, these small adjustments of explicit representations went in a positive 
direction for the project. Sorne contractors used specifie work routines that allowed 
them to deliver their work packages earlier than previewed, such as in InfraR or 
EnergyTP: 
"On the detailed construction, there was a particular crew or particular 
contractor that was ... that had a better productivity than we planned ... And 
that opened an opportunity to change the schedule and moved them on to 
something else, you know ... " (Interviewee 1, EnergyTP) 
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Similarly, the innovative work style of the steel contracter in TerminalE helped them 
work faster and involved design and schedule changes: 
"For reinforcement, for instance, they had this business of using roll mats for 
reinforcement, pre-fabricating the reinforcement, putting it on the truck and 
taking it across the raad and then pouring it. The business of erecting steel was 
much quicker. There were changes in design as a consequence. " (Intreviewee 
2, TerminalE) 
In sorne projects, new explicit representations were created as a result of colliding 
implicit representations. For example, the temporary-changed traffic and parking rules 
in InfraS, as well as rules of safe circulation on the construction site were understood 
differently by contractors working on the site and the public and local businesses. This 
confusion was solved by installing additional road signs and a more clear traffic 
signalization. In a similar manner, new communication and information sharing 
procedures were created between certain teams in projects DigitBIS and TerminalE 
after initial incompatible work styles. 
Sometimes the thematization was refused by one of the actors involved, and the project 
management had to intervene to (re)synchronize representations. For example, 
incompatible communication routines between one designing team and the team 
representing the future operator ofTerminalL were fixed only after the issue escalated 
to the level of project manager and the vice-president of operations, respectively. The 
initial attempts made by the teams directly involved did not lead to any solution, and 
only after the involvement of higher hierarchies new communication protocols were 
put in place. 
Considering the two main types of implicit representations that co-exist in projects, 
thematization could be generated by collisions between different pre-project 
representations, between project-specific representations, or between pre-project and 
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project-specific representations. These collisions have a higher magnitude and could 
not be solved through fine re-adjustments within the stratum of implicit 
representations, so they had to go through a drift-like translation. In order to be re-
synchronized, actors need to take them into the project social arena, invite public 
awareness, and create explicit elements that would standardize solutions for those 
specifie issues. A somewhat similar mechanism was theorized by Nonaka (1994) as 
externalization. In his view, in order to transform tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge, actors organize meetings and in "meaningful" discussions "reveal hidden 
tacit knowledge that is otherwise hard to communicate" (p. 20). White the motivation 
and development are different, we retain the idea of public discussions to create explicit 
elements that are understood by the concerned actors in a similar manner. At the same 
time, the idea of creating a social representation out of actors ' implicit representations 
is in line with the literature on sensemaking (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, 
1979). 
Finally, we observed that this translation is also a form of moving from concrete to 
abstract or more general frameworks , for example, to generate a general procedure that 
would solve specifie work problems (see also Floricel et al., 2011 b ). 
5.6 Routinization- Explicit representations to implicit representations 
Routinization is the process of translating explicit representations to implicit 
representations, so the opposite of the previously-presented thematization. As a result, 
project-specific implicit representations are created or modified. 
Actors applied their pre-existing cognitive frameworks to give sense to new explicit 
representations (see Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991 ). The diversity of these frameworks 
led to a diversity of interpretations, sometimes conflicting. Differences were observed 
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between actors that belong to different countries, organizations, departments, 
professions, and between actors with different roles in the project. The German 
construction contractor in project EnergyH interpreted the distribution of roles and 
areas of responsibilities in a way in which he was used to from his native country, but 
which came in conflict with the understanding of Canadian subcontractors and workers 
unions. Similarly, in project InfraR, quality of deliveries, responsibilities and 
communication protocols were understood and applied differently by ltalian 
contractors, German contractors and Swedish project management. 
Interpreting technical specifications and even standards often led to disputes in projects 
TerminaiS, EnergyTP, EnergyEX, EnergyH, DigitPTIS, DigitBIS or PharmaB. As one 
interviewee explained: 
"For instance, if the specifications say: "it has fire protection to ... such and 
such a standard." Weil .. . then when people come together, and say: "Weil, 1 
might dispute what that standard me ans ... The way we interpret that standard 
may be different than the way the engineering company did or the way [name 
of the project owner J do es ... rm (Interviewee 1, EnergyTP) 
However, more often than not, routinization leads to rather compatible implicit 
representations. And as successful synchronizations are to be replicated, routinization 
could also take the form of what has been called learning in the previous literature 
(Bresman, 2013; Bresman and Zellmer-Bruhn, 2013 ; Prencipe and Tell, 2001; 
Shepherd et al., 2011). At various moments during project lifecycle, certain actors-
usually the project management team- organizes learning exercises, so that !essons 
become implicit- or internalized in Nonaka' s terms (Nonaka, 1994). These learning 
sessions usually take place either after significant crises or between major phases. For 
instance, after tests revealed that the new drug provokes kidney toxicity, the PharmaS 
project management team gather together representatives of different disciplines and 
departments to better understand the causes of this toxicity and its implications for 
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future research. Director of project TerminaiS organized a learning exercise after the 
software for access doors malfunctioned in the opening day of the first phase of the 
project. In DigitBIS, the sub-project manager responsible with IT solutions encouraged 
severa! small learning sessions for her teams to share solutions to cornmon technical 
issues. Finally, project managers of EnergyEX and TerminaiS organized ample 
learning sessions at the end of the first phase of their projects, so mistmderstandings, 
conflicts and mistakes would be avoided in the subsequent phases. 
This learning could also happen on a more regular basis, for example when actors learn 
to collaborate and cornmunicate with each other. This was the case in InfraR, when 
only after more than a year the collaboration with regulatory authorities became 
smoother: 
"And to sorne extent they were inexperienced, they could not take the decision. 
And that took more ti me, and for a project that has to pay for its rents it 's a bad 
thing. Time is crucial always in projects. But, after a couple of years they got, 
let 's say, comfortable with the documents we sent in, they had confidence in our 
studies and so on. So, then they could take quick decisions, and that moved the 
project forward. " (Interviewee 2, InfraR) 
On the other band, changing roles within the project hampers the process of learning 
and requires the development of different collaboration and work routines. In project 
TerminaiS, the project manager and the construction manager consultant could not 
keep their collaboration routines developed during the first phase of the project as the 
role of the consultant changed. As the contractual approach changed from a flexible 
cost-plus contract to a rigid lump-sum, the consultant lost its active role and 
coordinating capabilities and became more like an external advisor. In consequence, 
the project manager could not have the same level of collaboration when unexpected 
events occurred and often bad to deal directly with the contractor. 
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Finally, our results suggest that explicit representations have to be salient to involve a 
process of routinization. If not, actors simply ignore them and use implicit 
representations with which they are more comfortable - replicate their old routines 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003 ; Giddens, 1984). For example, the project DigitPTIS 
prepared a boundary team to synchronize representations of the two main contractors 
in order to encourage and coordinate their communication. However, during the first 
years of project lifecycle, the project management disregarded the importance of this 
team, the contractor responsible for the role neglected its responsibilities, and the two 
contractors followed their work routines and limited communication with each other, 
which created major incompatibility issues and delays. 
In conclusion, we observed that project-specific implicit representations grow around 
explicit elements, through the process of routinization. The result could take different 
forms , because different social actors understand explicit representations differently 
(see Tukiainen et al. , 2010). We found similarities with the processes of learning 
(Bresman, 2013; Prencipe and Tell, 2001; Shepherd et al., 2011 ), internalization 
(Nonaka, 1994), and sensegiving (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991 ; Rouleau, 2005). 
Moreover, we observed that often routinization and thematization come in pairs, since 
the explicit representations created through thematization have to be applied and 
understood in a harmonized way to eventually solve the conflict that led to the initial 
thematization. Symmetrically, colliding project-specific implicit representations 
resulting from routinization are sometimes synchronized through the process of 
thematization. 
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5.7 Positioning- Spontaneous interests to regularized interests 
We call positioning the translation of spontaneous interests to regularized interests. 
Actors manifest new desires, affinities or animosities and require new agreements that 
would satisfy them. The existing regularized elements cannot keep them aligned or else 
the translation would have taken the form of what we described above as agitation. 
Hence, new agreements are elaborated or the existing ones are amended. 
Sometimes actors considered that the initial agreement did not include all their desires, 
so they ask for this agreement to be revisited. For instance, after a successful, but 
temporary equilibrium, the association of local businesses demanded the InfraS project 
team to facilitate daily deliveries to their stores. The project re-aligned them by 
organizing temporary areas for deliveries and providing small delivery trucks. 
However, the most common case of this type of positioning is when clients or owners 
ask for new desires to be fulfilled by the developing project, so agreements need to be 
adjusted accordingly. For example, clients of DigitPTIS and DigitA, as well as the 
future operating team of the interrelated project in EnergyTP constantly asked for new 
technical specifications to be added to the final solution and in consequence financial, 
time or other aspects of the initial agreements were modified to reflect these changes. 
"But then it ended up in a series of conversations around specification 
changes ... And often, the ir new operating people would want to have something 
(. . .) But, we have got ... to think of al! the implications, al! the cast implications, 
the schedule implications . . . Recause it is not only .. . you just change one 
valve ... You change construction and schedules ... (. . .) Well ... in the final 
analysis . .. the commercial contract... reasonably... not only protected 
[EnergyTP] interest ... , but also was afairly solid basis for renegotiations with 
the customer, when the customer was in a vastly changed circumstance. " 
(Interviewee 1, EnergyTP) 
New interests regarding design could satisfactorily be taken into account due to the 
initial fair! y-made agreement between the project team and the architects in Termina!L: 
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"One thing 1 would say is that in our negotiations and our initial development 
of our ... , not only scope, but our method ofworldng with the clients, at the 
outset, to sorne degree we agreed which is (. . .) we agreed the types of things 
that would be additional services. So that, at !east we had vehicles to make what 
1 think, [the project manager J who you yesterday met, would cal! a win-win 
situation. Y ou know, the goal was that ... they get you to build a good building 
and that we could do a good job professionally and that we could get paid 
reasonably, not unreasonably and not, you know, tao little. " (Interviewee 6, 
TerminalL) 
Other actors felt their interests as a distinct group were not taken into accowlt when the 
project was initiated. This was usually the case of future users or operators, and of 
actors indirectly affected by the project output. In project DigitPTIS, the new 
information system would affect different groups working at the owner organizations: 
bus drivers, metro operators, marketing and sales teams, maintenance and IT, etc. 
While sorne would be able to adapt with minimwn training, many blue collar groups 
and particularly maintenance teams and bus drivers were concerned their positions 
would become obsolete or they do not have the skills required for the new positions. 
The project team organized sessions to explain the new system and sorne additional 
activities were added to offer sufficient training. In order to convince the skeptical 
union members, both contractors were involved in information and training sessions 
and one even invited sorne union representatives at their production facilities. The 
effort paid off and the groups were eventually full y co-interested in the project. 
"Faut pas oublier on est dans un environnement syndiqué,- il y a trois syndicats 
différents, trois accréditations syndicales différentes. C'et très fort, c 'est très 
très très très fort. (. . .) Même si le syndicat a dit c'est bon, ils représentent un 
certain nombre d'individu, ons 'entend il est supposé tout les représenter mais 
bon il y a ceux qui adhèrent et il y a ceux qui adhèrent pas. Et puis il faut 
essayer de faire que ce soit un petit peu plus vendeur, nous on avait organisé 
de présenter le véhicule à tout le monde donc on l 'a présenté ici aux chauffeurs, 
on avait un horaire, ici aux employés on a laissé le véhicule ici en avant-midi, 
les gens allait durant la pause, et puis on avait des gens dans le véhicule pour 
expliquer comment ça allait fonctionner, on a fait les autres centres 
147 
d'exploitations, on afait tout les terminus qu 'on appelle, puis on l 'a mis dans 
les terminus pour le présenter à la clientèle, pour que les gens puissent aller 
voir, ça va ressembler à quoi, comment ça va marcher. Donc a fait ça, on a fait 
aussi des présentations dans des salles de chauffeurs, avant même que tout les 
véhicules soient équipés, on leurs a présenté comment ça allait s 'installer, on 
a présenté les équipements, c 'étais nouveau ça aussi, il n 'avait pas l 'habitude. 
(...) Vraiment ça été profitable, quand on dit que c 'est payant mais là oui, ça 
été payant. À deux reprises on est allé dans les salles de chauffeurs avec des 
montages spécials, des banderoles qu 'on avait fait faire, on organisait tout un 
kiosque, on répondait aux questions ... " (Interviewee 7, DigitPTIS) 
Animosities between project participants sometimes reached the level where, in order 
to be solved, they had to be taken into the project social arena and relationships 
significantly redefined. Often this meant the actor that could not be realigned was 
removed from the project, such as leaders of certain project teams in EnergyH, 
DigitPTIS and DigitA. Others actors refused realignment in the new conditions and left 
themselves, such as two successive project managers in TerminaiS after persona! 
conflicts with the client representative. The most prominent case involved severa! 
contractors' teams in the roads and bridges subproject in TerminalL. In order to solve 
the conflict, the project manager involved an external professional mediator who 
successfully coordinated ali actors re-alignment. Sorne more problematic leaders of 
contractors ' teams were replaced from the project. 
"ln the ground side, particularly building the roads, we were at a point where 
we were going to fail. We were going to fail, we were going to end up in court, 
we were not gonna have our roads, it was real/y a mess. And everybody was 
painting at everybody else, it was real/y falling apart. He [the external 
professional mediator J came in, got the original participants, 1 mean, high leve! 
people, presidents of the companies, we sat in around for two days, and he 
rescued it. 1 mean, it was amazing! 1 went away shaking my head. He turned it 
around what was a definite failure, because he had sorne very strange 
techniques ... He had sorne of the project officers, sorne of the juniors in, and 
he make them sit in a chair loo king out the window and then just that went ali 
the frustrations, with the ir presidents sitting and listening. We had that for two 
days and afterwards, it was interesting ... four people were ji red immediate/y, 
and the se things .. . you know, when you heard ali the frustrations from ali si des 
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and everybody sat the re . . . The guy had this skills as an intervener, as a 
facilitator to use these tools. He was magic. 1 became a convert. He saved us. 
We would have sunk. 'Cause everybody, of course the senior people on each of 
the company was backing their own guys and, you know, listening to these 
stories... What we re ally need was to come back and say: "remember that we 
all agreed we would gonna build that? Now listen to what these people have to 
say! You guys, you didn't get to where you are in these companies by being 
fools. You listen to what they're saying and then we need us around this table 
we 've got to solve this or is gonna go in a tank" And everybody agreed that it 
was gonna go in a tank, and it was magic." (Interviewee 1, TerminalL) 
Actors constantly manifest spontaneous interests and as sorne become important, enter 
the explicit arena and need to be discussed. We could say that interests translated 
through the mechanism of positioning are powerful enough to reach the project social 
arena and to be taken into considerations by other actors (Mitchell et al., 1997; Werder, 
2011). Most are easily solved by adjusting existing agreements and commitments or 
by elaborating new ones. However, we observed that, in sorne cases, actors preferred 
to dis-connect and leave the project - similar with the exit strategy presented by 
Hirschman (1978). 
5.8 Acceptance- Regularized interests to spontaneous interests 
The opposite translation to positioning is acceptance and regards the mechanisms that 
actually keep actors aligned. Acceptance translates regularized interests to spontaneous 
interests or, in other words, channels their material impulses toward supporting the 
project coalition by discouraging divergent interests and by cultivating affinities and 
adhesions. 
We found two mam mechanisms to gain and maintain actors ' acceptance: one 
emphasizes collaboration, strong ties and voluntariness and so focuses on building 
adhesive connections; the other appeals to power, hierarchy, weak ties and directions 
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and therefore favours coercive connections (Brady and Davies, 2014; Granovetter, 
1973; Levina and Orlikowski, 2009; Ruuska et al. , 2011). We noticed that most 
projects used a combination of coercive and adhesive connections, although sorne had 
a preference toward one or the other. 
Coercive connections oblige actors to stay aligned with the project goal. Rigid 
contracts, penalties, market position, political influence or hierarchical ties were all 
used to force actors to behave a certain way. We identified coercive mechanisms in all 
projects, used either at the project level or at least in sorne parts or phases of the project. 
They were preferred for their simplicity, such as in the second phase of TerminaiS or 
sorne subprojects in TerminalL and EnergyEX, and their efficiency in aligning actors, 
such as in EnergyH, EnergyTP, DigitS, and the second part ofDigitPTIS. For example, 
they were great in speeding the decision making process by imposing the powerful 
ac tor' s interest. 
However, sometimes the results were the opposite of those expected. For instance, 
project managers of DigitPTIS and EnergyH emphasized this kind of connections and 
ended up imposing technical requirements against contractors ' will and ad vice. As a 
consequence, sorne requirements could not be eventually incorporated, but generated 
frustration and required additional effort to realign: 
"Ils ont modifié un câble, nous, on a un câble entre la console du chauffeur et 
la BP E qu'on livre d 'une façon. Eux ils nous ont dit non non non, il faut que 
ton connecteur en bas soit à 90 degrés. On a fait re design ça sur une pièce de 
plastique, c 'est pas simple, du gros plastique industriel. Là maintenant il est à 
90 degrés, ils sont contents. Mais là ce qui arrive c 'est que vu qu 'il est à 90 
degrés, ça mis un affaiblissement dans la gaine et là la gaine se met à sortir et 
ça, ils nous ont dit c 'est un défaut systématique. On l 'a rejeté ça pas été trop 
long. Si vous aviez pris notre câble standard, ça f erait pas ça. " (Interviewee 8, 
DigitPTIS) 
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Actors maneuvering coercive elements, could even intervene in bilateral relationships 
and impose their will. In EnergyH, contractors' mutual relationships were not only 
governed by their own interests and affinities, but also by the project management's 
will. Conflicts were often solved in this way and externally imposed solutions had to 
be accepted and applied . Similarly, higher hierarchies intervened and realigned 
different functional teams within DigitBIS, PharmaS, PharmaR and DigitS . 
One particular way of using coercion was to have a strong control of the network of 
connections and disconnect certain actors to diminish their influence. In project 
DigitPTIS, the project manager reduced the number of connections through which 
partners or teams could bypass the chain of command and impose their spontaneous 
interests. He built closed teams that would only communicate top-dawn, and forbade 
any other communication with the ex teri or. The project manager himself had to respect 
the established relational configuration: 
"Un exemple, ici, il y a une salle de tests, moi, encore aujourd 'hui, je n 'ai pas 
le droit de rentrer. C 'est juste les gens de tests qui pouvaient rentrer. Parce que 
sinon, tout le monde serait rentré et là «Tu pourrais tu me faire ça?». Ce qui 
fait qu 'on a utilisé une technique qui n 'est pas habituelle: la force des silos. 
(. . .) Il n 'y avait pas de collaboration, on avait édicté, on avait presque interdit 
la collaboration. " (Interviewee 2, DigitPTIS) 
On the other hand, adhesive connections emphasized voluntary commitment, 
friendship and collaboration. In arder to align the actors, the mechanism involved 
weakening actors ' links with their parent organization and strengthening connections 
with the project organization. Project subteams would not be representatives ofvarious 
organizations anymore, but part of one united team. The project interest would become 
primordial as opposed to their organization interests, so their spontaneous energy 
would be use to fuel the smooth project development. Project TerminalE is a great 
example of successful adhesive connections that lasted even beyond project lifecycle 
(see section 4.3), but other projects also managed to create spontaneous adhesion, at 
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least in sorne parts or phases of their development, such as TerminaiS, TerminalL or 
InfraR. 
However, since projects are ephemeral, but the parent organization will continue to 
exist even after project completion, this mechanism was not without flaws. This issue 
was particularly problematic in matrix organizations with two sets of powerful 
connections in parallel: one within the project and one within the department, such as 
in projects DigitA, PharmaS and PharmaR. Project leaders and their teams had to also 
consider their future beyond project lifecycle, and cultivate connections within the 
parent organization. This limited their independency in taking decisions in the interest 
of the project. The project manager of DigitPTIS explains this struggle and his 
advantage as he planned to retire after project completion, so not being concerned with 
the struggle: 
"Je suis supposé prendre ma retraite dans 2 ans. Donc j 'attends que le projet 
se termine et je quitte. C'est un avantage d 'ailleurs. (. . .)Quand tu es quelqu'un 
de l 'interne et que tu retournes à ton ancien poste ou que tu restes dans 
l'entreprise, ça devient un moment donné difficile. Tu penses à ta carrière, il 
faut que tu te protèges. Souvent, tu n 'iras pas au maximum de ce que tu devrais 
peut-être. Pas l 'effort que tu ne mettras pas mais amener la solution ou amener 
le projet où tu penses qu 'il doit aller. Moi, on a conçu. C'est notre bébé. (. . .) 
Et après ça je m'en vais. Moi je ne retourne pas dans les autres opérations. Ça 
me donne une liberté que d 'autres n 'ont pas nécessairement parce qu 'ils 
m 'aiment ou qu 'ils ne m 'aiment pas, je m 'en fous . On m 'a choisi pour ça 
aussi. " (Interviewee 3, DigitPTIS) 
From our observations, we can conclude that coercive connections assumed the limited 
temporality of project organizations, so focused on building elements only strong 
enough to keep actors aligned for the duration of their involvement in the project. On 
the contrary, adhesive elements aimed to build open-ended connections, which would 
extrapolate to future periods, contexts and situations. 
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Similarly with the thematization - routinization pair, positioning and acceptance also 
come together. Through positioning, actors express new interests, desires, fears, 
affinities or animosities and new agreements and commitments are necessary to 
incorporate them. However, actors are re-aligned only after they accept the newly built 
visible connecting elements, so only after a process of acceptance also takes place. On 
the other hand, regularized elements that are not able to keep the actors committed and 
aligned, lead sometimes to positioning, as these need to be modified, or new 
agreements put in place. 
5.9 Conceiving - Volitional connections to cognitive connections 
Conceiving is the translation ofvolitional connections to cognitive connections. Actors 
project certain representations of the project according to their own interests and this 
could lead to the formation of new project-specific representations orto the alteration 
of existing representations as actors' interests change or are manifested. 
In all projects, we observed numerous examples of representations being built to reflect 
actors ' affinities, animosities, desires and interests. For instance, the team that initially 
worked on the drug developed in PharmaA later sold the idea to a large pharmaceutical 
company, but desired to keep autonomy in their activities and also selling rights for 
certain cow1tries; the contract as well as later communication protocols and work 
procedures reflected their requirements. In Project InfraST, one actor refused to share 
responsibility for a part of the project in which he had no expertise, so the project 
scheme clearly showed this separation: 
"The project [InfraST] is the blue and the red and the yellow parts. (. . .) The 
yellow partis done by the [name ofpartner 1}, the blue partis done by [name 
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of partner 2}, and ... yeah, the re is always a place where we me et each other 
and that 's in the red part. " (Interviewee 4, InfraST) 
Competing interests could reflect in competing representations of the future project. 
The initial design of project InfraST reflected project initiators' pride of being 
recognized as parents of a monumental and spectacular artifact, despite the unrealistic 
budget and complexity. The local politicians from opposition parties express their 
concern with the project magnitude and, when elected, imposed their own will on 
developing smaller projects which was later reflected on the new design of InfraST. 
"The City wants to make ... big central station, nice central station. They see 
things happening in the city, they want to ... put real es tate in it, they want to 
have a nice are a in the city (. . .) We 're the jirst stop co ming from South, it was 
a pride to make it ... This is [city name}. (. . .)He [the local opposition leader} 
was looking at that plan also, from the City, and he said it was megalomaniac, 
it was tao far away of ... of the reality. And there were elections he re, in the 
city, and he came to rule and then it was over with that plan. " (Interviewee 2, 
InfraST) 
"He [the opposition leader} won the elections. And his party was against 
projects, great big projects. So, when they were in the government of [city 
name }, in 2002, projects like that were ... eut (. . .) ft was a political item from 
them, during the elections, to stop huge projects. We have the ward 
'megalomane ', that was the ward [the opposition leader] used ... So, the other 
party, are the . . . the La bor party, he put them on the si de by calling them: 
"that 's the party that ... al! those megalomane projects ". That was his political 
strate gy " [Interviewee 1, InfraST] 
Moreover, we noticed that actors could use cognitive connections to justify and even 
sugarcoat their will and emotions. We identified such translations from the initial stages 
of project planning, when actors built elaborate representations to sell the idea to 
project sponsors, but purposefully underestimate the resources needed, such as in 
DigitPTIS and DigitS, overestimate the economie or social advantages, such as in 
InfraR and InfraST, or minimize the risks, like in EnergyH. Similar translations could 
occur later on, when actors try to impose their will in subtle ways. The project manager 
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ofinfraR was not esthetically pleased with the initial design ofthe railway station roof 
top and chose to subtly suggest an alternative design: 
"ft was the original design, the glass was colored ... glass it was colored with 
red, it was colored with yellow, it was colored with orange ... and it was ... you 
could see the co/ors, but also the projection of the col ors, so also the platforms 
would be yellow, orange, and red, etc. ft was .. . [sighing] ok, it was approved 
design, but personally, it was terrible! So, f always told our architect: "do you 
re ally like your design ?" "Yeah, it 's very nice! " But, [sighing} 1 was thinking 
... ahh ... this unbelievable ... two and a half hectares, more than 20 000 sq. 
rneters of colored glass over here, waaw, that 's not good! So, that was another 
... yeah .. . challenge for me, but that moment f decided to ... make a mock-up, 
yeah, and you see ... a very big one, with the colored glass. And, the re was 
nobody who was saying at the time: "waaw, beautiful is this! " Ali people were: 
"what is this yellow, red ... " So ... First, f had the challenge to change the 
design and second/y 1 had the challenge to integrale the solar system. And that 
was exact/y the match, because due to the solar system the architect was 
prepared to abandon, his ideas. So, and now, which you see now, if you go 
outside, you see more white and grey and dark colOl'S. ft is not colored, it is 
white, grey, it 's ... yeah .. . f think, it 's better now. " (Interviewee 4, InfraST) 
In conclusion, sorne elements in their network of interests could lead actors to create 
new project representations. Agreements and commitments often have a corresponding 
cognitive form which could be later adjusted as actors' interests evolve. The opposite 
is also true, and come as a translation that we call interpretation and discuss it in the 
next section. 
5.10 Interpretation- Cognitive connections to volitional connections 
Actors transform cognitive connections into volitional connections through 
' interpretation'. This translation results into stimuli to interest actors in the project and 
preserve their alignment. New agreements are concluded or the existing ones are 
adapted to incorporate the project specifie construed representations. 
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Certain representations could be interpreted as attributing roles and ordering non-
hierarchized ac tors. The actors ' volitional connections would th en be tributary to 
dependencies established through schedules, plans or order of activities. Sometimes, 
the result of such interpretations contradicts the existing agreement and actors need to 
be realigned. For example, in project TerminalE, unclear areas of responsibility in a 
particular subproject could only be solved by informally subordinating the first-tier 
supplier to the second-tier supplier that was doing most of the work in that subproject. 
Adjusting existing representations for various reasons could also affect actors ' interests 
and involvement. For example, in project TerminalE, delays of various construction 
teams and late requirements of the main airline delayed the overall schedule, so the 
communication infrastructure work package was partly shrunk and partly postponed. 
In this way, the communication contractor's interests and desires were vastly ignored. 
As many technical solutions could not be sufficiently tested neither operators properly 
trained, major communication system issues affected the perceived project success, 
which, in tum, demotivated the contractor for the rest of its involvement in the project. 
"We started [TerminalE] with a vision, everyone bought into the vision that we 
were doing something unique and [the project owner] had advertised to 
everyone how they were al most a hero in being part of the project. When [the 
terminal} opened and it failed on the first day and p eople were celebrating that 
night the celebrations were slightly tempered with '! can 't believe thal 
happened. ' Everyone who existedfrom March onward through the remediation 
project, it certain/y took the wind out of them, it took the shi ne and polish off of 
what they had made strides for years to do. That had a big impact on the guys. " 
(Interviewee 4, TerminalE) 
Project representations could appear in light of actors ' will as either attractive or 
dreaded stimuli . This relates to our distinction between coercive and adhesive 
regularized elements, see sections 4.3 and 5.8 of this thesis . In this sense, team building 
workshops, partnering sessions or communication protocols that favour collaboration 
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ali motivate actors to stay aligned and work as a team, such as in TerminalL, TerminalE 
or DigitBIS. On the contrary, multiple levels of hierarchy, segregated silos and 
numerous means of strict control forcefully position actors within the project, such as 
in EnergyH or DigitPTIS . 
Conceiving and interpretation form the third pair of opposite translations, along with 
thematization/routinization and positioning/acceptance. Analogously, we noticed an 
interplay between cognitive and volitional connections (see also Bercovitz and Tyler, 
2014). Project specifie representations are translated into stimuli to align actors with 
the project interest, and, in turn, actors ' interests shape project specifie representations 
accordingly. We go beyond dualistic views presented in chapter 2 and suggest that the 
rational and material realms are in close relation and mutually influenced each other 
(Damasio, 2006; Descartes, 2003; Nietzsche, 2000). 
5.11 Discussion 
The analysis of our initial four-stratum framework in the context of 18 real-life projects 
enabled us to suggest that the project network of volitional and cognitive connections 
goes through a continuous redefinition. The four strata have specifie mechanisms to 
deal with and incorporate smaller changes and weaker impulses, while keeping the 
same connecting paradigm (Kuhn, 1962; Liguori, 20 12). For instance, new ac tors ' 
interests are aligned without a significant alteration of the regularized elements stratum, 
in other words without affecting existing agreements. 
Translations occur in response to missing, unclear or conflicting cognitive and 
volitional connections. Actors fill in the void by creating, for example, project-specific 
implicit representations to understand project explicit elements. Small collisions 
between work routines lead to a better definition of either actors ' implicit 
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representations or project explicit representations. Slightly divergent interests realign 
in response to either stronger connections to the project goal orto guiding regularized 
elements. When not possible, new agreements and commitments are formed or existing 
ones are amended. The actors ' alignment is successful if they accept the project goal 
as one oftheir own goals . In this case, actors direct their spontaneous impulses toward 
supporting this goal and marginalize impulses that remain unaligned. 
Giving their time-limited aspect, projects do not develop a wide range of specifie 
implicit representations. However, the routinization translation is particularly useful in 
scrutinizing the compatibility of newly created or modified explicit representations 
against existing representations. Most incompatibilities, even between explicit 
elements, become evident only when activities are performed in a routinized manner. 
We observed that translations could happen at various moments intime, with a variable 
frequency, and in different forms . They could be initiated by any actor involved or 
affected by the project. However, we noticed that the project management team plays 
a central role in these processes, as it coordinates project development and tries to 
maintain a certain stability of its structure. For instance, the project management tearn 
coordinates the expected (re)conceptualization and (re)attaching processes associated 
with the integration of new actors that jo in activities ail along project lifecycle. It also 
encourages or sometimes forces thematization and positioning to solve subtle conflicts. 
In general, giving its central position within the network of project connections, the 
management team is or tries to get involved in ail types of translations to ensure a 
smooth project development. 
We also noticed that the elements in the visible strata are often correlated, as actors 
project their interests in form of project representations and interpret existing 
representations in terms of stimuli aligned with their interests. Often new elements are 
added to the two strata in a coordinated way, especially when new actors join the 
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project and both their volitional and cognitive frameworks are synchronized with the 
project structure. The two strata together compose the project social arena, a coherent 
project image as it could be seen by externat and internai actors. 
The important observation is that ali these translations are actively happening during 
stable periods. They could be seen as means to release tension and lower the number 
of radical transformations, by not allowing conflicts to escalate. However, at times, the 
project structure is overwhelmed by certain impulses and, major alterations on multiple 
strata are required. We cali these radical periods structuring episodes and see them as 
sequences of multiple translations that unfold in a coherent manner. We discuss them 
in detail in Chapter 7, but first, in Chapter 6 we elaborate on the type and role of 
triggering events in launching structuring episodes. 
CHAPTER VI 
TRIGGERING EVENTS 
Our research results appears to suggest that the project configuration of cognitive and 
volitional connections is stable for most of the project lifecycle and has the ability to 
cope with most conflicts and misunderstandings that occur naturally in a project. 
However, we also found that, at times, these conflicts overcome a certain threshold and 
the project configuration of relations needs to change at a more profound level to be 
able to incorporate them. In this chapter we focus on the triggering events that lead to 
these major transformations. The triggering events that we observed were mainly in the 
form of colliding implicit representations or of divergent interests . Therefore, we 
discuss these two types of events in more detail in the following sections. We end the 
chapter we sorne observations regarding the two type of events and what distinguish 
them from regular events. 
6.1 Introduction 
Triggering events did occur and experienced practitioners expected surprises . .. : 
"!don 't think you should ever go into any major project like this thinking that 
nothing's gonna happen, something's gonna happen. " (Interviewee 2, 
TerminalL) 
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But sorne of them were virtually unpredictable .. . : 
"Stuff like that just mentioned it happened in [Termina!L}, 1 don 't think that 
anybody other than a fortune tell er could've come up with tho se . . . type of 
events " (Interviewee 2, TerminalL) 
This observation emphasizes the importance of our topic: it is a real issue, present in 
ali projects, and theoreticians and practitioners alike would tremendously benefit from 
better understanding when and where such events appear and how managers could 
successfully cope with them. In this sub-chapter we discuss the first issue - the 
triggering events that perturb the smooth project development and their locus of 
generation. 
We identified a total of98 structuring episodes in all18 projects, so 98 triggering events 
that generated them (see Table 6.1). We found between 2 and 14 triggering events in 
each project. The airport development project TerminalE was by far the most 
challenged, with 14 events, while two bio-pharmaceutical projects (PharmaS and 
PharmaB), one digital (DigitMIS) and two infrastructure projects (InfraS and 
EnergyTP) had the smoothest evolution. It is interesting to note that the smooth 
evolution did not mean performance, since EnergyTP and PharmaS were actually 
closed, for different reasons, before completion. At the sarne time, the early closure 
might explain the lower nurnber of challenges, since these two projects did not 
complete their lifecycle. However, the main purpose of this research was to understand 
major transformations and not list ali significant changes, so discussions about number 
of events and comparisons between industries are mere! y orienting and presented more 
with the purpose of offering a description of the data we collected. 
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Table 6.1. Triggering events in projects 
Project Number of Number of Total lndustrial sector Location colliding implicit divergent Number of 
na me 
representations interests Events 
InfraR Infrastructure - Europe 2 5 7 
transportation 
InfraST Infrastructure - Europe 6 3 9 
construction 
InfraS lnfrastructure- roads North 1 2 3 America 
TerminalE lnfrastructure - Europe 6 8 14 
airport 
TerminaiS Infrastructure - North 3 1 4 
airport America 
Termina IL Infrastructure - North 1 5 6 
airport America 
EnergyEx Infrastructure - North 3 3 6 
energy America 
EnergyTP Infrastructure - North 0 3 3 
energy America 
EnergyH Infrastructure- North 6 1 7 
energy America 
Total Infrastructure 28 31 59 
DigitA Digital - telecom Europe 3 2 5 
DigitS Digital - telecom Europe 3 2 5 
DigitMIS Digital - IS Europe 1 2 3 
DigitPTIS Digital - rs North 4 3 7 America 
DigitBJS Digital - IS North 3 3 6 America 
Total Digital 14 12 26 
Ph arma A Bio-pharmaceuticals Europe 4 l 5 
PharmaS Bio-pharmaceuticals Europe 2 0 2 
PharmaB Bio-pharmaceuticals Europe 2 0 2 
PharmaNA Bio-pharmaceuticals North 3 l 4 America 
Total Pharmaceuticals 11 2 13 
Total Ali projects 53 45 98 
We distinguished between events provoked by collisions of implicit representations 
and those provoked by divergent spontaneous interests. The former type occurred 28 
times in nine infrastructure projects, 14 times in five digital projects, and 11 times in 
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four bio-pharmaceutical projects. In compartson, events provoked by divergent 
interests occurred an approximately similar number of times in infrastructure and 
digital projects, 31 and 12 times, respectively, but much less often in pharmaceutical 
projects - only twice. This might be explained through the stronger regulatory 
constraints that shape the project development process in the biotechnological and 
pharmaceutical sectors. Looking at the project level, digital projects had a rather similar 
number of events generated by either colliding representations or divergent interests, 
while in most infrastructure projects only one type predominated . Of course, as 
explained above, in ali bio-pharmaceutical projects most events resulted from implicit 
representation issues. 
In the next two sections we discuss each of these two types of events in more detail. 
We end the chapter with sorne concluding observations. 
6.2 Events as Colliding Implicit Representations 
The first type of triggering events occurred in the form of colliding implicit 
representations (see sorne exarnples in Table 6.2 and a full list in Appendix C). 
Different actors ' assumed or developed implicit representations were not compatible 
with other actors ' representations or with the actual project context and simple 
translations were insufficient to synchronize them. In the 18 projects, we identified a 
total of 53 colliding representations that led to structuring episodes. 
The most common event was caused by discrepancies between project planners ' initial 
representation of the future project and the later project reality . One first sub-category 
regards an accumulation of stressors that together formed the event that at one point 
launched a major project structure transformation. There was no particular activity that 
lasted too long, cost significantly more or encountered particular complexity, but 
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multiple such situations that amassed and determined the project management team to 
alter the configuration of project relations. We found such examples in lnfraR, 
TerminalE, EnergyEX, DigitA, DigitS, DigitPTIS and DigitMIS. 
The second sub-category occurred frequently in infrastructure projects as result of 
project planners misinterpreting or minimizing the impact ofharsh soil conditions. The 
hydro-electrical plant in EnergyEX was built in an area that had been known for its soil 
instability and sandy texture. Other companies had considered developing similar 
projects there, but renounced after seeing the feasibility tests results. EnergyH was 
approved in spite of ali these warnings, but ended up going through six different 
structming episodes generated by inappropriate soil conditions that perturbed digging 
the intake channel, vibro-compacting the base of the dam or threaten the construction 
teams' security when boulders detached and feil on the site. InfraST also had to deal 
with three different events related to the vast amount of underground water in the 
construction site that generated complications with regards to the isolation of 
underground foundation and facilities . In their turn, EnergyEX planners overlooked the 
network configuration of small rivers and creeks and faced a major risk of water 
contamination. 
A third sub-category regards the inaccurate initial representation of the legislative 
environrnent. For instance, PharmaNA was taken by surprise by specifie national 
testing rules in one of its international sites. Similarly, TerminaiS could not rehabilitate 
and so use the old fir beams to decorate the new terminal because the rehabilitation 
would be done in a milllocated abroad and the transfer of beams would be subject to 
bilateral trade regulations and quotas. 
Other projects in the area could also generate events, as project managers could not 
predict their evolution or could not properly understand their own explicit 
representations. For example, EnergyEX was competing for the same workforce with 
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severa! other large projects in the area, so planned to reach its peak use of workers 
between peaks of other projects. However, one of these projects was delayed, so the 
two peaks ended up coinciding. The construction of the metro station subproject in 
InfraST unexpectedly interfered with a smaller construction project, as the latter 
projected a horizontal foundation for its building and so overlapping the two 
construction areas. Even the unexpected configuration and technology of piping and 
sewage system in project InfraS could be included in this category. The municipality 
had outdated plans that revealed a very different image than what construction teams 
fotmd on the site, so initial digging plans and work routines could not be used as 
planned. 
The higher technical complexity of the artifact or service developed in the project is 
another source of this type of events. Project management teams of DigitBIS and 
DigitA realized only later in the project that the new technical solutions would require 
new development platforms. Researchers in PharmaNA discovered after a series of 
tests that the initial dose formulation is inaccurate and needs to be increased 10 times. 
PharmaS team identified adverse reactions to the drug in a certain ethnie group and 
later a high risk of kidney toxicity, which eventually led to project closure. On the 
contrary, PharmaA team eventually benefitted from this type of events, as they realized 
the drug could work for the treatment of other, related diseases that were not envisioned 
initially. 
The rules in the environment could change independent of the project evolution. For 
example the September 11 , 2001 terrorist attacks generated a lot of concerns re garding 
airport security, so the national and international legislation changed accordingly. 
National agencies were created to recommend specifie measures and oversee their 
implementation. As a consequence, all three terminal projects that we studied, which 
had been designed before the attacks, had to revisit their understanding of appropriate 
airport security measures . In the same category, we could include changes in the parent 
165 
organizations' strategy. For instance, project PharmaB was affected by its owner's 
decision to switch to a preservatives-free policy, as the initial drug formulation 
included preservatives. 
Conflicting understandings ofproject explicit representations was another major source 
of triggering events. In these cases, two or more actors interpret explicit elements in 
conflicting ways and so they cannat perform their activities until the conflict is solved. 
For instance, the two partner organization in InfraR, as well as two contractors in 
TerminalE went through repeated misunderstandings re garding areas of responsibility, 
which accumulated and demanded a significant reconfiguration of relations. The two 
partners in InfraST chose to carry on activities as two separate sub-projects, but each 
developed its own understanding of the sequence of activities and sub-projects 
dependencies, which led to multiple conflicts and misunderstandings. 
Other collisions occurred between implicit representations developed by the project 
management team and other external or interna! actors. In project PharmaA, public 
communication protocols were understood different! y by the international project team 
and one national development team. One press release generated a huge scanda!, as it 
was interpreted by the international media in light of international communication 
protocols, not taking into account national particularities. Project DigitBIS was 
developed independently by its owner, but the implementation of certain information 
systems had to be coordinated at the industry leve!, with other similar projects. The 
project owners had their own perspectives on the implementation schedule, and 
DigitBIS ended up being delayed as other projects were not ready to switch to the new 
system. A more complex situation occurred in project InfraST. The construction budget 
set up by the project team was translated by architects into an actually more expensive 
design. Further, the interested contractors had their own perception of the detailed 
design, so made offers that were almost twice as big as the allocated budget. 
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In certain cases, regulatory authorities and project management teams understood 
project outputs differently. For instance, in project PharmaA, regulatory authorities 
delayed drug approval asking for more tests and clearer explanations, despite their 
advisory council voting for approval in majority. In a separate case, same authorities 
delayed approval of the change in the PharmaA drug application method with no clear 
justification. 
Other actors involved in the project could also have conflicting interpretations of the 
explicit elements set up in the project. In TerminalE, the control tower design and 
technical specifications meant different things for designers and construction 
contractors, so eventually construction modules were not compatible because of 
inappropriate tolerances. In another example, the two main contractors in DigitPTIS 
delivered technical solutions with major incompatibilities, because they were coming 
from a different background and using different procedures and even different 
measurement systems. 
"Donc nos équipes sont allées en France, eux sont venus ici et là, il y a quelque 
chose de bien important, peut-être que pour vous ce ne sera pas évident de 
comprendre, ce n 'est pas parce qu 'on parle la même langue qu 'on se 
comprend. Je suis très sérieux. Notre culture est beaucoup plus près de celle 
des Américains. Elle est beaucoup plus éloignée de celle des Français et c 'est 
un peu un leurre de penser qu 'on va se comprendre parce qu'on parle la même 
langue. En fait, leur culture est tout à fait différente de la nôtre et en plus, au 
niveau ingénierie et tout ça, ce ne sont pas les mêmes façons de mesurer. On 
n'a pas les mêmes standards. Nous, on est en Amérique, on respecte les 
standards américains : l 'épaisseur des cartes, le temps de réponse, ... Pour eux, 
ce n 'est pas la même chose. " (Interviewee 2, DigitPTIS) 
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6.3 Events as Divergent Spontaneous Interests 
The second type of triggering events occurred when actors manifested divergent 
spontaneous interests that could not be ignored, forcefully marginalized or smoothly 
realigned through the correspondent translations, so a more complex transformation of 
the project relational network had to be implemented. We identified 45 cases of 
divergent spontaneous interests that led to structuring episodes (see sorne examples in 
Table 6.2 and a full list in Appendix C). 
In spite of the project management team' s initial effort to align spontaneous interests 
of all actors and motivate them to support the project goal, sorne interests remained 
unaligned because actors never fully consent with all agreements details or because 
they simply manifest new desires as new alternative connections attract them. In 
consequence, we distinguish between events generated by actors displaying new 
interests and by actors re-affirming interests that were not appropriately aligned. 
Sorne actors were never fully satisfied with their role in the project or with the nature 
of sorne of their connections. The project manager of DigitA and the technical 
coordinator had disputes over certain responsibilities, each considering his other roles 
more important, so refusing to assume responsibility for those under dispute. Two 
teams in DigitBIS were also refusing certain tasks, this time because they considered 
them too difficult, so they preferred to avoid taking charge. The two unions in EnergyH 
were not satisfied with the initial agreement with the construction contractor, so 
threatened with going on strike and sabotaging project construction and demanded 
renegotiations. 
Actors in the immediate external environment (Piperca and Floricel , 20 12), nam ely 
those affected by the project but not directly involved, were often left unaligned. In 
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order to avoid future challenges, project managers made efforts to align external actors, 
but sometimes these interests were too divergent, so remained unaligned. Even so, 
project development could advance until the actor became too powerful or managed to 
gather a powerful coalition to impose its demands (Mitchell et al. , 1997). For example, 
the political opposition did not agree with the initial design of InfraST and after 
winning elections restarted the design and planning process. Likewise, in InfraR, 
environmental activists managed to impose their demand of preserving a protected area 
only after they won the case in court, so an official order was issued in this sense. The 
project manager of InfraST managed to impose his will in a more subtle way. The 
original impulse was a persona! dislike of the railway station roof colors and design. In 
order to change this design and gather a coalition to support his demand, the manager 
built up an alternative, more socially acceptable argument and promoted the idea of 
implementing a solar system on the roof top. 
Another way to impose their never-aligned interest was to simply act disregarding the 
consequences on the project. During the planning phase, the project management of 
InfraS contacted ali utilities companies operating in the area inviting them to 
synchronize planned interventions on their respective infrastructures, planning to limit 
the negative impact of construction on the local area, as weil as to increase the life of 
the pavement and other surface finishes. In spite of these precautions, one utility 
company decided to have maintenance interventions on its own infrastructure only 
when the project was close to completion, to the great dissatisfaction of ali project 
team, local residents and businesses, tourists and general public. Similarly, 
representatives from ali departments were involved in project DigitBIS, so they could 
express their own demands, but also learn about the project details and evolution. 
However, at one point, one marketing team attracted a large client promising that the 
technical solution developed in the project would be available much sooner than 
actually planned. Under pressure from higher hierarchies, who wanted to keep the new 
client, the project team had tore-plan the whole subsequent project development. 
-----------------------------------
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Internai actors often reacted the same way. We found multiple examples of contractors 
behaving opportunistically, trying to eut corners to maximize their advantages. Projects 
InfraR and EnergyEX each went through three different structuring episodes because 
of contractors ' aberrant behavior. Projects TerminalE and DigitBIS encountered 
similar problems with their suppliers. Even owner organizations could behave 
opportunistically toward their partners, such as in InfraST and EnergyTP, when 
decisions regarding their part of the projects where taken ignoring interrelated 
subprojects. 
Actors could also have or develop new interests that diverge from the project goal. For 
instance, project clients or users constantly have new demands. While most of these 
demands could be smoothly incorporated through translations, as we explained in the 
previous chapter, sorne imply more radical reconfigurations, such as the client' s site 
prioritization demands in DigitS or client' s interrelated project rescheduling in 
EnergyTP. The main client airlines that would use TerminalE and TerminalL generated 
severa! events in each project when asking for design changes or for more influence in 
taking decisions and even for constructing facilities that will be theirs for exclusive use. 
New actors' will was usually aligned through re-attaching processes and did not 
involve major changes of other actors ' agreements and commitments. However, we 
found three instances in which the new actor did not accept to simply integrate in the 
existing network of connections and managed to impose its will. In each TerminalE 
and DigitPTIS, a new project leader came with a very different style, while in 
EnergyTP, the newly hired operations team had its own demands regarding technical 
specifications of the transport and storage facilities . 
Actors' interests and their nature could change during project lifecycle, independently 
of their involvement in the project. In actor-network theory terms, we could say that 
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actors are attracted by other, more promising connections in their network (Law, 2004; 
Latour, 1987), su ch as more appealing proj ects or alternative action paths that would 
ensure their survival in difficult situations. For instance, the main airline filed for 
bankruptcy and preferred to channel its limited resources toward survival rather than 
fulfill its obligations in the project TerminalL. For similar reasons, the client of 
EnergyTP could not honor the initial agreement. A different way of survival occurred 
in projects lnfraR and TerminalL. After an initial courageous and ümovative decision, 
regulatory authorities changed their mind and decided to ask for the more traditional 
separation of the passengers' flows in TerminalL, thinking that this avoids future 
complications. Similarly, unsure which is the right decision and not willing to take 
major risks, environmental authorities significantly delayed the permitting process for 
a sub-project in InfraR, repeatedly asking for additional studies and explanations. 
6.4 Discussions 
What distinguishes triggering events from regular events is their capacity to challenge 
and significantly transform the current organizational structure. This capacity is, in 
fact, contingent upon the state of this structure at the time when events appear. Events 
that triggered structuring episodes looked similar with other events that occurred in 
different projects, or even within the same project. For the latter, usually, the existing 
project configuration could successfully incorporate their effects. But, from time to 
time, sorne events encountered imperfect or inexistent connections and the only 
possible reaction was a major project change. 
Moreover, we argue that our perspective is more relevant in understanding the source 
oftriggering events in temporary organizations, since it looks at the actual motives that 
generated them. Events that seem similar, such as regulatory authorities' decisions, 
technical incompatibilities or leadership changes, have sometimes a different logic of 
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development. For instance, although most projects changed their leaders severa! times, 
only three such changes led to structuring events. And even though ali three new 
arrivais coincided with the beginning of a structuring episode, the actual triggering 
event was different. In one case (InfraR), the episode was a natural occurrence, since it 
was triggered by discrepancies between initial planner representation of the future 
project and the later reality. The change would have happened anyway. In the other 
two cases (TerminalE and DigitPTIS), the episode was mainly generated by the new 
leaders ' initiatives of imposing their will and bringing major changes to the existing 
network of connections. Without their specifie arrivai, the episode might not have 
happened, especially in TerminalE, where the previous project development was 
positive and "on track". 
We found that ail events worked through processes in the hidden strata, which we see, 
contrary to many other researchers, as the more fragile and volatile parts of the project 
structure. Why not in the visible strata? First, because the project is built coherently, 
usually the same project management team overseeing the development of visible 
elements. On the contrary, despite the guiding role of visible connections, hidden 
elements are still specifie to each actor, so a Jack of unitary interpretation and 
unquestioned acceptance are highly possible. Second, because visible elements are ... 
visible, so possible conflicts with existing elements could be easily pointed out from 
initial phases of negotiations and elaboration. Of course, hidden elements could be seen 
only by actors in the immediate proximity and they become more visible exactly when 
interfering with others, so already generating conflicts. A smooth project development 
could make the whole structure similar to a "black-box", only the results being visible 
and not the mechanisms to reach them. Third, because colliding explicit representations 
and conflicting agreements would not really harm or prevent actors from performing 
their activities unless they are applied in their letter, not their spirit. Moreover, actors 
would not question an abstract element until a more concrete collision happens. 
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In the next chapter, we finally turn to discussing the major transformations that occur 
as result of triggering events, which we called structuring episodes. 
CHAPTER VII 
STRUCTURING EPISODES 
In this chapter we discuss the processes of major transformation of the configuration 
of cognitive and volitional connections in a project, which we called structuring 
episodes. We identified four pairs of matching patterns of episode unfolding. Each pair 
consists in one pattern for each locus of generation of triggering events, namely one 
for triggering events originating in the stratum of implicit representations and the other 
for events originating in the stratum of spontaneous interests. We present each of these 
patterns in turn and discuss their specifie characteristics, but, at the same time, we also 
highlight the main differences between them. We then discuss the idea of failed 
episodes and explain why seemingly similar events only sometimes lead to structuring 
episodes and what prevents certain processes of major transformation to develop or be 
implemented in the end. Finally, we propose a project-level perspective that includes 
episodes as the key lens to understand project evolution and so regards projects as 
sequences of structuring episodes. 
7.1 Introduction 
As explained in the previous section, we identified 98 structuring episodes in the 18 
projects we studied. Based on our interviewees ' responses, we initially listed 112 
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episodes, but eliminated a part of them during analysis. In sorne cases, we realized they 
did not involve major transformations, for example sorne being mentioned only 
because oftheir significant emotional impact, such as one casualty during construction 
in TerminalE or a key member leaving the project management team ofDigitA due to 
a terminal illness. In other cases, we did not have sufficient information to understand 
how the triggering event occurred, how the structuring process unfolded, or how the 
final stabilization took place. For example, in TerminaiS one event that seemed like a 
triggering event had just happened (or better said had just moved to the project social 
arena - see further in this chapter) the day before the interview, so the process of 
transformation just started. Of course, eventually it might have not evolved in a 
structuring episode, for different reasons, as we will explain later in this chapter, when 
we discuss the concept of failed episodes. Or it might have sim ply been a smaller issue 
than initially perceived, as explained by one interviewee: 
"The re is a tendency, especially with technical problems .. . in these kinds of 
things .. . so, the re is a tendency to overreact. So, someone says: 'ft is a 
problem!' ... 'fs it big or small? ' .. . 'ft is big! ' And you tend to think ... like ... 
'this is a fatal flaw ... we never ... we can 't finish the construction of the plant ' 
... Or .. . 'we won 't start it up! ' ... Or whatever, a hu ge problem! Usually ... 
once you look at it more carefully, and study it ... you know what it is ... it is 
not as big a problem as youjirst thought ( .. .) You know, the world is going to 
end, it is terrible .. . it is a hu ge problem. Then .. . it turned out to be ... not that 
bad ... " (Interviewee 2, EnergyEX) 
We developed our concept of structuring episode through repeated iterations between 
theory, data and emerging analytical concepts. We decided to approach the data with a 
very basic guidance from the theory and therefore construct new concepts based mostly 
on our observations of real-life situations of major transformations. As explained in 
chapter 2, the episode was initially represented as a basic three-stage process and the 
project structure as a network of connections between participants. Our preliminary 
definition of the episode was the process of transition from an existing form of 
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organizing project activities to a new one, as a result of participants ' response to 
interna! or externat forces . 
We started by building up narratives of each episode, which allowed us to have a 
detailed picture of each transformation. We then placed inside the four-stratum 
framework all the cognitive and volitional connections of different kinds that we 
identified in each episode (see Figure 3 .2). After severa! iterations, we incorporated the 
new concept of translations and started representing episodes in relation with the 
translations that take place during its development. In consequence, we refined the 
episode definition by adding the understanding as a series of translations th at unfolds 
in a coherent manner. In this way, we were able to distinguish 1 0 phases through 
which structuring episodes could go. Moreover, starting to picture different episodes 
from the perspective of these phases led us to a new visual representation of the 
episode. In the first instance, we ended up with around 40 different pictures of episodes, 
as we found many details we considered worth highlighting. However, after severa! 
more iterations, comparisons and analyses, sorne patterns stood out. We identified four 
pairs of matching patterns: progressive enrichment, bouncing resolution, open-box 
attraction and contagious development. 
The view of episodes as complex processes of transforn1ation that go through series of 
translations in a coherent manner emphasizes the magnitude and complexity of the 
transformation. More explicitly, the existing project configuration of connections needs 
multiple related translations to deal with certain colliding representations or divergent 
interests and this eventually lead to a significant alteration of this configuration. 
---------------------
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7.2 Phases in the Development of Structuring Episodes 
The systematic approach described above enabled us to conclude that all episodes go 
through certain necessary steps, which could be metaphorically associated with 
Callon ' s obligatory passage points (Callon, 1986). Two of these steps are found in all 
episode patterns that we identified, and both of these steps require involved actors ' 
convergence toward a common focus, understanding or vision. These two steps are 
particularly important in structuring episodes, hence we start our discussion with them. 
Later, we present the other steps or phases (sorne present in all episodes, sorne missing 
in certain cases) that define simple or more complex episode patterns. 
The initiation step 
The first such step occur in the beginning of the episode and regards the passage from 
relations in the implicit strata to the explicit strata or from bilateral connections to the 
project social arena. This passage takes place through either thematization or 
positioning - see chapter 5 for a detailed description of each of these translations -
depending on the stratum to which the triggering event is associated. Thus, we observed 
that cognitive events, or colliding implicit representations, move to the social arena 
through thematization, as the explicit element needs to be modified or sometimes built 
anew. In other words, a more abstract connection is needed to solve daily concrete 
issues that prevent actors from performing their activities . On the other hand, divergent 
spontaneous interests become exposed on the social arena through the mechanism of 
positioning, when actors manifest their interests, signal their intent to achieve 
satisfaction and other affected actors take notice and consent to revisit existing 
agreements . 
The omnipresence of this step seems to result from the fact that, for a structuring 
episode to occur, the conflict has to become visible and exposed to those affected. In 
this way, all involved actors are aware of the fact that there is a conflict and agree that 
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this is an issue that has to be solved. Failing to reach consensus in noticing the issue 
prevents the episode from unfolding, perhaps with the unintended consequence that the 
supressed conflict could become even more acute. For example, in project InfraST, the 
team of architects produced a railway station design they considered could be built 
within the allocated budget. Preliminary engineering analyses of the project 
management team and their consultants, suggested the construction would actually 
exceed the budget, but architects refused to significantly modify their design, arguing 
for the beauty of their design "as it is" and contesting the accuracy of estimations. 
Failing to reach a common understanding, the project management had no choice but 
invite bids for the whole work package. Interested bidders made offers significantly 
above the allocated budget, so the who le bidding process was considered a failure. The 
management then went back to the team of architects and, this time, they ali became 
aware of the existence of a problem, nan1ely that the design is more expensive than 
they thought, and of the fact that serious adjustments are necessary in order to solve 
the problem. The actual episode started only at this point, once ali actors involved 
consented to the common understanding that their respective station design 
representations are coliiding. 
"And, of course, in the period from April 2008 until November 2008, in which 
we had a lot of negotiations with our contractors, before they did the bid, we 
learned a lot about ... make it simpler, yeah? Only the architect, every ti me our 
contractor said: "can I make this design simpler, because ... it reduces the 
priee", our architect say: "no, I don 't like this, I like my design. (. . .) So, in 
November 2008, we had 3 bids ... 3 bids ... of 3 contactors. And the lowest bid 
was say the 190 and our budget was 130. So, we had a big problem. " 
(Interviewee 4, lnfraST) 
The stabilization step 
The second omnipresent step, which usually takes place at the opposite extremity of an 
episode, regards the ending of the episode or the stabilization phase. Once the necessary 
---~-- ---------
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visible elements are adjusted, the newly formed connections begin to be considered 
reasonable and appropriate by ail actors involved. For explicit representations, through 
the process of routinization, actors need to harmonize their understanding of the new 
elements with existing implicit representations. In the case of new regularized 
agreements, through the process of acceptance, actors willingly or forcefully realign 
their divergent spontaneous interests with the newly delimited boundaries of 
appropriate behavior. If this step fails , the whole episode could fail. However, in most 
cases an extra-iteration is taken, meaning the episode goes back in the social arena and 
further re-adjust corresponding visible elements. For example, in project DigitA, the 
software platform had to be change, but the new one still had major technical 
incompatibilities, so the project team had to add certain features and redo multiple tests. 
Other episodes go through multiple strata, so additional mandatory steps are required. 
In order to align certain interests, cognitive elements also need to be redesigned, and, 
vice versa, in order to restructure explicit representations, interests need to be 
regularized in a different way. For example, in project InfraR, environmentalist groups ' 
demanded that the construction of the railway should not affect a protected area. This 
demand could not be solved only by re-aligning the protestors with the project, as these 
did not accept to realign unless the area is preserved. On the other hand, the project 
team did not agree to change the path of the railway. The realignment was achieved 
only after activities for rebuilding the protected area were included in the project. 
Moreover, as the initial rebuilding proposai did not work, the conceiving/interpretation 
steps had to be retaken. Similarly, in PharmaA, colliding representations about the drug 
specifications and tests to ensure safety between the project team and regulatory 
authorities could not be solved exclusively at the cognitive level, but additional 
impulses from impatient investors had to be coped with, and new explicit 
representations interpreted in such ways that would keep investors motivated to back 
up the project. 
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The omnipresence of this step stems from the fact that, to carry on with project 
development and implementation activities, participants need to appropriate or at least 
make look like they adopted the new configuration of relations, and channel their 
repetitive activities and interactions accordingly. 
By looking at the translations that take place during episodes, we identified 10 phases 
through which the episode develops. Not all episodes go through all these phases, the 
simpler episodes going through fewer phases, but all episodes that we studied involved 
a minimum of seven phases. It should be noted that the phases are not always 
sequential, actually they often overlap, and moreover, sorne phases could occur more 
than once during structuring processes. 
Phase 1 The collision or conjlict 
This is the [ mandatory] first step of any episode. Implicit representations of different 
actors collide or spontaneous interests diverging from what other actors perceive as a 
stance that advances the project are manifested. We explained this step in more detail 
in Chapter 6, when discussed the triggering events. The condition for the episode to 
continue is for the event to overcome a certain threshold. For the implicit representation 
stratum, this means that the collision between implicit elements is too strong to be 
solved through habituai drift and requires a redefinition of explicit elements. For the 
spontaneous interests stratum, the divergence cannat be considered simple agitation, 
because it is too powerful to be ignored or controlled with existing agreements, so 
corresponding regularized elements need to be renegotiated. 
Phase 2 Moving into the project social arena 
As explained above, the episode could develop only if the conflict that generated it is 
taken to the social arena and discussed there. At the same time, actors involved have to 
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be aware of the necessity ofthese discussions and consent to participate. For example, 
when one marketing team attracted a large client for the parent organization after 
promising that the new information system would be functional at a date much earlier 
than the DigitBIS project team initially planned, the first reaction of the project 
management was to refuse to even take into consideration the event. But, because the 
parent organization would greatly benefit from working with such a large client, the 
parent organization management pressured the project manager to consider the context 
change and do everything in their power to shorten the schedule. ln this phase, the 
condition for the episode to continue is that a simple redefinition of explicit 
representations, or a renegotiation of existing agreements are not sufficient ( otherwise 
it would be a simple thematization or positioning translation), so more complex steps 
are required. 
Phase 3 Revisiting existing visible elements 
During this mandatory phase, existing explicit representations and regularized interests 
are discussed and gaps between corresponding visible and hidden elements identified. 
The actors try to better understand the collision, its roots, if it is real or just exaggerated 
(see the above example), and even check if they can ignore it or not. For example, in 
EnergyEX, when the project management team became aware that there will be an 
imminent risk to contaminate the water, they first checked if the risk is real, but also 
what the agreement with regulatory authorities said, to understand the extent to which 
they were compelled to prevent this risk, and whether it was possible, instead, to 
assume the possible consequences of an eventual contamination. After this preliminary 
analysis, the condition for the episode to continue is that actors agree with the existence 
of a real complex tension in the network of connections between them, which needs to 
be solved. 
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Phase 4 Loo king for ways to build or rejine visible connections 
This phase is, again, encountered in ail episodes we studied. Once the conflict is 
understood, actors start looking for solutions, to build new explicit representations or 
configurations of regularized interests or to ad just existing ones, in a way that would 
both solve the initial conflict, but also would not interfere with the existing network of 
connections. In other words, the new connections have to be harmoniously integrated 
into the existing configuration. For example, redefining areas of responsibilities in 
InfraR had to take into account existing agreements and roles, but also actors' desires 
and capabilities. Sometimes, the solution is not that obvious, so sorne episodes go to 
the next phase . . . 
Phase 5 Going beyond the initial conjlict 
More complex conflicts require special solutions. They might have consequences 
beyond the immediate area or actors considered initially, and irradiate to other parts of 
the project- especially for interconnected sub-projects- or affect actors that are not 
involved directly in the conflict. This phase could only be found in complex episodes. 
For example, very expensive solutions, such as building an isolating wall using a 
special method in InfraST, appeared to require a significant budget increase, which had 
to be approved by the project sponsors. Similarly, implementing ideas that were not in 
the initial plan, such as a solar system on the roof top of the railway station built in the 
same InfraST, requires the cooptation of new sponsors or supporters. Sorne other times, 
rebuilding connections might require attracting external experts to help find a solution 
or even new actors to help with implementation, or even bringing on board new 
stakeholders that are affected by the implementation and have to accept it. For example, 
when sediments polluted the river where EnergyH was building its hydro-electric plant, 
their impact on the project construction was negligible, but two municipalities in the 
neighborhood were in danger of losing access to potable water for severa! weeks, as 
the river was their main source. Not only that the two local communities had to be 
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(re)aligned, but another actor was brought on board, to build a new water treatment 
facility for these comrnunities and ensure their uninterrupted access to potable water. 
Phase 6 New input in the project social arena 
This is another "optional" phase, as not all episodes go through it. The impulse is 
related or at least generated like a side effect by the main conflict. It could take two 
main forms: an additional conflict or actor ' s manifestation of his or her interest that 
joins and deepens the initial conflict; or an additional conflict generated by the 
resolution of the initial conflict, in other words, the solution does not harmoniously 
integrate in the existing configuration of connections. For the former case, the 
additional actor that joins the 'episode ', one exan1ple cornes from EnergyH. The 
unexpected river bed shape demanded an innovative solution. External experts were 
involved and the main contractor assumed a more impotiant role and had its agreement 
renegotiated. Although not directly involved in the issue, one contractor took advantage 
of the "open black box" and also demanded a renegotiation of its agreement. One 
example for the latter, additional actors involved or affected by the solution prepared 
to solve the initial conflict, is how the project management team in PharmaS dealt with 
the results of certain tests. In one country, they discovered that one ethnie group reacts 
different! y to the drug, so they had to connect not only with that group of patients, but 
also with the national health authorities from that country, as well as with the 
management of the parent organization, since the project could have faced premature 
closure. Somewhere in between voluntary unexpected involvement and collateral 
victim of the episode is the case of the client in DigitS . As the prototype technical 
solution failed when attempted to be implemented on international sites, delays were 
accumulating, so the project client started to put pressure on the team to speed up and 
solve the technical incompatibilities faster. 
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Phase 7 Consequences for the future 
Another optional phase, although most episodes go through it, at least in a very 
informai way, regards situated learning. This takes place mostly at the cognitive level 
and involves reflecting, analyzing, learning and sharing. For instance, in projects 
DigitBIS and DigitA, technical teams set up a database with solutions for the various 
technical problems encountered, so that other members of the team could benefit from 
that even during that same project. In EnergyEX and TerminaiS, the project 
management was careful to address the deeper cause of sorne of the conflicts they had 
in the first phase of the project and avoid similar connections in the second phase. 
Phase 8 New visible elements in place 
Another mandatory phase occurs when new visible cognitive and volitional 
connections are formed or existing ones modified. New explicit representations and 
regularized interests reshape the project configuration of relations. Most of the time the 
visible elements are closely connected to the hidden elements that generated the 
conflict, but sometimes additional visible elements are refined to either strengthen the 
effect of the episode or simply unintentionally . For example, when the project 
management team ofPharmaS learned about potential kidney toxicity of the drug, team 
members first tried to find a solution to solve it, but as the risk seemed real and 
unreasonably high, they decided to close the project. At that point, very different visible 
elements had to be built - those associated with project closure. In general, failing to 
build appropriate visible elements, might eventually repeat the initial conflict and the 
whole episode. For instance, in the DigitS project, the strategie but completely 
unrealistic initial plan, had to be saon revised, but because of extremely high pressures 
from bath the parent organization and its client, who would use the system, the initial 
conflict was only partly solved. This later led to two additional, yet similar conflicts 
and therefore to new transformations. 
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Phase 9 Going back behind the stage 
Most of the episode takes place in the social arena, but it fully ends only by going back 
in the hidden strata. As explained above, the new interest or representation has to be 
accepted by actors and also to become compatible with the existing configuration of 
connections. If not full y compatible, the solution might be rejected immediately or, if 
the conflict is more subtle, it could lead to accumulation of tensions and later generate 
a full episode. For example, in project DigitPTIS, the resolution ofthe episode triggered 
by technical incompatibilities between deliveries of the two main contractors left one 
of the contractors unsatisfied. Tensions accumulated and eventually led to a new 
episode, a major conflict between diverging interests of this contractor and the project 
management team. 
Phase 10 New hidden elements developed 
The ultimate result of the episode is to develop new implicit representations that solve 
the initial conflict and 1 or spontaneous interests that are realigned. 
By observing episodes going through sequences of translations, phases and obligatory 
steps, we were able to identify eight patterns of episodes, four for each main type of 
triggering event. Each pattern starting in the stratum of implicit representations has a 
matching pattern that starts in the stratum of spontaneous interests, with a similar logic 
of development. We could say that we actually have four pairs of matching patterns. In 
the following section we present these patterns. 
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7.3 Patterns of Structuring Episodes 
As explained, we identified 4 parrs of matching patterns of structuring episodes: 
progressive enrichrnent, bouncing resolution, open-box attraction and contagious 
development. In order to distinguish between these patterns, we proposed two 
additional measures, namely episode depth and breadth. The episode depth accounts 
for the number of relational strata which the episodes affects, sorne episodes being 
limited to two strata - the conflict and its resolution stays within the same type of 
connections, cognitive or volitional, respectively- while sorne others involving all four 
types of connections. The other measure is the episode breadth, which accounts for the 
number of actors in the network or of issues beyond the initial local conflicting area 
that are touched by the episode. In simpler cases, only one conflict occurs and is solved, 
while in others the initial collision generates additional collisions and or attracts 
additional actors in the conflict. 
Progressive enrichment 
This pattern usually involves a simple, straightforward episode, with a minimum of 
iterations and no additional actors involved or affected (see Figure 7.1.a and 7.1.b). 
The episode unfolds in two strata, either the two cognitive or the two volitional strata. 
lt is the result of either colliding representations or conflicting interests of two actors 
or of discrepancies between initial projection of the future plan and the later reality. 
The only part of the episode that could vary significantly is the formation of new visible 
elements. Thus, it is usually shorter for simple re-attachrnent or re-conceptualization; 
it could have a medium length, if it involves a double re-conceptualization or re-
attaching, specifically when not only the corresponding visible elements are discussed 
and modified, but also sorne additional elements; and it could be longer, when actors 
also think about the future and elaborate procedures that would be used in subsequent 
phases or other subprojects. 
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This pattern was particularly encountered in the form of colliding implicit 
representations, we identified no less than 15 such occurrences. For example, in 
TerminaiS, in the initial design, architects proposed to incorporate a part of the old 
wood from a WWII hangar that was being demolished. The plan was built around re-
using this wood, after it is refinished. But this representation of the project team came 
in conflict with the reality of the project context. The work supposed to be done at a 
local mill , but no mill in the area was properly equipped to work with bean1s of that 
size. One option briefly considered was to send them to British Columbia and then 
return them, but the cost was prohibitive. They eventually found a mill in the New York 
State that was prepared to sand down the beams. However, following negotiations with 
the owner of the mill , the project team was warned that the wood would be subject to 
the Softwood Lumber Trade agreement between Canada and the US, because it was 
eut less than 100 years ago. Therefore, they realized that the time required to obtain the 
necessary approvals was unrealistic, given the project schedule. In the end, the project 
team decided to reuse wood only for architectural elements, and to buy new wood for 
structural elements. The unused wood pieces were offered for sale. 
We can notice here that after the initial collision, the actors move the discussions in the 
project social arena and revisit the explicit elements put in place, in this case the 
solutions to re-use the old fir beams. Giving the circumstances, they consider severa! 
options to solve the collision, but the clear legislation and time limitations make them 
adopta different approach. They end up ' re-conceptualizing' or changing the existing 
explicit representations to adapt to the new reality, more precisely they elaborate a new 
plan regarding the structural wood elements in the new terminal. The new explicit 
element (the new plan) is then shared with the actors involved and correspondently 
' routinized' to become the new guiding connecting element. Eventually, actors develop 
implicit representations regarding the new use of the old bean1s and the use of new 
structural elements. 
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Figure 7.l.a Exampl e of a progressive enrichment pattern - generated in the impli ci t 
representati ons stratum 
F igure 7.l.b Exampl e of a progress ive enrichment pattern - generated In the 
spontaneo us interests stratum 
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Bouncing resolution 
The core characteristic of this pattern is that the first explicit representations or 
regularized interests created or modified are rejected by the existing network of 
connections, so the routinization or acceptance part of the episode fails (see Figure 7.2). 
This is usually because they do not fully solve the initial conflict or because are 
incompatible with other connections in the network, like unintended consequences in 
Giddens' terms (Giddens, 1984). As a consequence, the episode returns in the social 
arena and actors look for new solutions and refine the just-built visible elements. The 
iteration creation-rejection-refinement could happen severa! times, like in a trial-and-
error exercise, before an appropriate resolution is found . 
For example, the initial plan of project InfraR was particularly optimistic in terms of 
budget, time and human resources needed to complete the project. New reflection and 
comparisons with other similar projects show that the budget needs to be significantly 
increase and the deadline postponed with two years. The collision between 
expectations and reality proved significant enough to involve a major re-planning 
exercise. In this circumstances, the project management team brings the collision into 
the project social arena and aims to elaborate a new, more realistic plan, so a new 
explicit representation. They start by questioning the existing explicit representations 
directly related to the collision, such as those related to the budget, human resource and 
timeline. A complex analysis and negotiation process follows. The project team 
manages to propose a new plan, but the 'routinization' process fails due to additional 
conflicts with the reality - delays in obtaining permits accumulate and more time is 
needed to complete the project. Moreover, the project organizational structure seem to 
be no longer appropriate for the new size of the team and the new deadline, and so 
generates new cognitive collisions that invite a re-evaluation ofthese additional explicit 
representations. A new plan is generated and implicit representations are built 
according to this. 
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Figure 7.2 Exampl e of a bounc ing reso lu t ion pattern - generated m the impli c it 
representations stratum 
Open-box attraction 
T hi s pattern supposes the vo lunta ry invo lvement of additi onal actors (see Figure 7.3) . 
Once the bl ack-box is open and the episode moves into the explicit arena, additi onal 
actors express the ir own inte rests or become aware of the ir own representati ons of the 
proj ect that (a lso) come in conflict w ith some of the ex istin g e lements. Inputs come in 
the fo rm of additi onal and unasked fo r inputs to reconceptualizati on or re-attaching. 
The reason behind these pattern is that actors e ither have the ir own issues that they 
wa nt to so lve and take advantage of the open box, or they want to see the epi sode 
unfo lding in a certa in way and so try to push for a specifie so lution or s imply for a fas t 
reso luti on. 
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The project DigitMIS aimed to introduce a new information system to help the 
operations of a large European pharmaceutical company. As it is often the case with 
change projects, employees were reluctant to adopt the new system, particularly 
criticizing it for promoting a very strict evaluation of their work hours, which was 
considered incompatible to the nature of work - research. The divergent spontaneous 
interests manifested frequently with a wide range of departments opposing the change. 
The moved the issue in the project social arena by demanding a re-evaluation of the 
newly proposed regularized elements (the scope of the MIS project). The project team 
attempted to ' attach' or ' re-attach' departments with divergent interests, but with 
limited success. An additional actor stepped in, the senior management of the company, 
who had a clear interest in implementing the project and tried, via a combination of 
better explaining the final goal and pressuring department heads to force ' acceptance ' . 
While this intervention reached a certain level of interest alignment, a majority of 
employees were still not convinced with the new changes. Eventually, the financial 
department realized the advantages for their work in having such MIS, so voluntarily 
stepped in to help increase the acceptance of project goals by the regular employees. 
The combining effort of these actors that intervened in different moments eventually 
led to a full acceptance and alignment of spontaneous interests between different 
departments, the project team and the management team. 
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Figure 7.3 Example of an open-box attract ion pattern - generated In the implicit 
representations stratum 
Contagious development 
Thi s pattern represents the most comp lex type of episode, wh ich goes through multiple 
iterations, in a li fo ur strata , and usually involves multipl e acto rs (see Figure 7.4 .a and 
7.4.b). Additional acto rs are usua lly affected , and not onl y those producing the epi sode. 
Often , this could take the form of externa l acto rs invited to join for their expert ise. 
However, s im ply using externa l experts does not create an ep isode. T he transformation 
becomes major onl y ifthese experts have particular requirements or when the attachin g 
of additi onal contractors redefines the configuration of the rest of the network. 
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Figure 7.4.a Exampl e of a contagious development pattern - generated in the implicit 
representati ons stratum 
Figure 7.4.b Example of a contagious development patte rn - generated 1n the 
spontaneous interests stratum 
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For example, the project InfraR was building a railroad that would cross a protected 
area. The project management team recognized the issue and tried to find alternative 
routes, but all of them proved non-feasible economically. The regulatory authorities 
delayed approvals until certain conditions were met, but eventually agreed with the 
project. However, environmentalist groups were still protesting, so the project 
management team invite them for consultations and discussions. In the light of our 
framework, we can say that the environmentalists positioned themselves related to the 
project and the project team moved the issue in the social arena and attempted to (re-
)attach them. The connections between them were revisited and severa! rounds of 
negotiations were unsuccessfully carried on. Eventually, all attempts to align them 
failed . Not having enough power to impose their interests, environmentalists involved 
the juridical power and took the matter to the Court - this could be considered as a 
second positioning. The Court agrees and oblige the project to rebuild the protected 
area. This moves the matter into the cognitive arena, where explicit and implicit 
representations about the project become involved. The plan needs to be changed, new 
activities introduced (the rebuilding of the area), additional actors with their own 
implicit representations and spontaneous interests are involved, namely the experts to 
advise the rebuilt and the contractor that would execute it. The initial proposai is 
rejected by the Court, so new reconceptualization and re-attachment activities are 
needed. The second proposai is accepted by both the Court and environmentalist groups 
and the subsequent acceptance is successful. We can notice in this project a frequent 
move between strata, following reluctance of acceptance from environmentalists and 
later the Court, but also due to the severa! proposai that had to be done before 
spontaneous interests are finally aligned and new implicit representations built. 
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7.4 Failed episodes 
First, we need to mention that by failed episodes, we understand those episodes that 
could not be completed, as a process, for different reasons explained below, which 
usually resulting in actors becoming stuck at a certain step (or necessary translation) 
during their development. We do not discuss the appropriateness of transformation. As 
a matter of fact, episodes that did not address the real conflicts that generated them or 
that did not find or implement proper connections to solve those conflicts will often 
lead to other, similar episodes, building up to a cumulative effect. This latter kind of 
collapse or nonfulfillment will be discussed in the last section of this chapter, when we 
raise to the project level and focus on the relationship between episodes. 
In order to be considered a structuring episode, an episode has to go through all the 
obligatory phases otherwise either there is no re-structuring or this is not accepted by 
the actors involved. If at any steps fails , it has to either go through an additional 
iteration or even start over. 
We identified severa! reasons for which episodes failed: actors fail to impose them on 
the project public agenda, external actors intervene successfully to block the 
restructuring, no major change occurs but only small adjustments in the style of a 
translation, and the solution implementation fails. 
The most comrnon case of failure is the situation in which episodes do not have the 
chance to start, or in other words, actors do not manage to move them into the project 
social arena. This was the case in InfraST. The two main partners decided to develop 
the project as two autonomous, although interrelated projects. When one actor 
experienced delays in its activities, the partner' s interrelated project was affected, but 
had no other choice than adapt. This situation occurred severa! times during the project 
lifecycle and sometimes the effect was significant, but none of the partners took the 
-- -- - - - -
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initiative to move it to the social arena and propose to revisit the existing connections, 
accepting the status quo. 
Sometimes actors fail in their attempt to manifest their interests strongly enough for 
them to be taken into the social arena. Alternatively, we can say that the regularized 
element held and the actor had no realleverages to impose its positioning. For example, 
in project EnergyEX, after significant changes in role, activities and connections with 
other actors, the main contractor demanded renegotiation of the existing agreement. 
The project manager refused to discuss, referring to the regularized elements in place, 
sorne freshly updated after the major restructuring we mentioned above. 
In the other stratum, failing to convince actors to thematize has similar results. We 
already gave the example with architects refusing thematization in the first instance in 
InfraST. However, the project manager convinced them to thematize in the second 
attempt. We found another thematization in two steps in EnergyEX, when the project 
team initially hoped to be able to ignore the water contamination risk, only taking it 
into consideration after initial analyses that proved it real. In another example we 
already gave, the project management team ofDigitBIS initially rejected the marketing 
team's attempt to position and only accepted to "start the episode" when the higher 
management from the parent organization intervened and obliged them to do so. 
Sometimes, external actors manage to intervene successfully and on time. This is the 
case when, for example, budget increases are approved with no or few conditions by 
the sponsor, such as in EnergyEX, aU IT/IS projects and partly in EnergyEX, EnergyH 
and InfraST. In these cases, the project configuration of connections remained stable 
and no major alterations of the explicit representations or regularized interests were 
necessary any longer. For example, projects DigitBIS and DigitPTIS had a priority 
status within their parent organizations and so managed to attract the best resources 
and in the amount required. 
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In other cases, the con:flict either looked more significant at the beginning than it 
actually was, such as the technical incompatibilities in EnergyEX (see the quote we 
provided above), or the existing structure of relations managed to solve it at the very 
last minute, such as the conflict between severa! teams of contractors in TerminalL. 
Although tensions accumulated and it looked like they would end up in court, the 
intervention of the partnering consultant clarified the roles of each team and instead of 
major restructurings, only sorne project leaders of contractors ' teams were removed 
and the project could continue smoothly. 
Finally, if the change fails to be implemented, then there is no episode. In InfraR, the 
project leader took into consideration one last major revision of the project plan, but 
although the process started and the plan was ready to be altered, the leader realized 
that they might still manage to finish the project in the initial conditions, so cancelled 
the "episode". The only serious impact was at the psychological level, as people felt 
the pressure back on their shoulders: 
"And to unleash the ha nd from 20 Il and get it back to 2010, that was difficult 
.. . issue, be cause psychologically, people when you have given them another 
year, and taking away that year from them, aga in, that is not easy. ( .. .) they 
had the pressure liftedfrom them, but now we get back the pressure again. And 
we had to tell them over and over and over again: 'it's 2010 that is final date, 
forget 2011! ' " (Interviewee 2, InfraR) 
7.5 Projects as Sequences of Structuring Episodes 
During our interplay between data and emerging concepts, we noticed that sorne 
episodes neglected the real conflicts that generated them or insufficiently reconfigured 
the network of connections. This led to other episodes and in sorne cases we even 
observed a cumulative effect, meaning certain connections were reset on! y after severa! 
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similar challenges. These observations inspired us the concept of sequences of 
structuring episodes, and a perspective that understands project evolution through the 
lenses of structuring episodes. 
For instance, we observed the cumulative effect in the InfraR project, with episodes 3, 
4 and 5. First, contractors in one subproject organized their activities in a way and a 
pace for their convenience, rather than what other participants in the project expected 
from them. This way, they accumulated delays and provided low-quality deliveries . 
Contractors in charge of interrelated work packages responded in a similar way, and 
the whole subproject was seriously affected. The project management team stepped in 
to realign them, but contractors were blaming each other and no clear responsibility 
could be attributed. When revisiting existing agreements, the project manager 
discovered that many details were ambiguous and they had no realleverages to realign 
them. The conflict was solved locally and the agreement remained the same. In a 
different subproject, the blasting contractor also behaved opportunistically and, trying 
to save money and effort, was using low-quality explosive, in a lower quantity than 
necessary, and inappropriate procedures. This led to high safety risks on the site, since 
many explosive packages did not explode and could have blasted anytime. In what we 
called the fourth structuring episode, the project manager succeeded in realigning the 
contractor, making him change his approach. Finally, the fifth episode was triggered 
by the dishonest behavior of certain contractors who adopted a very loose stance with 
regard to control and expenses. Again, the project management intervened and 
realigned them, but, as in the other two cases, it could only prevent them from further 
manifesting divergent interests in the future , but could not make them accountable for 
the past events. However, this time, the project manager decided to go to the deeper 
source of the conflict and change the connecting paradigm toward clearer details, more 
control and levers to use to make contractors accountable for similar aberrant behavior. 
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In other projects, episodes that did not solve the initial conflict properly allowed other 
similar episodes to occur later in the project. For example, the conflict between the two 
main contractors in the DigitPTIS project was not solved to the full satisfaction of one 
of the contractors, and this generated another episode, this time with a buge conflict 
between this contracter and the project management team. Similarly, colliding 
representations regarding a technical solution in InfraST were solved only partially in 
the first instance, by finding an innovative solution to the conflict. However, the 
solution was not fully compatible with the existing network of connections, and this 
led to another episode when the time came to implement the new solution. 
Somewhat related with the cases presented above, we also observed 'repetitive ' 
episodes or similar unrelated episodes. In each case, the project management focused 
on addressing the event rather than the type of the conflict. We did not observe a 
cumulative effect and neither these episodes influenced each other directly, but a more 
global solution might have helped avoiding other similar episodes. We relate this with 
the idea of learning in projects that we discussed in a previous section. Such is the case 
in EnergyEX with three unrelated cases in which three different contractors delivered 
inappropriate-quality parts. 
One final observation that inspired the project-as-a-sequence-of-structuring-episodes 
perspective was with projects in which ali or most episodes happened to correct only 
one major conflict, in this sense looking like a tmitary picture, like the project existed 
(also) to adjust one unique issue. Projects EnergyH, DigitPTIS and DigitS are great 
examples of such cases. For instance, in DigitS, ali episodes occurred as a result of the 
big discrepancies between the project director' s representation of the future project and 
reality. Having a clear strategie motivation to attract the client in any conditions and 
then develop a long-term relation, the project director proposed a project with very 
unrealistic characteristics, especially with regard to the schedule. The first episode 
attempted to fix this initial conflict and move the project from a strategie perspective 
201 
to one closer to reality and so a compromise solution was found. But this was nothing 
more than a compromise, the final implicit representations created were not fully 
compatible with reality either. In consequence, the second episode occur, to solve the 
compromised solution at the technicallevel (and also additional translations for smaller 
incompatibilities). The third and the fifth episodes were other attempts to further lower 
the initial discrepancy that could not be solved by the compromise solution from the 
first episode. The fourth episode also came as a consequence of that initial strategie 
plan. 
In conclusion, new episodes will occur when the stabilization phase of previous 
episodes is not done properly and the solution does not solve the conflict, does not 
solve the deep roots or the real motives of the conflict, or it solves it but creates new 
conflicts due to its incompatibility with the existing configuration of cognitive or 
volitional connections. 
CONCLUSION 
Our academie journey finally came to an end. In this chapter, we briefly review the 
main findings of this thesis and present sorne final observations and conclusions. We 
further explain the importance of our topic and highlight contributions to both theory 
and practice. We end with the limitations of our thesis, which we see as opportunities 
for future research. 
Thesis summary 
The goal of our thesis was to explain how projects evolve during their lifecycle. 
Inspired by previous theories, we distinguish between stable and active change periods 
and develop two sets of concepts to explain transformation in each of these periods. 
For stable periods, we proposed the concept of translations, or the unidirectional 
transition within or between strata, that enabled us to show how the project network 
configuration of cognitive and volitional connections integrates a multitude of small 
collisions or divergent impulses. 
We also suggested that, at times, the ability of this structure to maintain stability is 
temporarily overcome by triggering events that require more significant 
transformations. We answer our third research question in Chapter 6, by elaborating a 
typology of triggering events and discussing their influence over projects. We called 
the moments of active change that these events generate structuring episodes and saw 
them as collections of multiple translations that develop in a coherent manner. 
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Depending on the translations involved and the number of iterations, we distinguish 
between four pairs of matching patterns of episode unfolding, namely progressive 
enrichment, bouncing resolution, open-box attraction and contagious development. 
This helps us addressing the first research question, by offering an initial understanding 
of the new concept we proposed - structuring episodes. 
The usefulness of our initial distinction between volition-representation and tacit-
explicit is supported by our results, suggesting that it enables us to make refined 
qualitative distinctions between various episode patterns and to uncover other 
interesting aspects of the nature of project organizations and processes. This element, 
along with the concepts of translation and structuring episodes provide an answer to 
our third research question that aimed to understand how the project structure evolves 
over time. 
During our analyses, we observed a relationship between certain episodes. Since the 
episode does not end with a perfect solution to the conflict that generated it, but just 
with a functional one, when this is not appropriate or compatible with other existing 
connections, generates other episodes (see also Garud and Karnoe, 2003). This 
eventually inspired us the idea of projects as a sequence of structuring episodes, as a 
series of transformations, which should also be seen as an attempt to answer the fourth 
research question. 
Structuring episodes often have an impact that goes beyond the area which directly 
affected. Sometimes cognitive or volitional connections change at the leve! of the 
whole project, not just locally, such as the contracting approach in InfraR after 
cumulative episodes painting out toward a more profound conflict in this sense. lt was 
also the case in DigitA, EnergyEX or DigitPTIS, in ali cases their perspective of 
connecting to other participants changing beyond specifie people or contractors. We 
also observed an impact at the organization level, such as in DigitA, where the parent 
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organization changed the procedure of developing future projects; at the industry level, 
for example in EnergyH, where the contractor produced an innovative technical 
solution to solve a specifie conflict; or even at the political leve!, such as in lnfraST, 
whose initial "megalomaniac" design helped local opposition to win elections and 
come to power. 
Our notions of translation and patterns of episodes have sorne correspondence in 
previous research (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988; Laughlin, 1991). For example, 
Greenwood and Hinings (1988) discuss four tracks of strategie change, distinguishing 
between inertia, aborted excursions, reorientations, and unresolved excursions. As the 
name suggests, the first two involve no change or failed attempt to change, respective! y, 
which are not covered in our study. However, the forth type suggest that change 
happens, but the eventual re-coupling fails, something similar to our finding about 
failed episodes and corrective episodes that are needed to solve the partial equilibrium 
reached after initial related episodes. The third type of change suggested by the above 
mentioned authors further distinguish between linear progression, oscillations and 
delayed. The first two types have certain similarities to our progressive enrichrnent and 
bouncing resolution patterns, while the delayed idea is included in our view of repeated 
sequence of phases within an episode. 
Contributions for theory and practice 
With this thesis, we aimed to make severa! contributions for both theory and practice. 
We first contribute to the field of project management. We focused on large, complex 
interorganizational projects that are very weil known for finishing over budget and with 
serious delays. Despite the significant effort to minimize such risks, unexpected events 
still occur and the impact is still disastrous. We hope that our new perspective would 
have a valuable contribution to the topic by drawing attention to the actual reasons for 
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which events occur. Moreover, by relating episodes and discovering a certain causality 
between them, we hope to help project managers avoid incomplete resolutions of 
episodes. By more carefully examining the episode unfolding as well as its deep roots, 
they could avoid future similar perturbances. 
By distinguishing between hidden and visible elements of the project structure, we also 
draw attention to the more unstable and fragile structures of temporary organizations 
(as opposed to perennial organizations), since sorne parts (for instance implicit 
representations) are only defined later during project development. This also suggests 
that a very different logic of change applies to organizations and projects and so 
contributes to recent caUs in the field for developing a more specifie theory for project 
management. 
In more general terms, the concept of episodes enables us to advance a more dynamic 
approach to project management, which sees the project as a series of transformations, 
a series of structuring episodes. Rather than focusing on controlling and punishing 
deviations from the initial plans, project management becomes steering the sequence 
of structuring episodes and the transformations that occur in each episode 
Results reported in this thesis also contribute to the process v1ew of project 
organizations, and of organizations in general. At one level, the punctuated equilibrium 
model that we adopted to describe the evolution of the project organization, and from 
which the focus on structuring episodes emerged, aims to supersede the teleological, 
deviation-controlling view of this evolution implicit in the project management field 
(Floricel and Piperca, 20 16). Instead, these results encourage us to argue, that project 
organizations combine periods of more controlled yet continuous and not totally goal-
directed unfolding with more turbulent periods of revolutionary change. Our results 
regarding their overall evolution suggest that project organizations go through severa! 
major restructuring over the entire project lifecycle. Possibly, each of these episodes 
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brings the organization to a higher qualitative leve! with regard to the internai 
complexity of its network of relations, and hence of its ability to address environmental 
demands and other unexpected developments. Our empirically grounded theorizing of 
triggering events and of dynamic patterns within episodes shed light on the conditions 
and mechanisms (or internai logics) that produce the non-linear dynamics of such 
revolutionary changes (Dooley and Van de Ven, 1999; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). 
But even more importantly, our theory and empirical research into the nature of 
relations that form and maintain the project organization, and our grounded theorizing 
of the translations that accommodate fluctuations without triggering episodes pro vide 
support for a view of project organizations aligned with the 'process ontologies' for 
which events and processes are the essential constituents of our world. (Hernes, 2007). 
In particular, our results support arguments by scholars such as Tsoukas and Chia 
(2002) that continuai becoming is the normal state of an organization, and that it 
requires constant interactions to maintain and reweave sorne events into its underlying 
tissue of processes. Renee, even in periods of controlled unfolding, the constant 
jockeying and translation (in the ANT sense) of actors' will , together with the constant 
drift and readjustment of implicit representations and tacit routines, as well as the one-
step, unidirectional shifts from implicit to explicit strata, are all part of the continuous 
reweaving of project organizations. 
Our study also makes a contribution to the practice view on project management and 
on organizations in general, although we deliberately avoided associating this study 
with the practice literature because we started with a theoretical framework that is not 
a standard one in practice research, because our main interest was in more inclusive 
patterns and because we lacked the kind of observational data that are typical for 
practice research. But our results can also be interpreted as suggesting, for example, 
that the structuring episode is a concatenation of concrete local activities, sorne of 
which are inspired by accepted practice in the parent organization or in the broader 
organizational field, while others are the result of ad-hoc problem solving and 
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interactions. These practices build or reweave relations between participants and are 
intertwined with material abjects that preexist or are being made in the course of the 
project. In particular, the translations that we identified can be a source of inspiration 
for practice studies, as each reveal, for example, the approaches that practitioners use 
to stimulate recognition of an issue and bring it into the public arena in ways that do 
not stail the project. Transitions towards the outer strata in our framework, may reveal, 
in turn, how practitioners use abjects, notably representations on external supports, or 
surveillance systems that help regularize actors volition, in order to recreate and 
maintain the network of relations in a project organization. Further research using a 
practice perspective can attempt to study these practices using a more micro and 
observational lens. On a broader level, our study can help bridge the gap between the 
more philosophically grounded and overall pattern-oriented process view of 
organizations and the practice view, with its more eclectic and closer perspective that 
attempts to isolate actions that weave the social tissue in order to understand their 
nature. 
Limitations of current study and ideas for future research 
The current study has certain limitations that come from the novelty of the idea under 
study, methodological approach, limited access to data, and scarcity of resources that 
could be employed. These are ail related to sorne extent and hopefully future studies 
will help address at least sorne of these limitations. As explained in the methodology 
chapter (see subchapter 3.4 Quality concerns), we tried to manage sorne of these 
limitations by ensuring a high-quality level of data collection and analysis process. 
Despite our effort, sorne concerns remained. 
The novelty of the idea required an exploratory study, which provided clear benefits, 
but also offered only a narrow understanding of the phenomenon. We focused on 
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explaining what type of events generate structuring episodes and how these episodes 
look, but more needs to be done regarding the effect of these episodes at the project 
level. The projects-as-sequence-of-structuring-episodes idea seems exciting and 
promising, but our study merely proposed the concept and offered only a lirnited 
analysis. Future studies could focus on this topic as their primary concern and unveil 
other key elements of project evolution. 
Similarly, the failed episode idea only emerged in the later stages of the analysis, so 
our proposed explanations are very limited and should be seen more like an attempt to 
open the discussions on this topic. Future research could look into more detail at the 
differences between seemingly similar events that generate or not episodes and why 
this happens, as well as at the other causes that could occur during episode 
development. 
A particular concem were episodes that were less-well documented and cases where 
only one interviewee was available for discussions . Regarding the episodes, we simply 
dropped most of those that had an insufficient level of details, because they could not 
provide an adequate level of quality of information to be used in the analysis. 
Moreover, not being mentioned by more than one respondent or not being discussed in 
depth during the interview could also mean that those episodes were considered to lead 
to less significant transformations in those respective projects. On the other hand, the 
cases with one interviewee were all kept in the final analysis and this could be one of 
the limitations of our research that should be addressed in a future study. We were 
aware of this concem and treated these cases with precautions, for example by only 
using them to corroborate and test the patterns generated following the analyses of 
"detail-rich" episodes and cases (as explained in the methodology section - Chapter 3 
of the current thesis). The decision to include these cases allowed us to analyze an extra 
sector (bio-pharmaceuticals), but also to look into the only two failed projects from our 
sample (PharmaS and EnergyTP). 
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Another related issue was the tmbalanced representation of the three sectors in our 
sample. Although sorne IT/IS projects are very well documented and provided 
extremely useful insights, the infrastructure/construction type of projects dominated. 
At the pattern level we did not observe a preference for certain types of episodes in any 
of the industries, but we acknowledged this limitation and refrained from going into 
detail with regards to cross-industry comparisons (apart from triggering event 
discussion - see Chapter 6). This is another, associated limitation of our study. 
In light of these observations, we propose that future research should look in more 
depth into the IS/IT, but particularly the bio-pharmaceutical sectors and improve the 
understanding of structuring episodes and their triggering events. This will also allow 
comparisons between knowledge sectors and potentially highlight particularities of 
each knowledge culture. At a broader level, a future quantitative study could help 
generalizing sorne of the se findings. 
Finally, future research could also use the 4-stratum framework and/or the structuring 
episode concept and apply it in different contexts and to different types of 
organizations. For example, different types of projects could be compared using these 
perspectives or other types of organizational processes could be analyzed using the 
proposed 4-stratum framework. 
APPENDIXA 
THE INTERVIEW GUIDE IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH 
Issues for discussion 
A. Planning 
1. Please briefly describe the context and the intended output (artifact, process, 
system, technology) of this project. Where did the project idea originate and 
how was it defined? 
2. How the project was initially structured in terms of scope, team members, 
participants, schedule, budget, supervision, con tracts etc.? How was this 
structure developed? 
3. What were the major uncertainties that you deemed capable of affecting the 
success of the project? How did you plan to resolve these uncertainties? 
B. Execution 
4. Please describe the activities realized during the project in terms of major 
phases, participants, milestones etc. How did the project scope evolve during 
these activities? 
5. How did the project organization grow and evolve during these activities? 
Please discuss the difference between initial plans and the actual organization 
during the peak of activity. 
6. Please describe the patterns of collaboration between project participants. 
How did they help each other? What were the contents, channels, and pace of 
their communications? 
7. Please describe the typical misunderstandings and conflicts that occurred 
during these activities . What were their sources? 
C. Flexibility 
8. What were the major unexpected events (negative or positive) that affected 
this project? How did you learn about them? 
9. What was the initial reaction of the project team to these events? How did 
these events impact the relations between various project participants? 
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1 O. What was the even tuai response of the project to these events? How was this 
response developed? What encouraged or obstructed the creativity of the 
project team? 
11 . How did you obtain the additional resources needed to react to these events? 
What helped or hampered your efforts to obtain these resources? 
12. What changes did you have to make to the organizational and contractual 
structure of the project in arder to respond to these events? What precluded 
your intended changes? 
13. What was the ultimate impact of these events on the project? 
D. Outcomes 
14. What did you learn from this project about preventing negative events and 
exploiting positive events? How did this leaming influence your project 
managementapproach? 
15. How would you characterize the project performance in terms of: 
a. budget and schedule? 
b. technical success? 
c. sales and financial return? 
d. strategie advances for your organization? 
Guide d'entrevue semi-dirigée 
La planification 
1. S'il vous plaît, décrivez-nous brièvement le contexte et l'output envisagé par ce 
projet (artefact, processus, système, technologie). D ' où provenait l'idée du projet d'origine et 
comment fut-elle définie? 
2. Comment le projet a été structuré en termes de responsabilités, de membres de 
l'équipe centrale, de participants externes, de calendrier, de budget, de supervision, de contrats, 
etc.? Comment cette structure a-t-elle été élaborée? 
3. Quelles sont les principales incertitudes qui vous pensiez susceptibles d'affecter la 
réussite du projet? Comment aviez-vous prévu de résoudre ces incertitudes? 
L'exécution 
4. Pouvez-vous décrire les activités réalisées au cours du projet en termes de grandes 
étapes et des participants? Comment l' envergure du projet a-t-elle évolué au cours de ces 
activités? 
5. Comment l'organisation du projet a évolué au cours de ces activités? Quelles sont 
les principales différences entre les plans initiaux et l'organisation réelle des activités? 
6. Pouvez-vous décrire les modes de collaboration entre les participants au projet. 
Comment se sont-ils aidés les uns les autres? Quels étaient les contenus, les moyens et le 
rythme de leurs communications? 
7. Quels types de malentendus et de conflits ont eu lieu au cours de ces activités? 
Quelles sont leurs sources typiques? 
La flexibilité 
8. Quels ont été les principaux événements inattendus (positifs ou négatifs) qui ont 
touché ce projet? Comment en avez-vous pris connaissance? 
9. Quelle a été la première réaction de l'équipe du projet à ces événements? Comment 
ces événements ont-ils influencé les relations entre les différents participants au projet? 
1 O. Quelle a été la réponse définitive du projet à ces événements? Comment cette 
réponse a-t-elle été développée? Qu'est-ce qui a encouragé ou, au contraire, fait obstacle à la 
créativité de l'équipe du projet? 
11. Comment avez-vous obtenu les ressources supplémentaires nécessaires pour 
réagir à ces événements? Qu'est-ce qui a facilité ou entravé les efforts visant à obtenir ces 
ressources? 
12. Quels changements avez-vous eu à faire à la structure organisationnelle et 
contractuelle du projet afin de répondre à ces événements? Qu'est-ce qui vous a freiné dans ces 
changements? 
13. Quel est l'impact final de ces événements sur le projet? 
Les résultats 
14. Qu'avez-vous appris de ce projet tant sur la prévention des événements négatifs 
que de l'exploitation des événements positifs? Comment cet apprentissage a influencé votre 
approche de la gestion de projet? 
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15. Comment caractérisiez-vous la performance des projets en termes de: 
a. respect du budget et des échéances? 
b. réussite technique? 
c. ventes et rentabilité financière? 
d. avancées stratégiques pour votre organisation? 
APPENDIXB 
THE REFINED INTERVIEW GUIDE- ENGLISH 
ISSUES FOR DISCUSSIONS 
A. Planning 
1. Please briefly describe the context in which the project idea emerged. Who 
proposed the project? What was its main justification? How did promoters 
draw support and co-opt other participants? 
2. Who were the main stakeholders that opposed the project? What were their 
arguments? What actions were carried out to overcome their resistance? 
3. How the project was initially structured in terms of scope, team members, 
participants, schedule, budget, supervision, contracts etc.? What was the role of 
your organization? 
B. Execution 
4. Please describe the activities realized during the project in terms of major 
phases, participants, milestones etc. 
5. What significant changes of the project initial plan occurred during these 
activities? Who promoted these changes? How were these changes 
accomplished? 
6. Please describe the patterns of collaboration between project participants. 
What were the typical misunderstandings and conflicts that occurred during 
these activities? What were their sources? 
7. What were the major unexpected events (negative or positive) that affected 
this project? How did you learn about them? 
C. Structuring - for each structuring episode 
8. What event or situation triggered the process of restructuring? What was the 
initial reaction of the proj ect team to this event? 
9. How did participants realize that organizational change was needed? 
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10. How was the eventual response developed? What alternative responses were 
taken into consideration? What encouraged or obstructed the creativity of the 
project team? 
11 . What analyses, deliberations and debates between participants occurred? 
What conflicts took place? How did the main actors change their position 
during this restructuring process? How eventual changes to the project 
organization and other elements were agreed and implemented? 
12. How were obtained the additional resources needed to implement these 
changes? What helped or hampered your efforts to obtain these resources? 
13. What was the ultimate impact ofthis change on the project and on the relations 
between various project participants? 
D. Outcomes 
14. How would you characterize the project performance in terms of budget and 
schedule? Technical success? Sales and financial return? Strategie advances for 
your organization? 
APPENDIXC 
LIST OF TRIGGERING EVENTS 
THA T LED TO STRUCTURING EPISODES 
NB: The events are sorted by project and presented in chronological order. 
Project InfraR 
1. Project management team' s optimistic initial representation regarding the 
project plan and the resources needed to reach the project goal 
2. Repeated misunderstandings re garding areas of responsibilities between the 
two partners 
3. Contractors' aberrant behavior leads to delays and low-quality deliveries. 
4. Blasting contractor cuts corners and generates work safety issues 
5. Dishonest behavior of sorne contractors regarding control issues 
6. Conflicting interests between project initiators and regulatory authorities 
regarding the railway route in one protected area 
7. Environmental activists, supported by the court, impose their demand to 
rebuild the protected area affected by the construction of the railway 
Project InfraST 
1. Conflicting interests regarding the project design between the local politicians 
2. Project designers ' inaccurate representation of project surroundings - the 
foundation position of a neighboring building 
3. The three partners dispute their representations of the project idea and 
sequence of activities 
4. The project planners underestimate the complexity of project surroundings -
solutions to isolate the metro station 
5. The project planners underestimate the complexity of project surroundings -
the construction of the freezing wall 
6. Project designers ' inaccurate representation of project surroundings - water 
leakage in the metro station and the pavement sinking 
7. Colliding representations regarding construction cost between project 
management team, architects and possible bidders 
8. One partner change the activity sequence for its part of the project to better 
suit its needs and interests 
9. Disliking the current design, one project manager proposes to implementa 
solar system in the railway station roof 
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Project InfraS 
1. In order to minimize the project impact on their activities, the association of 
local businesses ask for a dramatic compression of the project schedule 
2. Incompatibilities between outdated technologies and contemporaneous work 
routines 
3. One utility company suddenly decides to improve its pipelines infrastructure 
when the street was almost fully rehabilitated 
Project TerminalE 
1. External actors impose the ir will on the future proj ect design 
2. Conflicting interests between project team, environmental groups and 
governmental agencies regarding an existing river diversion 
3. The project client demands design changes to lower project cost 
4. The main airline using the airport demands major design changes to adapt to 
single terminal occupancy 
5. A new leader cornes with a different vision regarding project development 
6. One contracter requires design changes to accommodate his construction 
routines 
7. Misunderstandings re garding areas of responsibility between contractors 
8. Project management team' s inaccurate representation of the project costs and 
schedule - the construction of the second satellite building 
9. Designers ' inaccurate representation of the control tower design 
10. Contracter cuts corners so deliveries of inappropriate quality - auxiliary car 
park 
11. National and international legislation changes in terms of airport security 
12. The main airline requires last-minute changes of design and specifications 
13. Project planners' inaccurate initial representation of the project schedule 
14. Information system contracter' s inaccurate representations re garding baggage 
system operation 
Project TerminaiS 
1. National and international legislation changes in terms of airport security 
2. Information system contractor' s inaccurate representations regarding security 
system operation 
3. Project management team's underestimation of issues regarding reusing old 
fir beams 
4. Supplier do not follow the initial design and delivers boarding bridges with 
technical issues 
Project TerminaiL 
1. The main airline requires a major change of design to better fit its interests 
2. Regulatory authorities suddenly reverse their decision regarding passenger 
flow design 
3. The two main airlines using the airport mer ge and demand changes to 
accommodate their new needs 
4. National and international legislation changes in terms of airport security 
5. The main airline using the airport fills in for bankruptcy and cannot 
participate anymore in fitting its allocated space 
6. Main airline demands more involvement in one subproject - to have more 
influence re garding specifications of the hangar and conveyors it will use 
exclusive! y 
Project EnergyEX 
1. Construction manager consultant's errors in estimating project costs 
2. Supplier gain a contract too large for its capacities and therefore delivers 
valves of inappropriate quality 
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3. Supplier cuts corners in the manufacturing process and delivers metal rings of 
inappropriate quality 
4. Project planner's inaccurate representation ofwork force availability. 
5. Project planner's inaccurate representation ofproject surroundings- water 
contamination risk 
6. Supplier cuts corners in the manufacturing process and delivers pressure 
vessels of inappropriate quality 
Project EnergyTP 
1. The client reschedules interrelated project (first delays commencement date 
and then slow down construction 
2. The client demands major changes in technical specifications 
3. The client goes bankrupt and demands project closure and preservation 
Project EnergyH 
1. Project planner' s inaccurate representation of project surroundings -
unexpected river bed shape 
2. Project planner's inaccurate representation ofproject surroundings -
difficulties to dig the intake channel due to soil texture 
3. Project planner's inaccurate representation of project surroundings-
difficulties in vibro-compacting the base of the dam 
4. Conflicts unions - main contractor regarding work conditions and roles in the 
project 
5. Project planner's inaccurate representation ofproject surroundings-
difficulties to dig through a granite block 
6. Project planner' s inaccurate representation of project surroundings- one 
boulder detaches and falls on the construction site 
7. Project planner' s inaccurate representation of project surroundings -
sediments in the river 
Project DigitA 
1. Project planner inaccurate initial representation regarding human resource 
2. In arder to avoid future technical issues of compatibility, the project 
management decides to change the development platform 
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3. One team and its leader are perfectionists and delay the delivery oftheir work 
package 
4. Conflicting interests in assuming responsibilities between the project manager 
and technical coordinator 
5. Project planner inaccurate initial representation regarding schedule 
Project DigitS 
1. Strategie planning assumes an unrealistic schedule 
2. The prototype solution has major incompatibility issues when used in 
international sites 
3. Inaccurate initial representation of the project schedule 
4. The client requires prioritization of certain sites 
5. Inaccurate representation of the project schedule after the first re-planning 
Project DigitPTIS 
1. Major technical incompatibilities between deliveries of the two main suppliers 
2. Major conflicts between the project management and the main contractor' s 
project team 
3. The new leader imposes a completely new vision regarding project 
development 
4. One partner requires renegotiation of its agreement with the main contractor 
5. Project planner's inaccurate representation of the project schedule 
6. Project planner's inaccurate representation regarding the complexity of the 
payment mode technical specifications 
7. Technical issues with deliveries once the operations start 
Project DigitMIS 
1. Future users oppose to certain features of the new information system 
2. The project management team build a support coalition to convince reluctant 
departments 
3. Project planners' inaccurate representation of the project schedule and 
implementation complexity 
Project DigitBIS 
1. In arder to avoid future technical issues of compatibility, the project 
management decides to change the development platform 
2. The new IT function manager imposes her vision regarding the utility of a 
quality management process to be integrated in the project 
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3. One supplier delivers a software program with many technical issues and does 
not inform the project team 
4. One team from the marketing department attracts a new major client for the 
parent organization by promising access to the new IS for an unrealistic date 
5. Responsible teams ignore and avoid a specifie work package due toits 
difficulty 
6. Schedule coordinating issues with similar projects of other banks regarding 
the date of switching to a new technical standard, at the national leve! 
Project PharmaA 
1. The main stakeholder takes over the project from the initial development team 
2. Drug seems promising for treatment of other, related diseases 
3. Regula tory authorities delay drug approval 
4. Regulatory authorities delay approval of the change in the drug application 
method 
5. Colliding public communication protocols between the international te am and 
the initial development team 
Project PharmaB 
1. The parent company switches to a preservatives-free policy 
2. Inaccurate labels colors 
Project PharmaS 
1. Inaccurate initial representations regarding patients ' reaction to the drug in 
one country 
2. Inaccurate initial representations regarding kidney toxicity 
Project PharmaNA 
1. Inaccurate initial representation regarding the pool of volunteers that would fit 
the requirements for testing the drug 
2. Inaccurate representation regarding requirements for performing tests in one 
specifie country 
3. Inaccurate initial dose formulation 
4. The parent company sells a less-promising competing project 
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